Multi-outcomes construction policies by CRC Construction Innovation
 QUT Digital Repository:  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/26847
CRC for Construction Innovation (2009) Multi-outcomes construction policies. 
CRC for Construction Innovation, Brisbane.
 
 The Participants of the CRC for Construction Innovation have delegated authority 
to the CEO of the CRC to give Participants permission to publish material created 
by the CRC for Construction Innovation. This delegation is contained in Clause 30 
of the Agreement for the Establishment and Operation of the Cooperative Research 
Centre for Construction Innovation. The CEO of the CRC for Construction 
Innovation gives permission to the Queensland University of Technology to publish 
the papers/publications provided in the collection in QUT ePrints provided that the 
publications are published in full. Icon.Net Pty Ltd retains copyright to the 
publications. Any other usage is prohibited without the express permission of the 
CEO of the CRC. The CRC warrants that Icon.Net Pty Ltd holds copyright to all 
papers/reports/publications produced by the CRC for Construction Innovation.
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Final Report 
Multi-Outcomes Construction Policies 
 
 
Research Report No:  2006-036-A-01 
 
 
The Research describe in this report was carried out by: 
 
Project Leader Siobhan Austen 
 
Researchers Siobhan Austen 
 Richard Seymour 
 Kerry Brown 
 Craig Furneaux 
 Angela McCabe 
 
Project Affiliates Western Australian Department of Housing and Works 
 Rider Levett Bucknall 
 Curtin University of Technology 
 Queensland University of Technology 
 Queensland Department of Public Works 
 
Research Program:  A 
Business and industry development 
 
Project:  2006-036-A   
Multi Outcomes Construction Policies 
 
Date:   December 2007 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
Distribution List 
 
Cooperative Research Centre for Construction Innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclaimer 
The Reader makes use of this Report or any 
information provided by the Cooperative Research 
Centre for Construction Innovation at their own 
risk.  Construction Innovation will not be 
responsible for the results of any actions taken by 
the Reader or third parties on the basis of the 
information in this Report or other information 
provided by Construction Innovation nor for any 
errors or omissions that may be contained in this 
Report. Construction Innovation expressly 
disclaims any liability or responsibility to any 
person in respect of any thing done or omitted to 
be done by any person in reliance on this Report or 
any information provided. 
 
 
 
© 2009 Icon.Net Pty Ltd 
 
To the extent permitted by law, all rights are reserved and no part of this publication covered by copyright may be 
reproduced or copied in any form or by any means except with the written permission of Icon.Net Pty Ltd. 
 
 
Please direct all enquiries to: 
Chief Executive Officer 
Cooperative Research Centre for Construction Innovation 
9th Floor, L Block, QUT, 2 George St 
Brisbane   Qld   4000 
AUSTRALIA 
T: 61 7 3138 9291 
F: 61 7 3138 9151 
E: enquiries@construction-innovation.info 
W: www.construction-innovation.info 
  
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Background ..................................................................................................................... 1 
Project Objectives & Scope ............................................................................................ 4 
Methodology ................................................................................................................... 5 
Key Project Stages ...................................................................................................... 5 
Social Policies Leveraged on Public Construction Projects in Western Australia and 
Queensland ...................................................................................................................... 8 
Western Australia ........................................................................................................ 8 
Queensland ................................................................................................................ 15 
Literature Review .......................................................................................................... 23 
Economic Perspectives ............................................................................................. 23 
Empirical Studies Utilising Economic Frameworks ................................................. 29 
The Economic Literature: Conclusions .................................................................... 32 
Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................. 33 
Data Collection and Analysis ........................................................................................ 40 
The Training Policies of the Western Australian Government: A Quantitative 
Analysis ..................................................................................................................... 40 
The Training and Employment Policies of the Western Australian Government: A 
Qualitative Analysis .................................................................................................. 61 
The Training and Employment Policies of the Queensland Government: A 
Qualitative Analysis .................................................................................................. 77 
The Provision of Public Art as a Percentage of Capital Works Contracts: A 
Theoretical Analysis ................................................................................................. 93 
The Percent for Art Policy of the Western Australian Government: A Qualitative 
Analysis ................................................................................................................... 105 
The Art Built-In Policy of the Queensland Government: A Qualitative Analysis . 131 
Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 166 
Appendix A: Summary of interviews for percent for art ............................................ 169 
Appendix B: Summary of interviews for Art Built-in ................................................ 170 
References ................................................................................................................... 171 
 
  
 ii
 
 
Tables 
Table 1: Minimum Apprentice and Trainee Requirements .............................................. 11 
Table 2: Transaction Costs: Determinants, Responses and Outcomes ............................. 29 
Table 3: Percentage Decline in the Average Number of Tender Bids by Pre-Qualification 
Financial Level 2001-2006. .............................................................................................. 46 
Table 4: Estimated Coefficients for Equation on Bid Numbers on Government Non-
Residential Construction Contracts (Priority Access Policy), Western Australia 1997-
2001. .................................................................................................................................. 56 
Table 5: Estimated Coefficients for Equation on Bid Numbers on Government Non-
Residential Construction Contracts (Building Skills Policy), Western Australia 2000-
2004. .................................................................................................................................. 57 
Table 6: Estimated Coefficients for Equation Including Market Segment Measures. Bid 
Numbers on Government Non-Residential Construction Contracts (Building Skills 
Policy), Western Australia 2000-2004. ............................................................................. 58 
Table 7: Public Art – Benefits identified from the academic literature .......................... 104 
Table 8: Costs of the Percent for Art Policy According to Key Stakeholder Groups .... 113 
Table 9: Overall summary of the costs and benefits of the WA Percent for Art Policy 
compared to the literature review ................................................................................... 130 
Table 10: Costs of the Art Built-In policy According to Key Stakeholder Groups ........ 138 
 
  
 iii
 
 
Figures 
Figure 1: Total, Private, and Public Nominal Values for Non-Residential Construction 
Work done in Western Australia by Quarter, December 1996 to December 2006. ......... 42 
Figure 2: Average Number of Tender Bids on WA Public, Non-Residential Construction 
Contracts by Year, 1997 to 2006 ...................................................................................... 43 
Figure 3: WA Public Non-Residential Construction Awarded Contracts by Regional 
Development Region, 1997 to 2006 (per cent) ................................................................. 44 
Figure 4: The Average Number of Tender Bids for the Perth, Peel, and South West 
Regional Development Regions by Year, 1997 to 2006. .................................................. 44 
Figure 5: The Average Number of Tender Bids for All Regional Development Regions 
other than Perth, Peel, and the South West Regions by Year, 1997 to 2006. ................... 45 
Figure 6: WA Public Non-Residential Construction Contracts by Pre-Qualification 
Financial Level, 1997 to 2006 (per cent). ......................................................................... 46 
Figure 7: Tender Bids by Pre-Qualification Level ........................................................... 47 
Figure 8: Building Cost Index for the Perth Region by Month, January 1997 to December 
2006. .................................................................................................................................. 48 
Figure 9: Construction Industry Average Weekly Earnings for Western Australia and 
Australia by Quarter, February 1996 - November 2006. .................................................. 49 
Figure 10: Materials Cost Index for Buildings other than Housing for the Perth Region by 
Quarter, December 1997 to December 2006. ................................................................... 49 
Figure 11: Department of Employment and Workplace Relations’ Skills Vacancy Index 
for Western Australia by Month, December 1996 to December 2006. ............................ 50 
Figure 12: Average Number of Tender Bids for Contracts with a Pre-tender value < 
$150,000 and Tenders with a Pre-tender value ≥ $150,000 by Year, 1997 to 2001 ......... 52 
Figure 13: Average Number of Tender Bids for Tenders with a Pre-tender value ≤ $2m 
and Tenders with a Pre-tender value > $2m by Year, 2000 to 2006. ............................... 53 
Figure 14: Costs and Benefits of Percent for Art: Comparison between the expected 
outcomes identified from the literature and additional outcomes from this case study .. 165 
  
 1
 
 
Background 
 
Construction 2020 (Hampson and Brandon 2004) outlines a series of visions for securing 
the long term success of the construction industry in Australia. In particular, Vision 2 
proposes a future in which “the design, construction and operation of facilities truly 
reflect the present and future needs of the project initiator, future owners and tenants, and 
aspirations of stakeholders…it will develop better systems for capturing client 
requirements (Hampson and Brandon 2004: 14). Understanding and meeting the disparate 
needs of clients and other stakeholders is critical to the success of construction projects 
and for the construction industry overall (Seaden and Manseau 2000). This report focuses 
on an arena that brings a range of stakeholders into the market transactions that underpin 
construction contract regimes. The expansion of commercial activities to incorporate a 
mix of social and economic outcomes and broadening the array of those involved beyond 
the client and constructor to deliver projects is a policy instrument that has not been 
investigated in much depth in Australia.  
 
In Australia, government is a significant client as the level of government-initiated 
construction projects approaches 30-40% of total industry turnover in the commercial 
building and engineering sectors. Government is thereby in a position to strongly 
influence the market due to its procurement policy for capital works and its role as 
regulator of the construction industry (Hampson and Brandon 2004). Until recent decades 
this role of designer, principal and project manager was typically undertaken in-house by 
public works departments, but in recent times some jurisdictions, have devolved these 
functions to other government agencies, some of which have little or no experience in 
construction (APCC 2002), and are then reliant on pre-qualified consultants to provide 
expertise in the procurement of built assets.  
 
Each jurisdiction in Australia has developed capital works procurement policies that 
regulate the way in which government agencies procure built assets (see Furneaux, 
Brown, Allan, McConville, McFallan, London & Burgess 2006 for an overview); 
including various approaches to the way these agencies engage with the multiple 
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stakeholders involved in construction projects. Capital works procurement policies 
establish the role that individual government agencies can have in the construction 
process, and, depending on the policy stance adopted, may involve a number of 
additional government agencies in the planning, tendering and delivery of built assets.  
 
This project extends previous research on government procurement of capital works, by 
explicitly exploring the multiple outcomes that may be leveraged from public works 
activities through public policy initiatives. McCrudden (2004) notes that government has 
two roles in these activities: participation in the market as a procurer of goods and 
services and, using this purchasing to achieve social outcomes. It is this latter element 
which is the focus of this research. Watermayer (2000) suggests that while public sector 
procurement polices have increasingly sought to integrate social outcomes into capital 
projects, there has been limited research on the effectiveness of utilising procurement 
policy to achieve these outcomes. In a later study, McCrudden (2004) finds that 
information about the operation of procurement programs that seek to include social 
outcomes is difficult to locate.  
 
Watermayer (2000) suggests that procurement linked to social objectives may produce 
positive economic benefits including acting as a stimulant to economic activity, 
improving competitiveness with other sectors, redressing regional disparity, promoting 
employment of those in disadvantaged employment groups, allowing environmental 
sustainability and developing markets for locally sourced labour and products. However, 
the mix of market and state-driven imperatives in contractual arrangements is not without 
problems. Potential difficulties identified by Watermayer (2000) include issues of 
overburdening administrative capacity of governments in procurement oversight, creating 
unfair competition, compromising value for money in projects, creating a situation in 
which the private sector is unable to deliver efficient and effective projects and exposing 
government to high level risk. This research project examines in detail these potential 
benefits and costs in an Australian context, providing information on the efficacy of a 
range of interventions undertaken via the contracting of public construction projects.  . 
The specific policies investigated in this research include public works procurement 
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policies with the embedded social objectives of promoting training, local employment, 
indigenous employment and public art.    
 
While these policies are technically owned and championed by other agencies, due to 
their incorporation into capital works procurement they are effectively implemented by 
public works agencies (e.g. Department of Housing and Works (DHW) in Western 
Australia, and Department of Public Works (DPW) in Queensland). This situation can 
give rise to conflict, given that the works agencies’ task continues to be the achievement 
of optimal contract outcomes from restricted budgets in a timely and transparent fashion1.  
 
A particular perspective explored in this report is that the inclusion of additional social 
outcomes in the specification of public works contracts often (but not always) results in 
large additional contract management costs. Concern has also been expressed that the 
specified social outcomes are sometimes not achieved, or only achieved at a relatively 
high cost. In sum, a perception exists within some government agencies that, in many 
circumstances, the costs of attempting to leverage social outcomes on construction 
contracts are large, whilst the benefits (in terms of achieved outcomes) are small. 
 
                                                 
1
 For example, one of the DHW stated corporate objectives, which is “To effectively and efficiently manage 
the Department’s resources to ensure its sustainability” (DHW 2006). 
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Project Objectives & Scope 
 
The primary objective of the ‘multi-outcomes’ project is to promote the efficiency of the 
public sector project management regime. It has sought to do this by: 
• Identifying the categories and magnitudes of contract management costs 
associated with leveraged social outcomes. 
• Identifying the set of factors that contribute to these costs and, in turn, the 
circumstances where the inclusion of social outcomes is likely to result in high 
costs/low efficiency. 
• Reviewing alternative mechanisms for achieving specific social outcomes and, in 
turn, identifying the opportunities for improving the net social benefit from public 
resources committed to these outcomes. 
 
The set of social outcomes examined in the ‘multi-outcomes’ project have been largely 
defined by the policy documents that guide the works agencies’ construction activities. 
These specify obligations in relation to: 
• Employment and training (for example, the hiring of apprentices and indigenous 
employment); 
• “Buy local” preferences; and 
• Percent Art - The provision of public art as a percentage of total public works 
construction costs (typically 1 or 2%). 
 
The project canvassed non-residential construction contracts that relate to both 
metropolitan and regional areas. The project has focused on the main contract type 
utilised by the DHW and DPW in their construction contracts, namely, the “design, bid 
and build” contract type. 
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Methodology 
The study was organised into 2 key parts: Part A: Employment and Training Policies; and 
Part B: Percent-for-Art Policies. This division reflected, first, the nature of available data 
and, thus, the suitability of different methodologies. Quantitative information was 
available to inform the study of the impacts of the training policies, but could not be 
reasonably applied to the other policies. The policies are also distinct in terms of their 
intent and application, and this also recommended the adoption of different approaches to 
the literature reviews, data collection and data analysis. Finally, the members of the 
project team have distinct disciplinary backgrounds. Austen and Seymour are labour 
economists who brought to the project their knowledge of economic theories and 
approaches. Brown, Furneaux and McCabe are management academics whose expertise 
lies in management theories and methods. The multi-disciplinary approach required by 
the availability and type of empirical data within the project thus aligned with the skills 
and backgrounds of the team.  
Key Project Stages 
 
Stage 1: Policy Summaries 
 
In the commencement part of the study all the relevant policy documents were accessed 
and summarised. This provided important background information on the intent, scope 
and administrative requirements of the various policies, helping inform the design of 
project’s investigation of costs and benefits. The summaries of the policies are outlined in 
the next section. 
 
Stage 2: Literature Review (Development of theoretical frameworks and identification of 
comparative approaches) 
 
Across the different parts of the study, the early stages of the project also featured a 
comprehensive literature review. This served the function of informing the study team of 
appropriate theoretical frameworks for the investigation of each policy type. Very briefly, 
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the review first identified the ‘principal-agent’ framework as the primary economic 
framework, particularly for the analysis of employment and training policies. This 
framework focuses on the contractual relationship between a principal (e.g. a government 
department) and an agent (e.g. a construction company). It directs particular attention to 
the circumstances which can cause contracts to result in less than optimal outcomes (e.g. 
a lack of training investment by the construction company); the factors that might 
contribute to these negative results; and possible contractual responses to these 
deficiencies. Bargaining theory was identified as providing additional, important 
economic perspectives on the issues affecting the success or otherwise of attempts by 
government departments to achieve socially desirable outcomes from their projects.  As is 
indicated in latter parts of this report, bargaining theory proved to be especially useful in 
the analysis of percent for art policies. 
 
Throughout, the literature review also sought out case studies of public-private sector 
partnerships that both have relevance to the circumstances of government departments 
and identified possible approaches to the analysis of the effects of multi-outcome 
policies. In the case of employment and training policies these were shown to be few. The 
percent for art scheme has a longer history and several discussions of its pros and cons 
have been assembled. 
 
Stage 3: Data Collection and Analysis 
 
The data collection and analysis stages of the project varied across the different parts of 
the study. In the training and employment component area, quantitative methods were 
used extensively to analyse the policy impacts of key training policies on bid activity in 
relation to DHW construction contracts. This was possible due to the availability of 
relevant data from the Tender Registration System database.  The methodology section 
fully describes the techniques used to organise the TRS data for this investigation and the 
statistical methods used in the analysis. 
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Qualitative methods (specifically, in-depth interviews) were used to collect data from 
industry participants on the costs and benefits of the various other policies. The 
recruitment of participants was achieved through purposive selection, whereby 
informants who were able to provide information on the issue under investigation were 
selected initially. Further individuals were identified through snowball sampling.  
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Social Policies Leveraged on Public Construction Projects in 
Western Australia and Queensland 
 
A number of key policies relating to employment, training and public art affect the 
contracting arrangements of public works agencies in Queensland and Western Australia 
in 2006. To provide important contextual information for the analysis conducted as part 
of the multi-outcomes project these are summarised in the following paragraphs. 
Western Australia 
 
Training 
The two training policies that affected the Western Australian work agencies’ contracting 
activities up until the start of 2007 and which are still reflected in the 2007 policy 
documents (as is outlined fully below) are: 
• The Building Skills Policy; and  
• The Priority Access Policy2.  
 
The stated objective of the Building Skills Policy is to ensure that there is an adequate 
supply of skilled labour in the building and construction industry to meet the current and 
future demand. The policy has been designed to meet this objective through two means: 
• By ensuring a new supply of skilled labour is entering the building and 
construction industry through apprenticeships and traineeships; and 
• By up-skilling existing workers in the building and construction industry. 
 
The policy has been implemented through placing minimum requirements on the quantity 
and quality of training undertaken on all State Government building and construction 
contracts with a total contract value exceeding $2 million. The policy’s quantity 
requirements include that 10% of the deemed labour hours be allocated to the 
employment of apprentices and/or trainees. In addition, up to a maximum of 25% may 
                                                 
2
 Priority Access n.d. Retrieved October 20, 2006, from http://policies.det.wa.edu.au/; Building Skills n.d. 
Retrieved October 20, 2006, from http://policies.det.wa.edu.au/. 
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also be allocated to the up-skilling of existing workers. The policy defines deemed labour 
hours as being 30% of the GST exclusive total contract price divided by 35. The policy’s 
quality controls are reflected in a requirement that, in the case of apprentices and trainees, 
training must lead to a nationally recognised building and construction qualification. In 
the case of up-skilling existing workers, the training must lead to a Statement of 
Attainment from a nationally building and construction qualification. 
 
There are three main groups of entities directly affected by the Building Skills Policy: 
• The Western Australian Department of Education and Training, which is the 
agency that formulated and sponsored the policy.  
• The Departments of Housing and Works, Main Roads and the State Supply 
Commission, which are the State Government delivering agencies, or in other 
words, the contracting agencies responsible for implementing the policy.  
• The contractor(s).  
 
Indirectly, the policy has consequences for other organisations and individuals, such as 
sub-contractors and ‘purchasing’ agencies (such as Justice and Health Departments), 
which need to accommodate the costs of training in their capital works budgets. 
 
The implementation of the Building Skills Policy directly imposes additional contract 
management tasks on the main entities.  For the Western Australian Department of 
Education and Training, these additional tasks include: recording, assessment and 
approval/disapproval of contractors’ Training Plans, Compliance Reports, and 
Completion Reports; visiting project sites to ensure compliance with the Training Plan; 
providing six-monthly reports to the Government; and providing six-monthly Compliance 
Reports to the contracting agency. 
 
For the contracting agencies, these additional contract management tasks include: 
incorporating the appropriate contractual requirements in tender documents; keeping the 
Western Australian Department of Education and Training informed of building and 
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construction contracts that fall under the Building Skills Policy; and ensuring that any 
tendering pre-qualification process is compliant with the policy. 
 
For the contractor(s), additional contract management tasks include submission to the 
Western Australian Department of Education and Training of a Training Plan within 14 
days of being awarded the contract; a Compliance Report at the end of each 13 week 
period; and a Practical Completion Report within 10 days after the completion of the 
project. 
 
The stated objective of the Priority Access Policy is to increase the employment and 
training opportunities in Western Australia to ensure that there is an adequate supply of 
skilled labour to meet future labour market demands. One of the specific policy 
objectives is to increase the number of apprenticeship and traineeship positions.   
 
The Policy has been implemented through requiring contractors to meet a minimum of 
100 points in order for them to be able to tender on State Government building and 
construction contracts that are greater than or equal to $150,000 in value, or State 
Government procurement contracts that are greater than or equal to $500,000 in value. 
Points are allocated to a contractor based on the contractor’s involvement in specified 
employment and training activities. As such, it largely attempts to regulate training 
quality. Specified activities include the contractor having an apprenticeship and/or 
traineeship employment level of 10% or better, the employment of staff with recognised 
VET qualifications, the employment of staff with tertiary qualifications, and staff 
participating in work related training programs. The policy is weighted more towards 
apprenticeships and traineeships, with contractors being allocated 100 points if they meet 
the apprenticeship and traineeship employment level criteria. In contrast, a contractor is 
only awarded either 30 or 40 points for meeting any of the other specified employment 
and training activities. 
 
The three main entities involved in building and construction contracts that fall under the 
Priority Access Policy are the same as those for the Building Skills Policy. The DET is 
  
 11
 
 
the sponsoring agency; DHW or another public works department is the delivery agency; 
and contractors are also directly affected.  
 
The additional contract management tasks and costs associated with the Priority Access 
Policy include, for the DET: the processing and approval/disapproval of contractors’ 
Priority Access applications; and conducting 12-month compliance checks of contractors. 
For the DHW or its equivalent, additional tasks include: incorporating the appropriate 
contractual requirements in its tender documents; and ensuring that any tendering pre-
qualification process is compliant with the policy. For the contractor(s), additional 
contract management tasks include: registering as a Priority Access employer with 
Western Australian Department of Education and Training every 24 months; and a 12-
month compliance check carried out by the Western Australian Department of Education 
and Training. 
 
The Priority Start – Building Policy, which came into affect on January 1, 2007 
superseded the Building Skills Policy and the Priority Access Policy. Its stated objectives 
are similar to the previous policies: to ensure that contractors employ apprentices and/or 
trainees on State Government building and construction sites. 
 
The policy is also implemented in a similar fashion. A minimum apprentice and trainee 
requirement is imposed on all State Government building and construction contracts 
where the estimated labour component is greater than $300,000. The specific minimum 
requirements vary with the size of the contract, as is shown in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Minimum Apprentice and Trainee Requirements 
Value of the Labour Component for a 
Contract 
Minimum Apprentice or 
Trainee Requirement 
$300,001 to $1 Million 1 
$1,000,001 to $2 Million 2 
$2,000,001 to $3 Million 3 
$3,000,001 to $4 Million 4 
$4,000,001 to $5 Million 5 
$5,000,001 to $6 Million  6 
$6,000,001 and above Assessed on a project by project basis 
using above ratio as guide. 
Source: (Priority Start – Building Policy, 2006) 
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Similar to the Priority Access Policy, the new policy also requires that a contractor has to 
pre-qualify before they can tender on any State Government building and construction 
contract. A contractor can pre-qualify by either providing evidence of direct indenture of 
apprentices and/or trainees, engaging apprentices and/or trainees from a group training 
organisation, or by providing evidence of engaging sub-contractors that have indentured 
or host apprentices or trainees. This applies to both government and private work 
undertaken by a contractor. For contractors who are unable to demonstrate either of these 
conditions, there is a six month provisional registration available. 
 
On being awarded a contract, a contractor must then comply with the minimum 
apprentice and training requirement by engaging the minimum number of apprentices 
and/or trainees based on the labour component of the contract. The contractor can meet 
this minimum apprentice and training requirement by direct indenture of apprentices 
and/or trainees, engaging apprentices and/or trainees from a group training organisation, 
or by hiring sub-contractors who meet the training requirements. 
 
The three main entities affected Priority Start – Building Policy are unchanged. The 
Department of Education and Training has responsibility for the processing and 
approval/disapproval of contractors’ Training Plans. The contracting agency, such as the 
DHW is required by the policy to incorporate appropriate contractual requirements in its 
tender documents, and to process contractors’ application for pre-qualification to the 
Priority Start scheme. Contractors have responsibility for the development and 
submission of a Training Plan.  
 
Employment 
A key employment policy affecting the contracting of public construction work in 
Western Australia is the Buy Local Policy. The stated objective of this policy is ‘…to 
maximise supply opportunities for competitive local Western Australian businesses when 
bidding for State government contracts’ (Buy Local Policy 2002: 1).  Some of the 
expressed motivations for the policy are a preference for increasing local contracting 
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opportunities, facilitating sustainable local business employment growth, maximising 
industry development potential, stimulating competition, and ensuring that government 
agencies’ purchasing decisions are based on best value for money. 
 
The policy has been implemented through requiring that a “local content” selection 
criteria be included in State government tenders that have an estimated contract value of 
$750,0003 or above. In addition, a minimum weighting of 20% must be applied to the 
“local content” selection criteria. Although it is not mandatory, State Government 
agencies are also encouraged to apply the Buy Local Policy to tenders that have an 
estimated contract value of less than $750,000.   
 
Under the Buy Local Policy, there are two types of price preference that a government 
agency can use in assessing tender bids. The first is an ‘Imported Content Impost Price 
Preference’.  When assessing tender bids, this preference allows a state government 
agency to scale-up the total cost of the imported content contained within a tender bid by 
20%4.  
 
The second is a ‘Regional Price Preference’. Under this preference, government agencies 
can reduce the value of total tender bids of eligible businesses by a specified percentage5. 
To be eligible for this preference a business must be registered or licensed to conduct 
business within Western Australia and have conducted its business for 6 months from a 
permanent office located within a prescribed distance from a contract point6. The 
preference does not apply to businesses in the Perth region. 
 
The Buy Local Policy also encompasses the Western Australian Government’s 
Aboriginal Economic Development Strategy. The objective of this strategy is to 
increase the number of Aboriginal owned and operated enterprises, or enterprises that 
                                                 
3
 It does not state in the policy document whether the contract value is inclusive or exclusive of GST 
4
 This excludes goods, services, or items imported into Australia from New Zealand. 
5
 For example, under the Regional Business Preference the assessment of housing and works purchase or 
contract tenders bids is reduced by 5%, up to a maximum of $50,000. 
6
 The regional zones where the preference does apply are defined in the Regional Development 
Commissions Act 1993 
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employ Aboriginal people, that supply government agencies. To achieve this objective 
Government agencies are to give priority to tender bids from businesses that are solely 
owned by Aboriginal people, in partnership with Aboriginal people, or have implemented 
employment programs for Aboriginal people.  
 
The State Supply Commission is the sponsoring agency for the Buy Local Policy. It is 
charged with responsibility for administering the policy; conducting random audits of 
government agencies to assess their compliance with the policy; and reporting to the State 
Government on this compliance. 
 
The State Government delivering agency(s), such as the DHW, are responsible for 
contract management tasks including: defining the contract points and prescribed 
distances in contract documents; calculating the impost and preferences; defining 
provisions for breaches of the policy; monitoring and managing contracts to ensure 
compliance; and recording and reporting the percentage of contracts awarded based on 
business location.  
 
To make use of the policy, contractors need to calculate the total cost of goods, services, 
or items affected by the policy; and demonstrate compliance with their buy local 
contractual commitments. 
 
The Aboriginal Enterprise & Employment Tendering Preference Policy also targets 
indigenous employment. Its stated objective is to ‘…promote increased employment and 
economic opportunities for Aboriginal Western Australians by offering a tendering 
preference for tenders involving enterprises that employ, or are owned and operated by 
Aboriginal residents of Western Australia’ (Aboriginal Enterprise and Employment 
Tendering Preference Policy 2005: 1).  The policy was implemented in December 2005, 
and will be reviewed in December 2007. 
 
This policy is implemented through the use of a tendering preference, which is dependent 
on whether the organisation employs Aboriginals or is an Aboriginal enterprise. The 
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tendering preference is calculated as 10% of the preference amount, with the maximum 
tendering preference being set at $100,000. 
  
Percent for Art 
In 1989 the WA government adopted a Percent for Art scheme as a policy to stimulate 
the incorporation of public art into the built environment. The public art strategy involved 
the following key areas:  
• The percentage of the construction costs of public building scheme, 
commissioning scheme, townscape enrichment scheme and corporate sector 
scheme.   
• The percent for art scheme involved a percent for the total construction costs 
being spent on artworks, in particular, art that was integrated into the building. 
Capital works projects over $2m must allocate 1% of total costs to art and under 
$2m the percentage is up to the agency’s discretion.  
• WA also developed a ministerial taskforce on public art that was designed to 
oversee the selection process, implementation, advise government, develop 
advocacy material and provide role models for the private sector.   
 
The aims of the WA public art strategy were to enhance the aesthetics of public buildings 
and create employment opportunities for artists in WA (WA Taskforce 1993). The 
purpose of the scheme was to commission local artists to develop artworks to be 
integrated into contracted public buildings and to improve the environment in which 
people live and work.  
 
Queensland 
 
Training 
The key training policy in the Queensland jurisdiction is the 10% Training Policy, 
which has the objective ‘…to maximise the potential of Queensland capital works 
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projects to address skills shortages and create additional employment opportunities for 
apprentices, trainees and cadets in the building and construction industry’. 
 
The Policy has been implemented through placing a minimum training requirement on all 
Queensland State Government building and construction contracts that have a total 
contract value exceeding $250,000 for building or $500,000 for civil construction. The 
quantity requirements in the policy require that 10% of the deemed labour hours7 be 
allocated to the employment of apprentices, trainees or cadets. In addition, up to a 
maximum of 25% may also be allocated to the up-skilling of existing workers. 
Furthermore, quality controls in the policy require that the training must lead to a 
nationally recognised building and construction qualification or a Statement of 
Attainment. 
 
The Queensland Department of Education, Training and the Arts is the sponsoring 
agency for this policy. Its responsibilities include: assessment and auditing of contractors; 
auditing contractor data; recording of compliance data; provision of compliance reports; 
and liaison with contracting agencies to determine strategies for dealing with contractor 
non-compliance. 
  
The contracting or delivering agencies include the Department for Public Works and the 
Department of Main Roads. They are responsible under the policy for the incorporation 
of appropriate contractual requirements in tender documents; liaising with the sponsoring 
agency on contracts that fall under the policy; and ensuring that any tendering pre-
qualification process is compliant with the policy.  
 
The Policy requires from contractors a written undertaking to comply with the policy; a 
Compliance Plan within 10 works days of acceptance of the contract; interim compliance 
reports at the end of each 13 week period; and, at the completion of the project, a 
Practical Completion Report. 
                                                 
7
 The policy defines deemed labour hours as being 30% of the total GST exclusive contract price divided 
by $35/hour times 10%  for building construction projects, and 15% of the total GST exclusive contract 
price divided by $35/hour times 10% for civil construction projects. 
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Employment 
 
There are a number of policies relating to the achievement of employment objectives via 
Queensland government construction contracts. They include the Indigenous 
Employment Policy, which has the stated objective of maximising: 
 
“…. the potential employment opportunities on Queensland Government building 
and civil construction projects and address skills shortages in Indigenous 
communities. It also aims to build Indigenous capacity to participate in building 
and civil construction.” (Indigenous Employment Policy for Queensland 
Government Building and Civil Construction Projects n.d., p.2) 
 
The Policy has been designed to meet these objectives by requiring contractors to ensure 
that employment and accredited training occurs on Queensland Government building and 
civil construction projects in specified Indigenous communities. The Policy was initially 
implemented in 2001. A review of the policy was conducted in 2003, with the current, 
policy being the outcome of that review. The current policy was implemented on the 1st 
January 2004. 
 
The Policy has been implemented through placing a minimum employment and training 
requirement on all Queensland State Government building and construction contracts in 
specified Indigenous communities that have a total contract value exceeding $100,000 for 
building contracts, and any value for civil construction contracts. The policy replaces the 
10% Training Policy in specified Indigenous communities with a requirement that a 
minimum of 20% of the deemed labour hours8 be undertaken by Indigenous people 
                                                 
8
 The Policy defines deemed labour hours for building construction projects as being 30% of the GST 
exclusive total contract price divided by $35/hour times 20%. For civil construction projects it defines 
deemed labour hours as being 15% of the GST exclusive total contract price divided by $35/hour times 
20%.  
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recruited from the local community. Half of the 20% of these hours are to be in 
accredited training.  
 
The sponsoring agency for this policy is the Queensland Department of Employment and 
Industrial Relations. Its legislated tasks include overseeing the overall implementation 
and monitoring of the policy. The contracting agencies are responsible for tasks relating 
to the incorporation of appropriate contractual requirements in tender documents; 
informing the sponsoring agency of contracts that fall under the policy; ensuring that any 
tendering pre-qualification process is compliant with the policy; and liaising with the 
sponsoring agency with regard to determining the strategies for dealing with contractor 
non-compliance. Additional contract management tasks for contractors include: 
coordination and development of employment and training project plans to identify skills 
needs and availability; and completion of compliance forms. 
 
A further policy aimed at promoting employment is the Local Industry Policy9. This has 
the objective of maximising the use of local goods, services and labour in major 
government resource and infrastructure projects, and through this provide economic 
benefits to Queensland and the project proponents. As stated in the policy document 
(“Local Industry Policy” n.d., p.2): 
 
“Whilst recognising that investment decisions are made in a competitive global  
market, it is desirable to achieve the maximum level of local content in goods, 
services and labour where these are competitive as to price, quality, and delivery 
requirements.” 
 
The policy was developed by the Queensland Department of Premier and Cabinet over a 
six month period, and then the responsibility for implementation of the policy was passed 
                                                 
9
 The description of the Local Industry Policy is based on the version of the policy which 
applied at the time of writing. A new version of the policy is now available and can be 
accessed at:   
http://www.dtrdi.qld.gov.au/dsdweb/v3/documents/objdirctrled/nonsecure/pdf/32014.pdf 
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on to the Department of State Development. The policy was approved by Cabinet in 
December 1999, and the actual implementation program commenced in February 2000. 
 
The Local Industry Policy has been implemented through requiring project proponents 
(i.e. the entities funding the projects) to prepare Local Industry Participation Plans for 
Queensland government funded projects with a value greater than $5 million or major 
projects where the Queensland government has provided a significant contribution10. In 
these plans project proponents are required to demonstrate how they will give 
competitive Queensland businesses an opportunity to be involved in their project.  
 
The Policy outlines seven key criteria that project proponents should take into 
consideration (where applicable) when developing their Local Industry Participation 
Plan. These are specified in the policy (“Local Industry Policy” n.d., p.5) as: 
 
“1. Development of long-term, internationally competitive industries in  
      Queensland and Australia; 
 2. Employment, training and skills development; 
 3. Regional development and initiatives; 
 4. Value-added activity; 
 5. Opportunities for participation by small business; 
 6. Existing industry development activity and proposed new investment; and 
 7. Innovation, research, and development.” 
 
The Queensland Department of Tourism, Regional Development and Industry is the 
sponsoring agency for the Local Industry Policy. Its tasks include the policy’s 
implementation and evaluation, as well as reporting to Cabinet on the ongoing 
implementation of the policy. 
 
                                                 
10
 
Defined as a government contribution of more than $2.5 million
.  
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The contracting or delivering agency(s) are the various project proponents – for example, 
the Department of Main Roads. As noted above, they are responsible for preparing Local 
Industry Participation Plans. These agencies are also required to complete and submit 
reports on the outcome of their Local Industry Participation Plans to the chair of the 
Local Industry Committee on a six monthly basis; 
 
The Industry Capabilities Network (ICN) is also involved in the implementation of the 
Local Industry Policy, as it has the specific function of  
assist[ing] with the identification of competitive local supplies for the 
purpose of increasing opportunities for import replacement activities.” 
(“Local Industry Policy” n.d., p.6)   
 
Its tasks associated with the Local Industry Policy include: the provision of advice to 
project proponents on the capabilities and competitiveness of Queensland industry; the 
provision advice or seconded staff to project proponents to assist in the development of 
Local Industry Participation Plans; and the provision of advice to project proponents on 
the ability of Queensland and Australian industry to uptake overseas technology. 
 
 
Art Built-In 
The Queensland policy for inclusion of public art as a percentage of building works is the 
Art Built-In policy. Despite the difference in names between the Queensland and the 
Western Australian policies (Percent Art) they have virtually identical policy intent, with 
a percentage of the total building contracts allocated to public art commissions although 
they do differ on specific details.  
 
It is important to note that the Art Built-In policy has been recently replaced in 
Queensland by the art+place policy, following a review by the Queensland Government. 
As commissioned public art projects funded under this new policy have yet to be 
finalised, this report will focus on the Art Built-In policy instead. Important differences 
between the two policies are noted later in the report.  
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The stated purpose of the Art Built-In policy was: 
 
… allocating 2% of the total value of State Government capital works building 
projects for public art. The purpose of the policy is to ensure that cultural 
expterise and contemporary discourse and an integral part of shaping the built 
environment and influencing the spirit of place. The policy aims to maximise the 
social, cultural and economic benefits that will result from a heightened quality, 
experience and understanding of Queensland’s public places (Art Built-In Policy 
and Guidelines 2004).  
 
The Art Built-In policy is implemented through requiring capital works projects valued at 
more than $250,000 to allocated 2% of the total budget (excluding government fees and 
charges), and this allocation occurs at the business case stage of the planning of new 
capital works, as part of the Capital Works Management Framework.  
 
Arts Queensland, through its Public Art Agency is the sponsoring body of the Art Built-In 
policy and is responsible for its implementation. Specifically the Public Art Agency 
assists in best practice commissioning of public art, providing assistance to government 
agencies to audit and manage their existing public art collection, providing policy advice 
on allocation of monies for public art from capital works budgets. The Public Art Agency 
provides ongoing evaluation of the Art Built-In policy, for the provision of ongoing 
policy advice to government and to government agencies. The Public Art Agency also is 
responsible for developing a whole of government strategy for the audit and management 
of the Government Public Artworks Collection, including de-accessioning and disposal of 
artworks. The Public Art Agency also has an advocacy role in promoting public art in 
Queensland.   
 
Having reviewed the social outcomes which are intended to be achieved through public 
works procurement in Queensland and Western Australia, the next section outlines the 
economic perspectives which underpin the subsequent analysis of the policies.  
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Literature Review 
 
Economic Perspectives11 
 
As could be expected, the theoretical literature in economics on the specific topic of the 
effects of the above types of policies on construction projects is very limited. However, a 
number of economic studies have developed frameworks and engage in analyses that 
have some application to the issues under consideration. In the economics literature these 
papers are generally associated with applications of microeconomic concepts, especially 
those relating to what is known as principal-agent or contract theory analysis. 
 
Principal-agent analysis is an economic framework that can be applied to the contractual 
relationship between a public-sector works agency and their ‘agents’ (e.g. a construction 
company). As is typical of most microeconomic theory, this framework begins by setting 
out the objective functions of the two sets of players. For example, the works agency is 
assumed to aim for the maximum possible net social benefit from its projects, whilst the 
construction company is assumed to aim for maximum profits. Principal-agent analysis 
then directs attention to the circumstances which can cause contracts to be ‘incomplete’ 
and, as a consequence, fail to realize the maximum possible payoff, especially in terms of 
net social benefits.  
 
A particularly important aspect of this type of analysis relates to the difficulties 
encountered in designing a contract that fully specifies all the required quantity and 
quality outcomes. As is elaborated on in the papers surveyed below, these problems can 
cause additional monitoring and transaction costs, encourage strategic, anti-competitive 
behaviour, and, generally, result in a failure to realize potential social benefits. 
 
The work of Harvard economist Oliver Hart is highlighted in the first part of this 
literature review. He appears to be one of the few economic analysts who thus far have 
                                                 
11
 A technical version of this section is included in Section X. 
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focused attention on issues associated with the administration of service contracts by 
government agencies. A much larger literature, in which Hart is also represented, 
explores the potential costs and benefits of privatization per se – building a case either for 
or against privatization. However, much of this literature is not directly relevant to the 
current project, given its concerns with the efficiency of contract management in a post-
privatisation environment. 
 
Much of Hart’s work is based on his studies of a US agency involved in the management 
of prisons. In the following paragraphs we summarise the parts of his models and 
conclusions that have direct relevance to the inclusion of ‘quality’ improvements in the 
specification of government contracts. In our own work we establish an analogy between 
these quality provisions and the inclusion of requirements relating to training/local 
employment in a construction contract. 
 
Hart, Shleifer & Vishny (1997) develop a model, (hereafter the HSV model), which they 
use to explore the factors affecting the ability of a government agency to secure social 
benefits from the contracting out of a government service. The model relates to 
circumstances where contracts are incomplete and the government agency is interested in 
achieving the ‘basic’ contract outcomes, as well as ‘quality improvements’. These 
improvements are described as creating direct and effort costs for the contractor but 
social gains for the community at large. In the first stage of their analysis, Hart et al. 
demonstrate that, in the absence of specific contract provisions, contractors do not have a 
profit incentive to incorporate quality innovations and, as a consequence, potential social 
benefits from the contract will not be realised12. 
 
The second part of the HSV model that is relevant to the effects of employment and 
training policies examines the negotiation of contract provisions relating to quality 
                                                 
12
 This is a fairly common assessment of how firms and individuals respond to incentives. For example, 
Holmstrom and Milgrom’s (1991) hypothesise that when an agent has to perform multiple tasks and 
rewards are linked to measured performance, she/he will devote more effort to those task(s) where 
performance is most easily measured.  
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innovations. These negotiations are shown to have the potential to increase the social 
benefits from the contract relationship. However, importantly, a number of sets of factors 
will influence the contract outcomes. These sets include: a) factors affecting the 
relationship between a contractor’s investment in quality innovation and social outcomes 
(for example, if a project is very small in size the influence of quality variations is likely 
to be minimal); b) factors affecting the relationship between quality innovations and the 
contractor’s costs of production (these factors affect the barriers to the inclusion of 
contract provisions relating to ‘quality’ outcomes); and c) factors affecting competition in 
the tender market (for example, ‘tight’ markets will tend to bid up the price of quality 
innovations). 
 
In sum, the HSV model provides a useful starting point for the analysis of the issues 
raised in this project. It establishes a framework for understanding the rationale and 
details of multi-outcome policies. It also helps establish a framework for examining the 
circumstances that potentially could result in resistance to training and employment 
provisions amongst contractors and/or make the implementation of these provisions 
costly. 
 
Despite these advantages, however, the HSV framework also has some important 
limitations. For one it only deals with the case where the contractor derives no benefits 
from quality investments (that is, all benefits are ‘externalized’). Furthermore, the model 
does not include transaction and/or governance costs – and these are likely to be a 
significant constraint on the efficiency of contract provisions relating to training and 
employment. Additionally, the HSV model is limited to the case of a single government 
agency, whereas training and employment policies typically involve a number of 
agencies, who are likely to have different perceptions of ‘the social good’. 
 
A development of the HSV model by Bennett and Iossa (2005) helps address the first of 
these limitations. They incorporate considerations of the effect of asset ownership on the 
outcomes of the HSV model. Specifically they address the possibility that a contractor 
may expect to capture (or ‘internalize’) some of the benefits of a quality innovation. 
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Using Bennett and Iossa’s terminology, in these circumstances the residual value of the 
contract accruing to the firm increases with the quality innovation.  This increases the 
likelihood that the firm will make investments in quality and reduce problems associated 
with regulating these innovations. 
 
Training provides an interesting application of these ideas. For example, a contractor may 
anticipate that by training workers the asset value of the company will increase. This will 
provide direct incentives for the firm to engage in training and reduce the difficulty 
associated with achieving this particular social objective.  
 
A large literature on the economics of training (see especially Becker, 1975; also 
Ehrenburg and Smith 2005 for an overview) helps to elaborate on the possible 
relationships. We can start by noting that the HSV assumption that all social benefits are 
external is akin to an assumption that the skills imparted through training are perfectly 
transferable (or ‘general’). The main theoretical models of training also posit (in line with 
the predictions of the HSV model) that when skills are highly transferable, firms in 
competitive labour markets have little incentive to invest in their provision. This is 
because in the post-training period trained workers will be able to access alternative jobs 
at higher wage rates. The training firm thus has little opportunity to recoup any costs 
incurred in the provision of training. 
 
The Bennett and Iossa extension focuses attention on the alternative situation, where the 
skills produced by a training program have at least some degree of specificity and/or the 
skills involved are general but the labour market is imperfectly competitive. In these 
cases, due to restrictions on the mobility of trained workers, the firm is able to capture (or 
internalise) at least some of the benefits of a training investment. 
 
In sum, Bennett and Iossa’s work adds a further set of factors to consider in empirical 
work. These include: the nature of the training likely to be involved with the project 
(general or specific); the level of competition in the local labour market (competition 
increases the mobility of workers, reducing possible returns to the contractor from 
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investments in general skills); and uncertainty about future product market conditions 
(which is likely to reduce a contractor’s willingness to commit to quality investments). 
 
Bargaining Theory 
 
Globerman and Vining (1996) take a different and less theoretical approach to the 
analysis of the contracting out of services. However, their paper provides a useful 
complementary framework to the HSV model, especially with regard to the analysis of 
the impact of governance costs on the efficiency and organisation of contracts (the second 
deficiency of the HSV model noted above). As is noted in the following paragraphs, the 
Globerman and Vining approach is similar to the framework used by leading Australian 
commentators on these issues – Jensen and Stonecash. 
 
Central to Globerman and Vining’s framework are issues associated with task 
complexity, contestability, and asset specificity. Their paper identifies the possible effects 
of each of these possible features of the contracting environment and describes potential 
strategies for mitigating the effects of each. 
 
Task complexity refers to ‘the degree of difficulty in specifying and monitoring the terms 
and conditions of a transaction’ (Globerman and Vining 1996: 579). When the task being 
contracted is complex, problems associated with uncertainty, asymmetric information, 
and potential externalities will rise, increasing bargaining costs13. The authors make the 
obvious point that if task complexity is large and outside the sphere of a government 
agency’s expertise, the agency may not have the specialized knowledge to effectively 
design and negotiate contract outcomes. Jensen and Stonecash (2004) add details on the 
role of uncertainty, noting, first, that if the level of uncertainty is high tendered prices are 
likely to incorporate a risk premium. When levels of uncertainty are very high, a 
                                                 
13
 Globerman and Vining (1996) define four types of bargaining costs: contract negotiation costs; post 
contract renegotiation costs; performance monitoring costs; and dispute costs. They point out that, although 
the last three bargaining costs are all ex post, they can be identified and dealt with during the design of a 
contract, thus adding to contracting costs in the ex ante period.  
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contractor may not tender for a project because no risk premium would compensate for 
the risk.  
 
Contestability refers to the degree of potential competition in the market for the 
contracted product or service and in Globerman and Vining’s (1996) analysis this acts as 
a deterrent to opportunistic behaviour14. It also creates an incentive for contractors to 
submit tender bids close to their marginal costs of production, reducing the agency’s 
bargaining task. Rimmer (1994) concurs with this analysis, arguing that the contestability 
in the market should be one of the key factors considered before a project is outsourced 
(see also Reca & Zieg 1995).  
 
Asset specificity – the extent to which physical and human assets associated with a 
project can be secured from other sources - influences potential opportunism costs 
through the ability of one or other party to ‘hold up’ a project. Jensen and Stonecash 
(2004) present a similar argument. They conjecture that if an agency has to renegotiate a 
contract variation with a private provider, the private provider may engage in 
opportunistic behaviour and increase its price during the renegotiation. In other words, 
the private provider will appropriate an economic rent from the government, through 
hold-up. 
 
Importantly, Globerman and Vining (1996) note that, ex post, task complexity, 
contestability, and asset specificity are symmetrically related. They argue that the higher 
the degree of task complexity, the higher the level of investment will be in specific 
production knowledge. This, in turn, produces a barrier to entry, reducing contestability 
in the market in future contracting rounds and raising opportunism costs.  
 
                                                 
14
 Globerman and Vining (1996: 578) define opportunism as:  “… behavior by a party to a transaction 
designed to change the agreed terms of a transaction to be more in its favour”. This type of behaviour 
typically occurs in the ex post period (that is after the initial contract has been agreed) and can involve one 
party to the contract attempting to exploit the other’s dependence on contract outcomes to renegotiate 
contract terms. 
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Keeping this in mind, the following table outlines the various possible scenarios 
described by Globerman and Vining (1996) and their predicted implications for 
behaviour and contract outcomes. 
 
Table 2: Transaction Costs: Determinants, Responses and Outcomes 
Environment Behavioural response Implications for contract 
outcomes 
Low task complexity, 
High contestability, and 
Low asset specificity 
 Small bargaining and 
opportunism costs. Lower 
contract price and higher 
efficiency ceteris paribus 
Low task complexity, 
High contestability, and 
High asset specificity 
Potential for contractor 
to engage in hold up 
Contractor may ask for higher 
contract price (to compensate for 
risk of hold up) 
Low task complexity, 
Low contestability, and 
High asset specificity 
Potential for both parties 
to engage in hold up 
Higher bargaining and 
opportunism costs 
High task complexity, 
High contestability, and 
Low asset specificity 
Potential for 
disagreements about 
contract specifications & 
performance monitoring 
Higher bargaining costs 
High task complexity, 
Low contestability, and 
Low asset specificity 
Contractor may use 
ambiguities or 
deficiencies in contract 
specification to seek 
contract renegotiation  
Higher bargaining costs 
Low task complexity, 
Low contestability, and 
Low asset specificity 
 Higher opportunism costs due to 
low contestability 
High task complexity, 
Low contestability, and 
High asset specificity 
 Worst case scenario contributes 
to higher bargaining and 
opportunism costs; higher prices 
and lower efficiency 
 
Empirical Studies Utilising Economic Frameworks 
 
There have been very few empirical studies of the types of multi-outcome policies and, of 
those that have been conducted, concerns have been raised about the ability to generalize 
their results. In the following paragraphs we summarise the literature relating to what can 
be thought of as economic studies of the experiences of contracting government services. 
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Our primary aim has been to identify the approaches taken to this measurement task and, 
in doing so, inform the design of empirical strategies for the analysis of multi-outcome 
construction policies. A secondary aim of this part of the literature review was to use the 
available empirical evidence to cast more light on the theoretical propositions raised in 
the previous section. 
 
Jensen and Stonecash (2004) provide a very useful overview of empirical studies of 
outsourcing. They describe how empirical analysis of outsourcing has mainly focused on 
cleaning and refuse collection (e.g. Edwards and Stevens, 197815); mainly because they 
are the most frequently outsourced government services, and also because the outputs 
from both of these services are fairly easy to measure. Other empirical studies have been 
conducted on industries associated with transportation services, the maintenance of heavy 
equipment, waste water treatment (e.g. Holcombe 199116), fire protection services, prison 
management services, tax assessment services (e.g. Carver 198917), and road and 
maintenance services (e.g.  Blom-Hansen 200318). Most (but not all) of these analyses 
provided evidence of reductions in expenditure. 
 
Other empirical evidence reviewed by Jensen and Stonecash indicates that very few 
outsourcing projects turn out as expected. Supporting the proposition advanced in the 
                                                 
15
 This study examined the alternative market structures and regulatory arrangements in the private 
provision of residential refuse collection to determine the most efficient market structure and regulatory 
arrangement. The empirical analysis was based on three types of regulatory schemes for the private 
provision of refuse collection services: contracting, franchising, and licensing. It concluded that contracting 
was the most efficient regulatory arrangement for the private provision of refuse collection services. 
16
 This study used a linear regression model to compare the private and public construction costs of 
wastewater treatment plants. It concluded that private wastewater treatment plant construction costs were 
higher than public wastewater treatment plant construction costs. One factor contributing to this result was 
contract design, because the contracts for private construction of wastewater treatment plants allowed the 
private providers to pass most of their construction costs on to the government. 
17
 This study used a linear regression model to analyse whether the private provision of property tax 
assessment in Massachusetts cost less than the public provision. It concluded that the private provision of 
property tax assessment in Massachusetts cost more than the public provision. A number of explanations 
were contributed: a lack of competition in the private market; and legislation requiring property tax 
assessment to be routinely performed, causing an inelastic demand for property tax assessments, leading to 
higher prices in the private market. 
18
 This study used a pooled regression model to analyse the magnitude and source of expenditure reductions 
obtained from the partial contracting out of municipal road maintenance in Denmark. It concluded that 
partial contracting out of municipal road maintenance in Denmark did lead to a cost saving.  To determine 
if the reduction in costs was due to an increase in efficiency or quality-shading, a quality index was added 
to the model. 
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previous section, this research apparently identified problems associated with incomplete 
contracts, ex ante cost uncertainties, the specification and measurement of output, and the 
inherent risk associated with all projects. The authors assert that contract design is one of 
the important factors in determining the success of outsourcing the provision of a 
government service.  
 
The methodology generally used to determine the magnitude of any cost savings from the 
outsourcing of a government service involves a comparison of the cost of the public 
provision of a government service with that of the private provision. Most of the studies 
cited above as examples employed regression techniques to establish these comparisons. 
However, Jensen and Stonecash note that a number of difficulties are typically 
encountered in effectively implementing these methods. First, public sector data on 
operating costs and outputs is typically lacking. Second, it is difficult to find comparable 
services provided in public and private sector environments. Third, the dynamic nature of 
most contractual relationships reduces the value of cross-sectional data19.  
 
Other work by Jensen (notably, Domberger and Jensen 1997) provides a useful example 
of a case-study approach to the identification of the costs and benefits of outsourcing, 
especially with regards ensuring ‘quality’ outcomes. These authors examine outcomes 
from the outsourcing of refuse collection services and note that in this particular case 
effort can be either devoted to producing the refuse collection service or maintaining the 
refuse collection vehicles. They found that in the cases where the government owns the 
refuse collection vehicles and leases them to the private provider, the private provider 
would have little incentive to maintain the vehicles to a standard that would ensure their 
economic life extended passed the length of the contract. Thus, to overcome this problem, 
where refuse collection services are contracted out, it is generally specified that the 
private provider should own the vehicles. They concluded that poor specification and lack 
of monitoring appeared to be the main causes of quality-shading investments (such as the 
                                                 
19
 In an earlier paper, Domberger and Jensen (1997) make similar points. They argue that there are number 
of issues that lead to confusion in interpreting empirical evidence on the effects of outsourcing. These relate 
to problems associated with estimating changes in costs, measuring any change in quality, and 
distinguishing the effect of competition from ownership. 
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failure to maintain vehicles) and that improved contract design and implementation could 
prevent quality-shading investments. 
The Economic Literature: Conclusions 
 
This review of the economic literature identified a number of valuable theoretical 
perspectives on the issues raised in multi-outcomes project. Specifically, the theoretical 
models identified in this section define key categories of factors that are likely to be 
relevant to the costs and benefits of leveraged training and employment policies, 
including:  
• the relationship between a contractor’s investment in training and/or local 
employment and the magnitude of social outcomes;  
• the relationship between training and/or local employment and the contractor’s 
costs of production; 
• competition/contestability in the tender market; 
• the nature of the training involved with the project (general or specific);  
• the level of competition in the local labour market;  
• uncertainty about future product market conditions; 
• the complexity of the training and/or employment or arts task;  
• the specificity of assets devoted to the contracted project; 
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Theoretical Framework 
 
The theoretical framework developed by Hart, Schleifer & Vishny (1997), and outlined in 
the above section, is used in this study as the basis for the analysis of the potential 
efficiency effects of leveraging especially training outcomes on public construction 
contracts. As was noted in the literature review, the HSV model was developed to 
account for features of a contractual relationship relating to the provision of prison 
services. It was also motivated, in part at least, by a desire to evaluate whether public 
ownership or privatisation is the ideal arrangement. However, as we show in this section, 
the model can be applied both to situations where the provision of services and/or public 
works is already privatised and to the specific case of desired training and other 
investments on construction projects. Furthermore, the insights from the other strands of 
relevant literature – such as bargaining and standpoint theory – can be added to the HSV 
framework to provide a broad theoretical perspective on the issues raised in the study. 
 
Using the notation used in the original HSV model, M is a contractor whose actions 
(efforts) can influence the social benefits, B, and the costs, C, associated with a 
construction project. Residual control rights associated with the project are assumed to lie 
with the contractor, in the sense that he/she is responsible for any cost over-runs 
associated with the project and reaps the financial gains of any uncontracted cost savings. 
G is a government representative who is charged with responsibility to ensure the net 
social benefits associated with the project are maximised. 
 
Attention focuses on the quality enhancements the contractor may introduce. In the 
particular example used in this discussion these relate to investments in human capital via 
training. We model these enhancements as imposing additional resource costs on the 
contractor20. However, they raise the gross social benefits associated with the project. In 
the first version of the model that we present, the benefits of any quality improvements 
only flow to the broad community. That is, the benefits of any improvements are assumed 
not to be internalised (or captured) by the firm. 
                                                 
20
 In the original HSV model the innovations were a source of cost savings. 
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Two equations are defined: 
)(0 eBBB +=  
)(0 eCCC +=  
where e refers to the effort involved in achieving quality enhancement. 0)( ≥eC ; 
0)( ≥eB 21. 
 
Analysis begins by considering a scenario where quality improvements (eg training 
investments) are not part of the contract agreement; that is, potential improvements can 
be neglected without triggering a breach of the contract relating to the construction 
project. 
  
Not surprisingly, given the assumptions about the internalisation of costs but not of 
benefits, the model predicts that a profit-focused contractor will not introduce the quality 
enhancement. Such improvements add to his/her resource costs without contributing a 
financial benefit. 
 
Although this is a very simple result, it does underlie the expressed rationale for specific 
contract provisions relating to training and other social outcomes. That is, in the absence 
of these provisions it is likely that investments in quality enhancements that deliver broad 
social benefits will not take place. The framework introduced here is also a convenient 
‘building block’ for the remaining parts of the analysis. 
 
The next scenario considered relates to a situation where an attempt is made to contract e 
(that is, efforts directed towards quality enhancements). We begin by identifying the ‘first 
best’ situation, which involves G and M selecting a level of e to maximise the net surplus 
from their trading relationship. The surplus can subsequently be divided between the two 
parties. 
 
In the first best, G and M solve: 
                                                 
21
 B’(e) > 0; B’’(e) <0 
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{ )()(max eCeB
e
−   
This has a unique solution: 
0*)('*)(' =− eCeB  
 
This constitutes a useful guiding principle for the analysis as it implies that at the social 
optimum the marginal social benefit (B’(e)) of devoting extra effort to improve the 
quality outcomes of a construction project must equal the marginal cost of that effort 
(C’(e)). This is a standard tenet of welfare economics. 
 
We now consider whether negotiated outcomes from a contract that includes e will 
achieve this social optimum (assuming that quality enhancement and investments are 
fully observable). The payoff from a contract with a renegotiated price to encourage 
investment in quality will be, for the public agency: 
)()(00 eBePPBUG +−−=  
The payoff for the contractor will be: 
)()(00 eCePCPUM −+−=  
 
Assuming rationality, each party chooses e to maximise their respective payoffs. 
For the government, this involves solving: 
{ })()(max ePeB
e
−  
This has a unique solution: 
P’(e)=B’(e), implying the agency has an incentive to offer an increased contract price in 
proportion to the expected social benefits of the innovation. 
The contractor will solve: 
}{ )()(max eCeP
e
−  
This has a unique solution: 
0)(')(' =− mm eCeP , which has the straightforward interpretation that additional 
investments in quality will be undertaken by the contractor so long as the financial 
rewards, )('
m
eP , exceed the costs, )('
m
eC . 
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There are several implications from this stage of the analysis. First, the outcomes from a 
contract that includes provisions relating to quality enhancements will (given the 
satisfaction of assumptions relating to contract performance) result in positive 
investments in quality. However, compared with the first best outcome, a contract that 
includes provisions relating to quality enhancements is likely to result in the contractor 
under-investing in the enhancement. That is, unless P’(e) = B’(e)22, which implies the 
contractor accrues all the net benefits of the contract renegotiation, the contractor’s 
willingness to make investments in quality will be less than optimal. 
 
The level of competition for contractor services will affect this latter result. Specifically, 
higher levels of competition (due, for example, strong economic conditions) will bid up 
the price for any quality improvements and, thus, reduce the net surplus accruing to the 
government from any provisions that it does negotiate. 
 
Extensions to this basic framework provide additional insights to the issues affecting 
outcomes from construction contracts that attempt to leverage training outcomes. First, 
following Hart et al. (1997), and still within the confines of the ‘simple’ model described 
above, we add a shift factor, θ to the function B(e) in UG. This factor, ranging in value 
from 0 to 1 can be used to represent variables that affect the relationship between a given 
level of investment in training and the social benefits derived. Where θ is small the 
training actions of the contractor have little significance for social outcomes. Thus, the 
importance or value of special provisions to regulate training will be small and G’s 
willingness to offer a higher price to secure these investments should be small, ceteris 
paribus. Conversely, when θ is close to unity the importance of ensuring high investment 
levels will be relatively large. In a training context, θ is likely to be related positively to 
the size of the project in relation to the local economy. 
 
                                                 
22
 Note that first best requires 0*)('*)(' =− eCeB , whereas, M will operate where 
0*)('*)(' =− eCeP  
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It is also useful to add a shift factor, Φ, to the function C(e) in UM, with 0<Φ <1 to 
represent variables affecting the relationship between given levels of training effort and 
the additional costs incurred by the contractor. Where Φ is small the barriers to achieving 
particular levels of investment in training will be relatively small, reducing the contract 
price required to achieve high investment levels, ceteris paribus. In a training context, Φ 
is likely to be inversely related firm size (given that large firms often already employ 
apprentices, for example, and thus may not need additional training investments to meet 
contract provisions). On the other hand, Φ is likely to be positively related to labour 
market shortages and prevailing, administrated training wages and administrative costs. 
 
As noted in the literature review, Bennett and Iossa (2005) provide an extension of the 
HSV model that is useful in the context of questions about the factors affecting 
investments in training. Specifically, Bennett and Iossa address the HSV assumption that 
all the benefits of a quality innovation are external, in the sense that B(e) accrues to 
members of the community other than the contractor. In a situation where the quality 
innovation relates to training of workers, this is akin to an assumption that the skills 
imparted through training are perfectly transferable (or ‘general’), rather than specific.  
 
The Bennett and Iossa extension allows us to model a situation where the skills produced 
by a training program have at least some degree of specificity and/or the skills involved 
are general but the labour market is imperfectly competitive. In these cases, due to 
restrictions on the mobility of trained workers, the firm is able to capture (or internalise) 
at least some of the benefits of a training investment.  
 
To accomplish this a shift factor λ can be added to B(e) and the combined term λ B(e) 
inserted in the equation for UM . This also requires that a term (1- λ) is added to the 
equation for UG. λ will represent the share of the benefits of the training investment 
internalised by the firm. If it has a positive value the residual value of the contract 
accruing to the firm increases with the quality innovation.  This increases the likelihood 
that the firm will independently make training investments, reducing the need for special 
provisions to regulate quality and/or the need for increases in contract prices to achieve 
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these innovations. In a labour market context, λ is likely to be related to the nature 
(general or specific) of the training involved with particular construction projects; the 
level of competition in the local labour market (competition increases the mobility of 
workers, reducing possible returns to the firm from investments in general skills); and 
uncertainty about future product market conditions. 
 
Another important extension of the HSV framework reflects the likely importance of 
transaction and/or monitoring costs in contracts that incorporate provisions relating to 
quality innovations. In Globerman and Vining’s (1996) analysis, these costs include 
opportunism and bargaining costs. Opportunism relates to the risks that a contract party 
will attempt to change the agreed terms of the contract in its favour after the initial 
contract has been agreed. This risk arises where the other party has a dependence on 
contract outcomes and limited alternatives. Opportunism contributes transaction costs 
associated with the design of measures aimed at mitigating its potential influence.  
 
Bargaining costs refer to the costs involved in negotiating and re-negotiating a contract, 
monitoring its performance and resolving disputes. Although several of these costs are 
incurred after the contract has been agreed, they can be anticipated during the design of a 
contract. As such, these bargaining costs are likely to add to contracting costs in the ex 
ante period.  
 
In Globerman and Vining’s (1996) analysis, the magnitude of bargaining and 
opportunism costs will be related to task complexity (i.e. the degree of difficulty in 
specifying and monitoring the terms and conditions of the contract); competition in the 
relevant market; and asset specificity (i.e. the extent to which physical and human assets 
associated with a project cannot be secured from, or re-deployed to, other sources). They 
note, for example, that if task complexity is large and outside the sphere of a government 
agency’s sphere of expertise, transaction costs are likely to be particularly large. High 
levels of asset specificity add to the risks of opportunistic behaviour and thus also add to 
transaction costs. Competition within the contract market is predicted to have the 
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opposite influence – acting as a deterrent to opportunistic behaviour (and, thus, lowering 
transaction costs).  
 
It is possible to incorporate a factor, e.g. z(e), into the UG function to represent the 
additional transaction costs to the government associated with requiring quality 
investments by the successful tenderer. The influence of this factor on contract outcomes 
will be that the optimal level of investment, e*, will fall; as will the maximum price, P(e),  
the government agency will be prepared to pay for promised quality innovations. In turn, 
this will restrict the amount of investment accomplished through the contract option.  
 
From the above discussion of transaction costs, it is also logical to apply a shift factor, ∂, 
(0<∂<1) to reflect differences in the significance of z(e) associated with task complexity, 
competition and asset specificity. In a training context, ∂ is likely to be related positively 
to the size and length of the project and the complexity of the training task. 
 
A further extension of the HSV framework, making use of the insights of stakeholder 
theory, allows for the likelihood that G (the government) comprises a number of entities, 
potentially with different perceptions of the net social benefits of particular quality 
investments. For example, in the case of provisions relating to training, one agency is 
typically responsible for sponsoring the policy and identifying desired levels of training 
activities, whilst another agency is typically responsible for designing and implementing 
construction contracts. This framework predicts conflict between agencies and potential 
inefficiencies if the government department responsible for sponsoring the policy doesn’t 
take into account potential transaction costs. Specifically, under these circumstances, the 
sponsoring agency would be expecting a higher level of investment than is socially 
efficient. The magnitude of these effects would depend on factors relating to the power 
and urgency of this particular stakeholder. The analysis presented here implies that social 
efficiency is improved through the full representation of transaction costs in 
considerations of the net social benefits of prescribed quality innovations. 
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Data Collection and Analysis 
 
As noted in the introduction to this report, the complexity of leveraged social policies 
demanded that a range of data collection and analysis methods be employed for this 
project. The availability of data on tender bids both before and after the implementation 
of key training policies in WA meant that quantitative approaches to the measurement of 
some potential costs of the policies were possible. For the other policies, and for training 
and employment policies in Queensland, analysis relied on qualitative data, collected in 
interviews from key industry participants. The following sub-sections outline, for each 
type of policy/jurisdiction, the data used, the methods employed in the analysis and the 
results derived. 
 
The Training Policies of the Western Australian Government: A 
Quantitative Analysis 
 
The Western Australian Department of Housing and Work’s Tender Registration System 
(TRS) was implemented in 1996 as a way of recording the tender details of all WA 
government construction projects. As such it contains records on the details of each pubic 
construction project undertaken since 1996, including: a description of the works to be 
undertaken; the location of the planned work; and the estimated pre-tender value of the 
project. The database also contains information on the number of tender documents 
requested for each project, together with details on each of the tenders received and the 
winning bid.  
 
This study made use of the TRS project and tender details on government non-residential 
construction contracts awarded between 1997 and 2006 to study the possible impacts of 
the Building Skills and Priority Start policies on bid numbers and prices. As was noted in 
the theoretical discussion, the implementation of policies such as these could be 
anticipated to reduce the willingness of contractors to bid for public construction prices 
and/or raise the ‘supply price’ for these projects. This ‘supply-side’ effect is an important 
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component of the economic cost of the policies that should be considered in any 
evaluation of the efficacy of the policy measures. 
 
In total, we analysed 2519 government non-residential construction contracts awarded 
between 199723 and 2006. 11525 tender bids were submitted for these contracts. As such, 
our analysis is based on a sample that includes almost 100% of the relevant contracts and 
bids included in the TRS over the seven year period. Only a very small number of non-
residential construction contracts were excluded from the analysis due to incomplete 
recording of their details24.  
 
To facilitate analysis, this study made some alterations to the TRS records, in addition to 
‘cleaning the data’ to remove incomplete or nonsensical entries (such as contracts with a 
zero dollar value). First, the postcode information in the TRS was recoded to identify the 
regional location of the projects. This recoding was based on the Western Australian 
Department of Land Information’s regional development regions: Gascoyne, Goldfields-
Esperance, Great Southern, Kimberley, Mid West, Peel, Pilbara, South West, Wheatbelt, 
and Perth. Second, pre-qualification financial levels were imputed from pre-tender 
values, to minimise the data gaps associated with these levels. We also added to the data 
set information on a range of construction activity and cost pressures within the State. 
Together, this data provides a comprehensive overview of construction activity in 
Western Australia over the 1997-2006 period. 
 
Background: Construction Activity and Bid Numbers on Public Construction Contracts 
 
We can start by noting that the total value of non-residential construction activity 
completed in Western Australia in 2006 was $2280m. As the following figure shows 
private sector work dominates this total, comprising close to 75% of all non-residential 
construction work in 2006. Public sector activity in 2006 was valued at $592m. 
                                                 
23
 Although the TRS was initiated in 2006, records in this year were incomplete and, thus, excluded from 
our investigation 
24
 The omission of records on location and tender value appeared to be due to record keeping errors and is, 
thus, unlikely to be a source of systematic bias in the results of our analysis. 
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The information in Figure 1 also shows the strong upward trend in non-residential 
construction work in the State from the beginning of 2002, with this increase being 
dominated by private sector activity. Between December 2001 and December 2006 the 
total nominal value of private sector work increased by 120.6%. This compared to a 3.1% 
increase between December 1996 and December 2001. 
 
Figure 1: Total, Private, and Public Nominal Values for Non-Residential Construction Work 
done in Western Australia by Quarter, December 1996 to December 2006. 
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Source: Australia Bureau Statistics, 8752.0 Building Activity, Australia, Table 45. Value of Building Work by Sector, Western 
Australia: Original.  (Series Identifications: A2057722C, A2034996K, and A2046139R). 
 
It is not particularly surprising that the 1996-2007 period was also characterised by a 
sharp fall in the average number of tender bids for WA government non-residential 
construction contracts. As is shown in the following diagram, between 1997 and 2006 the 
average number of bids on these contracts fell from 5.1 to 3.3 bids, or by 35.3%. A large 
part of this change was concentrated in the years from 2001. 
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Figure 2: Average Number of Tender Bids on WA Public, Non-Residential Construction 
Contracts by Year, 1997 to 2006 
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Western Australia is a large and geographically diverse state and, as such, any analysis of 
construction activity needs to take into account sizeable regional differences in costs of 
production. In the study period, the large majority (70%) of public construction contracts 
related to work undertaken in the Perth region25. A further 9% of contracts were located 
in the South West and Peel regions, both of which are relatively close to Perth. As is 
shown in Figure 3, the remaining contracts were spread across a range of remote regions.  
                                                 
25
 This study matched the postcode information contained in the TRS with the WA Department of Land 
Information’s regional development regions25 to identify the regional distribution of contracts 
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Figure 3: WA Public Non-Residential Construction Awarded Contracts by Regional 
Development Region, 1997 to 2006 (per cent) 
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The decrease in bid numbers observed in the state as a whole also occurred in the two 
groups of regions identified here. In the regions located relatively close to Perth – that is, 
the Perth, Peel, and South West regional development regions – the average number of 
tender bids declined by 42% between 2001 and 2006. In the remaining, more remote 
regions, this decline was 35%. These patterns are outlined in the following figures. 
Figure 4: The Average Number of Tender Bids for the Perth, Peel, and South West 
Regional Development Regions by Year, 1997 to 2006. 
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Figure 5: The Average Number of Tender Bids for All Regional Development Regions other 
than Perth, Peel, and the South West Regions by Year, 1997 to 2006. 
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Another source of diversity in public non-residential construction work in WA is the size 
of the work undertaken. Projects range from small additions to local schools to large 
infrastructure projects. This diversity is especially important in the context of the current 
investigation because the training policies being studied only apply to relatively large 
projects. As was noted in the previous section, the Priority Access Policy applies only to 
contracts with a pre-tender value of $150,000 or more; the Building Skills Policy to 
contracts with a pre-tender value of more than $2 million. 1019 contracts (or 54.2% of all 
awarded contracts) have been subject to the Priority Access Policy since its introduction 
in August 1999. The Building Skills Policy has applied to 160 contracts (or 11.8% of all 
awarded contracts) since its introduction in October 2002. Further information on the size 
distribution of awarded contracts is contained in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: WA Public Non-Residential Construction Contracts by Pre-Qualification Financial 
Level, 1997 to 2006 (per cent). 
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The downward trend in tender bid numbers was common to each of pre-qualification 
levels associated with the contracts, but it was largest in magnitude in the Level 2-4 (mid-
range) categories. This pattern is summarised in the following table and set of graphs.  
Table 3: Percentage Decline in the Average Number of Tender Bids by Pre-Qualification 
Financial Level 2001-2006. 
Pre-Qualification Financial Level Percentage Decline in the Average 
Number of Tender Bids 
(Level 0) - $1 to $149,000 22.9% 
(Level 1) - $150,000 to $750,000 50.2% 
(Level 2) - $750,001 to $1,500,000 56.4% 
(Level 3) - $1,500,001 to $3,000,000 60.4% 
(Level 4) - $3,000,001 to $7,500,000  56.4% 
(Level 5) - $7,500,001 and above 26.2% 
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Figure 7: Tender Bids by Pre-Qualification Level 
Average Number of Tender Bids for Pre-Qualification Financial Level 0 by Year, 1997 to 
2006
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Average Number of Tender Bids for Pre-Qualification Financial Level 1 by Year, 1997 to 
2006
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Average Number of Tender Bids for Pre-Qualification Financial Level 2 by Year, 1997 to 
2006
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Average Number of Tender Bids for Pre-Qualification Financial Level 3 by Year, 1997 to 
2006
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Average Number of Tender Bids for Pre-Qualification Financial Level 4 by Year, 1997 to 
2006
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Average Number of Tender Bids for Pre-Qualification Financial Level 5 by Year, 1997 to 
2006
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The observed trends in bid numbers are likely to have been strongly influenced by 
changes in factors affecting the availability of other construction work and the 
cost/availability of resources. The years since 2002 have been associated with 
substantial growth in WA’s resource and construction industries and this has 
produced large pressures on available labour and materials. 
 
A number of related statistical measures convey information on these pressures. For 
example, as is shown in the following chart, based on the DHW’s Building Cost 
Index26, there was only a slight rise in building costs (by around 8%) from the 
beginning of 1997 up to mid 2002 but these then increased rapidly (by around 55%) 
to the end of 2006.  
 
Figure 8: Building Cost Index for the Perth Region by Month, January 1997 to 
December 2006. 
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Source: The Western Australian Department of Housing and Works. Works and Building Construction Building Cost Index – 
Perth, File BB 576/87, Personal communication DHW, May 30 2007 
 
The building cost index is derived from measures of labour and materials costs and 
reflects the costs of accomplishing standard types of public and private sector 
construction projects27. The influence of labour costs on the index is apparent in the 
similar pattern of change in construction industry wages over the study period. As is 
shown in Figure 9, these remained relatively stable between February 1996 and 
                                                 
26
 for the Perth region includes both labour and material costs. 
27
 For example, it reports the current cost of a typical school and prison. 
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August 2002 (increasing by only 1.6%). However, they rose rapidly from August 
2002 onwards, increasing by 40.8% by November 2006 (ABS, 2006a).  
Figure 9: Construction Industry Average Weekly Earnings for Western Australia and 
Australia by Quarter, February 1996 - November 2006. 
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Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Cat. No. 9941.0, Average Weekly Earnings by Industry Division (Construction) and 
Areas of WA, Total Employee Earnings, Original Persons Data, February 1996 - November 2006. 
 
Materials costs rose by only 6.1% between December 1996 and the September 2002 
but rose by 23.6% between the September 2002 and December 2006. This is 
described in the following figure.  
Figure 10: Materials Cost Index for Buildings other than Housing for the Perth Region 
by Quarter, December 1997 to December 2006. 
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Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Cat. No. 6427.0 Producer Price Indexes, Australia, Table 48. Materials used in Building 
Other Than House Building Special Series, Index Numbers – Perth. 
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Labour shortages emerged in the state post 2002 and were an important contributor to 
the rising wage costs. The Department of Employment and Workplace Relations skills 
vacancy index (DEWR n.d.), which provides a monthly indicator of the degree of 
difficulty that employers have in filling vacancies in occupations or specialised skill 
needs, recorded a 129.5% increase between the start of 2002 and the end of 2006. 
This data is shown in the figure below. 
Figure 11: Department of Employment and Workplace Relations’ Skills Vacancy Index 
for Western Australia by Month, December 1996 to December 2006. 
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Source:http://www.workplace.gov.au/workplace/Publications/ResearchStats/LabourMarketAnalysis/VacancyReports/ 
 
Multi-Factor Analysis of the Effects of Building Skills and Priority Access on Bid 
Activity in the WA Public Construction Sector, 1997-2006 
 
A central research question addressed in this study is whether the additional training 
requirements imposed as a result of the Priority Access and Building Skills policies 
had a measurable and distinct impact on bid activity for public construction contracts. 
That is, was there a measurable effect of these policies on bid numbers that was 
separate from the impacts on bid activity generated by the changing economic 
conditions which, as is shown in the above section, were so strongly underway in the 
state? 
 
Conducting such an analysis clearly requires a multi-factor approach that is able to 
‘control’ for the influence of the range of other factors on bid numbers (such as 
changes in private construction activity and costs, as well as variations in contract 
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region and project size) before focusing on the relationship between the 
implementation of the policies and bid activity. 
 
The approach adopted for this investigation is to examine variations in the number of 
tender bids for non-residential government construction contracts around the time of 
the implementation of each policy28. In the case of Priority Access policy, the analysis 
period is August 1997 to August 2001, which encompasses the 24 months prior to and 
the 24 months after the implementation date of the policy. In the case of the Building 
Skills policy, the 48 month analysis period is October 2000 to October 2004.  
 
The analysis focuses on differences in bid activity between the ‘market’ segments 
affected and unaffected by the policy. In the case of the Priority Access Policy this 
involves a comparison of changes in bid activity across the analysis period between a) 
projects with a pre-tender value of at least $150,000 (and thus potentially affected by 
the policy); and b) projects with a pre-tender value of less than $150,000 (not affected 
by the policy). In the case of the Building Skills Policy the two comparison groups are 
a) projects with a pre-tender value of more than $2million; and b) projects with a pre-
tender value of $2 million or less. In each case we hypothesise that if the policies 
were affecting bid activity, activity levels would fall in relative terms in the market 
segment affected by the policy. Furthermore, this fall would be observed in the 
analysis period. 
 
The following chart shows bid activity in the two market segments associated with the 
Priority Access policy over the analysis period. This data is clearly not supportive of 
the above hypothesis. In fact an opposite pattern is apparent: the average number of 
bids declined for contracts not subject to the Priority Access policy over the analysis 
period, whilst there was negligible change in the average number of bids for tenders 
subject to the policy.  
 
                                                 
28
 This approach to restricting the time period allows us to focus more fully on the effects of the policy 
whilst allowing for the possibility of anticipatory or delayed effects 
  52
Figure 12: Average Number of Tender Bids for Contracts with a Pre-tender value < 
$150,000 and Tenders with a Pre-tender value ≥ $150,000 by Year, 1997 to 
2001 
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The following chart provides information on changes in the average number of bids 
for contracts affected/not affected by the Building Skills policy between 2000 and 
2004. At face value this data is more supportive of a hypothesis that the policy 
affected bid activity: the average number of bids for contracts subject to the policy fell 
at a greater rate than those not subject to the policy over the analysis period. There is 
also an apparent alignment between the introduction of the policy and this relative 
change. However, given the strength of the other influences on the construction 
market (as described in the previous section), there is a need for caution before 
reaching firm conclusions about the effects of the policy. The following section 
provides more definitive insights. 
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Figure 13: Average Number of Tender Bids for Tenders with a Pre-tender value ≤ $2m 
and Tenders with a Pre-tender value > $2m by Year, 2000 to 2006. 
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Econometric Strategy 
 
The multi-factor analysis of the relationship between bid activity and policy settings is 
structured into two parts, each relating to the key policy initiatives: Priority Access 
and Building Skills. In each part, however, the same approach is taken to the 
measurement of the effects of the policy. Specifically, linear (OLS) regression 
techniques are used to estimate the following equation, which relates to the 
determination of the number of bids for public construction contracts. 
 
 NBi = β1 + β2 PDi + β3 Zi + β4 PTi + β5RNi + β6OFi + γ2 (Zi x PDi) + εit            
 
NBi, is the number of bids submitted on contract i; PDi is a dummy variable that is 
based on the date of implementation of the policy (for example, in the case of Priority 
Access this variable takes on a value of 1 for all contracts dated after August 1999); Zi 
is a dummy variable that identifies whether the contract falls within the scope of the 
policy’s application (in the case of Priority Access this variable is coded as ‘1’ for all 
contracts with a value of $150,000 or more); PTi is a continuous measure that relates 
to the contract’s pre-tender value; RNi is a dummy variable that identifies whether the 
location of the project was in the Perth, South-West or Peel Regions, or in another, 
more remote region. OFi is a continuous variable based on the value of the Building 
Cost index in the month that the bids were recorded. It is used in this model to proxy 
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the level of competition in the construction market29. Finally, the interaction term 
(Zi*PDi) identifies those projects that were affected by the implementation of the 
policy (for example, in the case of Priority Access this variable will only take on a 
value of 1 for contracts with a pre-tender value of $150,000 or more and dated after 
August 1999). εi is a random error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed 
with E(εi)=0 and the var (εi)= σ2. 
 
The modelled relationship can be described in the following simplified terms. First, 
the function S, shown in the diagram below, represents the positive relationship 
between the pre-tender value of the contract and the number of bids. 
 
 
 
 
 
The other factors in the model are hypothesised to be associated with shifts in this 
function. For example, in more remote regions the function S could be expected to 
shift downwards (implying a positive coefficient on the variable RNi in the above 
equation) due to the greater difficulties in accomplishing construction work in these 
                                                 
29
 As noted in the previous section, this index reflects current costs of accomplishing the types of 
construction projects contracted for via the TRS. A variety of measures of market conditions (such as 
indexes of labour availability, materials costs, etc) are available. However, testing indicated that these 
are strongly correlated with the Building Cost Index.  
NBi 
PTi 
S 
S’ 
Z 
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areas as compared to less remote regions. The background statistics shown in earlier 
parts of this report support this hypothesis. Higher building costs are likely to be 
associated with a downward/rightward shift in the function (implying a negative value 
on the coefficient on OFi). If the introduction of a training policy has a negative effect 
on bid activity, its application only to projects with a PTi ≥ Zi would cause a 
discontinuity in S around point Zi (as represent by the function S’). Evidence in 
support of this hypothesis would be a significant negative coefficient on the 
interactive term (Zi*PDi). The individual term PDi controls for the possibility 
(seemingly remote) that there was a change in bid activity for all contracts around the 
time of the introduction of the policy. The individual term Zi controls for the 
possibility (more likely) that there are underlying differences in the relationship 
between tender activity and pre-tender prices in the group of contracts ‘priced’ above 
and below the trigger value of the policy. 
 
Results 
 
The estimated relationships between tender bid numbers and the various explanatory 
variables included in the RHS of the above equation using DHW data are outlined in 
this section. Reflecting the above discussion, these results are presented separately for 
the Priority Access and Building Skills policies. 
 
 Priority Access Policy 
The above equation was first estimated with reference to data on bid numbers on 
DHW contracts for the period August 1997 to August 2001. In this case Zi is defined 
by the introduction of the Priority Access Policy in August 1999 and PDi is defined by 
the policy’s application to projects with a value of $150,000 or more. 
 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4 below. 
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Table 4: Estimated Coefficients for Equation on Bid Numbers on Government Non-
Residential Construction Contracts (Priority Access Policy), Western 
Australia 1997-2001. 
Variable Coefficient Prob. 
Constant -4.2950 0.6142 
Policy Implementation Date (PD) -0.4990 0.3528 
Contract above trigger value (Z) 0.9299 0.0007 
Pre-Tender Value (PT) -1.29E-07 0.0033 
Region 1.4243 0.0000 
Building Cost Index 0.0720 0.3394 
PD*Z 0.0216 0.9612 
Notes: Log-Likelihood: 1957.8; Nobs: 789; Method: OLS 
 
The data in Table 4 indicate that the implementation of the Priority Access Policy in 
August 1999 did not have a significant effect on competition for government non-
residential construction contracts in WA. The reduction in bid numbers observed 
around the time of the implementation of this policy was similar in ‘market segments’ 
subject to the influence of the policy (i.e. contracts with a value of $150,000 or more) 
and in other parts of the ‘market’. The figures in Table 4 show, rather, that during the 
analysis period (August 1997 to August 2001) bid numbers varied between contracts 
firstly due to regional factors. The average number of bids on contracts in more 
remote regions was 1.42 bids less than the number of bids on contracts in the Perth, 
South West and Peel group of regions. Bid numbers in the analysis period were also 
significantly affected by the value of the contract. Contracts with a value of $150,000 
or more had, on average, close to 1 additional bid per contract than those with a lower 
pre-tender value. A somewhat surprising result is the lack of a statistical significant 
relationship between the building cost index and bid numbers. The most likely 
explanation for this is that, as was outlined in previous sections, the period 1997 to 
2001 was a period of relatively stable economic conditions. There was little variation 
in the building cost index over the analysis period and, thus, this was not an important 
source of differences in bid activity.  
 
Building Skills Policy 
The results derived from the application of the above equation to TRS data relevant to 
the Building Skills Policy are presented in Table 5. In this case the analysis period 
spans October 2000 to October 2004; Zi is defined by the introduction of the Building 
Skills Policy in October 2002; and PDi is defined by the policy’s application to 
projects with a value above $2 million. 
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The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5 below. 
Table 5: Estimated Coefficients for Equation on Bid Numbers on Government Non-
Residential Construction Contracts (Building Skills Policy), Western Australia 
2000-2004. 
Variable Coefficient Prob. 
Constant 9.3524 0.0000 
Policy Implementation Date (PD) -0.4719 0.0516 
Contract above trigger value (Z) 1.4512 0.1009 
Pre-Tender Value (PT) 1.39E-07 0.0008 
Region 1.2794 0.0000 
Building Cost Index -0.0436 0.0004 
PD*Z -1.4152 0.0986 
Notes: Log-Likelihood: 1873.5; Nobs: 807; Method: OLS 
 
The data in Table 5 provide some evidence of a negative impact of the Building Skills 
Policy on bid activity relating to government non-residential construction contracts in 
WA. Bid numbers on contracts affected by the policy (i.e. above $2 million in value 
and commencing after October 2002) were, on average, 1.42 bids lower than contracts 
not affected by the policy after 2002. However, this effect was only statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
 
A further contrast between the results in Table 5 and those in Table 4 is the 
significance of building costs as a source of variation in bid numbers. The figures in 
Table 5 indicate a strong negative relationship between the building cost index and 
bid numbers. The difference between the results in Table 4 and 5 is likely to derive 
from the relatively large rate of change in the building cost index between 2000 and 
2004, as compared to 1997-2001.  
 
A similarity between the two sets of results is the measured importance of regional 
factors as a source of variation in bid numbers. In Table 5 the average number of bids 
on contracts in more remote regions was 1.27 bids less than the number of bids on 
contracts in the Perth, South West and Peel region. Finally, bid numbers in the 
analysis period relevant to the Building Skills Policy were positively affected by the 
value of the contract. 
 
Differences across Market Segments 
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The effects of the Building Skills Policy in the key segments of the WA public 
construction ‘market’ can be explored further by adding further terms, which interact 
the policy implementation date variable with measures of the pre-qualification level 
of the contractor30, to the regression equation described above. The coefficients on 
these terms identify the different effects of the Building Skills Policy in market 
segments associated with the pre-qualification status of the contractors. The amended 
regression results are outlined in Table 6. 
Table 6: Estimated Coefficients for Equation Including Market Segment Measures. Bid 
Numbers on Government Non-Residential Construction Contracts (Building Skills 
Policy), Western Australia 2000-2004. 
Variable Coefficient Prob. 
Constant 9.636244 0.0000 
Policy Implementation Date (PD) -0.426558 0.0810 
Contract above trigger value (Z) 1.964689 0.2361 
Pre-Qual.3 1.141072 0.0955 
Pre-Qual.4 -0.045097 0.9818 
Pre-Qual.5 -0.677310 0.6921 
Region 1.290959 0.0000 
Building Cost Index -0.045998 0.0002 
PD*Z*Pre-Qual.3 -3.350192 0.0447 
PD*Pre-Qual.4 -0.930167 0.4235 
PD*Pre-Qual.5 0.378037 0.5759 
Notes: Log-Likelihood: -1871.4; Nobs: 807; Method: OLS 
 
It can be noted, first, that the inclusion of the new terms did not cause the estimated 
role of other key variables – such as region and building costs – to change in any 
substantial way. The changed formulation of the model indicates that pre-qualification 
level is, in the main, an insignificant source of variation in bid numbers. However, the 
coefficients on the interaction terms are the main focus of our interest in this section. 
They identify whether – and to what extent – the measured effect of the introduction 
of the Building Skills Policy on bid numbers varied significantly between the different 
pre-qualification levels. For example, the coefficient on the last interaction term 
measures the extent to which the difference in bid numbers associated with the 
policy’s introduction varied between the group of projects associated with a pre-
qualification level 5 and those projects with a pre-qualification level of 2 or less. The 
results on the interaction terms indicate, first, that the changes in bid numbers on 
projects associated with pre-qualification levels 4 and 5 following the introduction of 
                                                 
30
 Pre-qualification level is closely related to tender value. Thus, the tender value variable is removed 
from the regression equation. 
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the Building Skills Policy were not significantly different from the change recorded 
by projects unaffected by the policy. This implies that large firms were relatively 
unaffected by the policy’s introduction. In contrast, bid numbers on projects 
associated with pre-qualification level 3, following the policy’s introduction, are 
shown to be significantly lower than bid numbers on projects unaffected by the 
policy.  This implies that small to medium sized firms were affected by the policy’s 
introduction, and that they reduced their willingness to tender on government projects 
as a result. 
 
Discussion of Quantitative Results 
 
It is important to consider why the Building Skills Policy, but not the Priority Access 
Policy, had an impact on bid activity for non-residential construction contracts in WA. 
Bid numbers were lower on contracts affected by the Building Skills Policy following 
the implementation of the policy in October 2002. This effect was distinct from the 
influence of changes in construction costs and regional and project size factors on bid 
numbers. A similar effect was not apparent following the introduction of the Priority 
Access Policy in 1999. 
 
A superficial assessment of the policies based on these differences might conclude 
that the Building Skills Policy, which requires that contractors allocate 10% of 
deemed labour hours to the employment of apprentices and trainees, is less desirable. 
The policy appears to have contributed to a lowering of competition for public 
construction contracts in the 48 month period surrounding its implementation. The 
data available to this study does not allow us to identify with certainty whether this 
change comprised a decreased willingness to tender for any public project, or a shying 
away from particular projects. However, both of these impacts have efficiency 
consequences for the public construction program, potentially contributing to higher 
costs and/or lower quality outcomes. Given that WA is currently under the influence 
of a range of economic pressures, these added costs are of particular concern. The 
Priority Access Policy, which required contractors to meet a number of requirements 
relating to employment and training activities (such as having staff with tertiary 
qualifications) did not appear to add to the contract price for public works. 
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Our interpretation of the results presented in the above section is quite different – and 
we conclude that the Priority Access Policy is not necessarily a superior approach to 
regulating training outcomes on government construction projects. We see in the 
results evidence that the Priority Access Policy did not in fact affect the training 
behaviour of construction companies: as the introduction of the policy had no evident 
impact on their willingness to bid for public projects. One possible explanation for 
this is that the policy did not impose high training requirements on contractors. As 
such, although the policy may not have affected competition for public works, it is 
unlikely to have achieved improved training outcomes. It is also likely to have still 
imposed transaction costs on contractors and, especially, the administering 
department. In sum, the apparent gains (via investments in training) of the policy are 
few whilst it was still associated with some costs. The next section, which reports the 
findings of a qualitative assessment of the policies will shed additional light on these 
costs and benefits. 
 
Questions remain about the positive impacts of the Building Skills Policy. As already 
noted, the policy appears to have influenced the willingness of small to medium-sized 
contractors to bid for public projects. This implies that at least some of these 
contractors perceived that they would need to change their training behaviour to meet 
the new contract requirements. However, a remaining unknown is whether the 
contractors who remained involved in the public works ‘market’ following the 
policy’s introduction were those already engaged in training, or whether the policy 
encouraged some firms to increase their training commitments. If the former scenario 
is the more accurate (implying that non-training firms simply shifted to other 
markets), then the benefits of this policy are also likely to have been small. Rather, 
substantial additional contract and administrative costs are likely to have been 
incurred as a result of the policy’s introduction with little in the way of a net social 
benefit. Although the data available to this quantitative study of the effects of the 
policy cannot provide definitive answers to these questions, the qualitative assessment 
of the policy, summarised in the next section, does provide some insights. 
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The Training and Employment Policies of the Western Australian 
Government: A Qualitative Analysis 
   
 
This section presents a qualitative analysis of the Western Australian government‘s 
Priority Access, Building Skills and Buy Local policies. The analysis is based on the 
costs and benefits as perceived by the main entities affected by these policies, which 
include the contracting agencies, such as the Department of Housing and Works; the 
sponsoring agencies, such as the Department of Education and Training; head 
building contractors; and subcontractors. The section adds important details on the 
costs and benefits of the policies and, as such, complements the quantitative materials 
outlined in the previous section. 
 
Sample and Method 
 
The sample included the key policy officers of the contracting and sponsoring 
agencies. It also included groups of head and subcontractors. The first group of 
contractors comprised companies that are currently engaged on public works projects. 
The second group comprised companies that have ceased tendering for public 
construction contracts. In the Perth region we interviewed one small, medium, and 
large head contractor from each group.  In the non-Perth region we interviewed small, 
medium and large head contractors currently engaged in public construction projects. 
The subcontractors interviewed were drawn from both the Perth region and regions 
other than the Perth region, and also ranged in size from small to large.  
 
The interviews were based on a semi-structured format, with a standard set of 
questions being asked of each entity, but allowing for other relevant issues to be 
discussed during the interview. All the interviews were conducted face-to-face and 
digitally recorded to ensure the accuracy of the interview transcriptions and 
summaries.  
 
  62
Costs and Benefits of the Priority Access Policy 
 
The costs associated with the Priority Access Policy were generally perceived to be 
small, although, as could be expected, the nature of these costs varied across the entity 
groups. 
 
The sponsoring agency: Department of Education and Training 
 
The main costs to the Department of Education and Training in implementing the 
Priority Access Policy were the costs associated with processing the Priority Access 
application forms and the costs associated with monitoring the policy. In relation to 
these tasks and their costs, the key policy officer stated that: 
 
”It was pretty light. Once people got their certificate and were deemed as 
Priority Access compliant that was it, there was no heavy monitoring.  We had 
one person on it, working on Priority Access, so there weren’t a lot of 
resources put in it from our end.” 
 
The magnitude of these particular costs could therefore be estimated as equivalent to 
the cost of one full-time equivalent position, presumably at a fairly junior level, for 
the duration of the policy.  
 
A contracting agency: the Department of Main Roads 
 
The administration costs imposed on the Department of Main Roads as a result of the 
Priority Access Policy were estimated by the policy officer we interviewed as “pretty 
minimal”. The Policy was perceived to be “just a registration process”, and 
registration could be easily achieved.  
 
A contracting agency: The Department of Housing and Works 
 
A number of costs were associated with the implementation of the Priority Access 
policy by the Department of Housing and Works.  The first of these are associated 
with including the provisions of the policy in the Department’s tender and contract 
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documentation. The Department’s key policy officer asserted that these costs were 
negligible: 
 
“It’s not hard to write things into contracts, it’s very easy to write obligations 
into contracts”. 
 
Further costs were related to the Department’s need for additional labour to process 
Priority Access provisions. However, these were also perceived to be small: 
 
“It’s all very difficult to quantify it, because everything else they have to do 
this is just one element of it. …In dealing with these issues we have not had to 
create a position and say that’s all your job is to manage all these issues.” 
 
The policy officer raised concern that the implementation of the Priority Access 
Policy had been associated with an increase in the tender prices on its projects. 
However, all of the head contractors and subcontractors that we interviewed asserted 
that the policy had not affected their tender pricing, although they also stated that the 
cost of employing apprentices, trainees and/or other staff were taken into account in 
both their tender pricing. The key question that remains therefore is whether the 
Priority Access Policy raised these costs. The material in the next sub-section (on the 
policy’s benefits) will help answer this issue. 
 
A related concern raised by the policy officer was that the Priority Access Policy 
acted as a disincentive for contractors to bid on government construction contracts. 
Against this, all of the head contractors and subcontractors interviewed indicated that 
the Priority Access policy had not affected their willingness to tender on government 
construction contracts. They all noted that the provisions of the policy were easy to 
meet and, thus, were not a barrier to their tendering for government contracts. 
 
Head Contractors and Subcontractors 
 
As noted in the introduction to this section, some of our participants were currently 
engaged in public construction contracts associated with the Priority Access Policy. 
They associated the policy largely with costs associated with the time spent 
  64
completing and submitting relevant paperwork.  However, each these participants 
estimated that this time (cost) was small and insignificant. 
 
The interviews also explored whether meeting the provisions of the policy imposed 
additional costs on head contractors or subcontractors. This would come about if, for 
example, they found it necessary to employ additional apprentices and/or trainees to 
comply with the policy. None of the head contractors and subcontractors currently 
engaged in public construction projects associated the costs of employing apprentices 
and/or trainees with the policy. There appeared to be two main reasons for this: In 
some instances the contractor had employed apprentices prior to the implementation 
of the policy (and, thus, was already compliant with the policy). In other instances, the 
contactor had a history (culture) of training (and, thus, didn’t perceive that the policy 
was the source of its training decision).  
 
None of the contractors that had ceased tendering on government contracts attributed 
this action to the introduction of the Priority Access Policy. More important reasons 
for the decision to cease involvement with government works included the 
Department of Housing and Works’ pre-qualification requirements, in combination 
with the availability of private projects. In relation to this factor, one contractor noted 
that there were large administrative costs associated with the pre-qualification 
process, and in the current economic climate the company did not have the time or the 
interest in pursuing the pre-qualification process. Another contractor highlighted the 
large ‘security deposits’ required by the DHW. He asserted that if his company did 
have a large amount of money spare, it would not be leaving in a bank account for 
someone else to use in case the company went bankrupt, it would be using the money 
to grow the business.  
 
The benefits of the Priority Access Policy clearly relate to the securing of additional 
training opportunities. The expressed aim of the policy is to: 
 
“Increase the number of apprenticeship and traineeship opportunities for job 
seekers” (Priority Access n.d., p.3). 
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And to achieve this objective, the policy would need to align employers’ behaviour 
with the objectives of the policy. However, across all the entities we surveyed, it 
would appear that the policy had very few impacts on the training decisions of 
contractors and that the benefits of the policy very small. 
 
The sponsoring agency: Department of Education and Training 
 
The key policy officer in the sponsoring agency commented that the benefits of the 
Priority Access Policy diminished over its lifetime as its provisions became more and 
more flexible: 
 
“It became so flexible over the years so that people just needed to show that 
they were committed to training, they provided work experience, and they 
employed uni-graduates, that sort of thing. It got a piece of cake to meet. At 
the end of the day I didn’t believe it added any value to the system other than 
one of perception.” 
 
A contracting agency: The Department of Main Roads 
 
The policy officer that we interviewed in the Department of Main Roads expressed an 
opinion that the policy was not very effective. He compared the policy with the 
process of opening a bank account, where you just need 100 points and the criteria for 
obtaining the 100 points were very weak. The policy was also viewed as deficient in 
its lack of rigorous monitoring or real enforcement. The officer’s opinion was that the 
building and construction industry did not take the policy very seriously because the 
criteria were so weak. The only perceived benefit of the policy was that it was an 
attempt to achieve change in the training culture of the industry. 
 
A contracting agency: The Department of Housing and Works 
 
A similar viewpoint on the progressive ‘watering down’ of the Priority Access Policy 
was expressed by the key policy officer in the contracting agency:  
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“When they brought in Priority Access the Priority Access that we ended up 
with had no particular focus on training either apprentices or professionals or 
graduates, so providing a contractor could demonstrate training 
obligations…they became registered…There were comments made across the 
industry that ‘well now we’ve sacked all of our apprentices because we don’t 
need them’”. 
 
Head Contractors and Subcontractors 
 
All the head contractors and subcontractors that we interviewed commented that the 
Priority Access Policy did not affect the number of apprentices, trainees or staff the 
company employed. None of the interviewees had taken on new apprentices, trainees 
or other staff in order to comply with the policy. Some interviewees noted that two 
factors critically affected employment and training decisions, and neither of these 
were linked to policy: their knowledge and perceptions of the amount of future work 
that was coming up; and the continuity of that future work. 
 
In sum, although all the interviewees had complied with the provisions of the policy, 
the policy had not changed the behaviour of the head contractors and subcontractors. 
It appears that very few new training positions were created as a result of the Priority 
Access Policy. 
 
A factor that is likely to affect the benefits produced by the Priority Access Policy, or 
any other policy, is the level of monitoring of compliance. The key policy officer in 
the sponsoring agency perceived that ‘there was no heavy monitoring’ of the Priority 
Access Policy. From the interviews with the head contractors and subcontractors, it 
seems that this was common knowledge in the industry. As a consequence, it appears 
that some companies maintained their Priority Access status without meeting the 
specified obligations of the policy. 
 
One of the interviewees noted that one company had engaged an apprentice from a 
group training organisation in order to get its Priority Access status, and then as soon 
as it was awarded its Priority Access status, it returned the apprentice to the group 
training organisation and never engaged in any training after that. The interviewee 
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also claimed that tenders had been accepted even though they had been submitted 
with invalid or expired Priority Access numbers.  
 
On the basis of this limited information, it would appear that any reported benefits of 
the Priority Access Policy are likely to have been overstated. Compliance with the 
policy did not necessarily mean the creation of new positions. Furthermore, it appears 
that it was common knowledge that contractors could shirk on their obligations under 
the policy because of the low level of monitoring. In sum, and in support of the 
findings of the previous section, the Priority Access Policy produced small 
administrative costs – largely for the sponsoring agency – and, at best, only negligible 
benefits. 
 
Costs and Benefits of the Building Skills Policy 
 
The Building Skills Policy was associated with a higher level of costs for many of the 
entities we surveyed. 
  
The sponsoring agency: The Department of Education and Training 
 
The main costs associated with the Building Skills Policy imposed for the Western 
Australian Department of Education and Training were those associated with 
developing and evaluating the policy. Additional labour was apparently required due 
to the complexity of the policy and its associated relatively large administrative task. 
The key policy officer observed that: 
 
“We had a second position put in when we were developing Building Skills; 
we created a temporary position so we had one position just managing the 
Priority Access program.  For Building Skills we created a temporary position 
which went a bit longer than we thought but that was to assist in the 
development of the Building Skills Policy and the evaluation of that.” 
 
From these comments it can be estimated that the cost imposed on the sponsoring 
agency was approximately equal to one full-time position during the development and 
evaluation stages of the policy. 
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A contracting agency: the Department of Main Roads 
 
The policy officer we interviewed in the Department of Main Roads estimated the 
administration costs associated with the Building Skills Policy to be insignificant. On 
the other hand, he asserted that the policy had resulted in higher tender prices on the 
Department’s projects subject to the policy. No information on the magnitude of these 
cost increases was provided. 
 
A contracting agency: The Department of Housing and Works 
 
The costs associated with the implementation of the Building Skills Policy for the 
Department of Housing and Work (DHW) included costs associated with developing 
provisions for the agency’s tender and contract documents. Costs were also associated 
with the processing the policy’s provisions. However, as was the case for Priority 
Access, these costs were considered to be fairly small.  
 
As was also the case for the Department of Main Roads, concern was expressed by 
the DHW policy officer about the effect of Building Skills on tender bids. However, 
this view was not supported by the head contractors and subcontractors, who asserted 
that the policy had not affected their tender pricing. The contractors did, however, 
take training and other labour costs into account when setting their tender prices. 
 
More evidence was available in the interview transcripts on the effects of Building 
Skills on competition for government contracts. One of the other head contractors that 
we interviewed stated that the Building Skills Policy had affected the company’s 
willingness to tender on construction projects subject to the policy. He considered that 
the Building Skills’ requirements placed an unnecessary administrative load on the 
company, and involved many administrative tasks that the company preferred not to 
do. In sum, for this firm, the Building Skills Policy acted as a disincentive to bid on 
government construction contracts. However, it is important to note that the other 
contractors we interviewed (including those who had stopped tendering on 
government contracts) asserted that that the Building Skills Policy had not affected 
their willingness to tender on government construction contracts.  
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Head Contractors  
 
The large sized contractors interviewed asserted that they did not find it difficult to 
meet the provisions of the Building Skills Policy, and that the policy had not 
discouraged them from tendering on government construction contracts.  In contrast, 
one medium sized contractor that was interviewed noted that the company did not 
tender on projects that were subject to the Building Skills Policy because the company 
considered the requirements of the policy to be an unnecessary administrative load on 
the company, and involved a lot of administrative tasks that the company preferred 
not to do. None of the small contractors interviewed were aware of and/or subject to 
the Building Skills Policy. 
 
The two head contractors interviewed, who had worked on contracts subject to the 
Building Skills Policy, provided additional information on the types of costs 
associated with the policy. These included, primarily, costs associated with the time 
spent completing and submitting the associated paperwork. However, one interviewee 
noted that the costs associated with the policy were non-identifiable in the day-to-day 
administration of the company. The other interviewee noted that the tasks associated 
with the policy were nuisance jobs, but noted that these tasks were not a major cost. 
However, the interviewee did note that the company generally had to chase its 
subcontractors to get the information on their training hours.  
 
The interviews with contractors also canvassed whether the Building Skills Policy 
created costs associated with the employment of additional apprentices and/or 
trainees. The head contractors that we interviewed who had projects that were subject 
to the policy did not perceive additional costs in this regard. One interviewee noted 
that the cost of training was disbursed across both its government and private 
contracts. 
 
Subcontractors 
 
The main costs to subcontractors working on government projects subject to the 
Building Skills Policy was the cost of keeping track of the number of hours their 
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apprentices spent on those projects. Interestingly, none of the subcontractors 
interviewed were aware of the Building Skills Policy.  However, two noted that they 
had been required by head contractors to keep track of the hours their apprentices 
worked on some government projects. Hence we can deduce that they had in fact been 
subject to the Building Skills Policy. One of the interviewees noted that providing 
information on apprentice hours to a head contractor was easy to accomplish.  
 
Another potential cost to subcontractors working on government projects subject to 
the Building Skills Policy was the cost of employing apprentices. In relation to this, 
one of the interviewees noted that the company did not employ apprentices simply in 
order to be able to tender for government construction contracts. Rather, apprentices 
were hired because of the need for tradespeople in the future. This interviewee 
claimed that over the last 10 or 15 years, Federal and State governments have not 
been promoting trades as a viable occupation for people to pursue. 
 
In summary, the main cost for subcontractors from the implementation of the 
Building Skills Policy was the cost of keeping track of the hours their apprentices 
worked on some government projects, and from the interviews it appears that this cost 
was insignificant. In terms of the costs of employing apprentices, the subcontractors 
did not appear to directly associate these costs with the Building Skills Policy.  
 
The benefits of the Building Skills Policy relate specifically to the generation of 
additional training opportunities. The Policy’s objective is to:  
 
“ensure an adequate supply of skilled labour for current and future needs” 
(Building Skills n.d.: 3) 
 
As was the case for the Priority Access Policy, Building Skills also relies on aligning 
the employment and training decisions of contractors with its specified objectives. 
However, as was also the case for Priority Access, strong doubts have been expressed 
about its success by a variety of entities. 
  
The sponsoring agency:  The Department of Education and Training 
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The key policy officer in the sponsoring agency was clearly of the view that the 
incentive structure in the Building Skills Policy had not achieved its objectives. 
Summarising the results of his own department’s review of the policy, he stated it was 
only able to identify the creation of one apprenticeship! 
 
“The evaluation of the Building Skills Policy was not very positive, it was 
found not to have added any new apprentices, we could only find one, we 
could only identify one.” 
 
Further problems were identified with current approaches to measuring the benefits of 
the Building Skills Policy. The measurement of the number of on-site training hours 
did not allow a determination of whether the measured training hours were undertaken 
by apprentices or trainees; or if the hours were performed by new apprenticeship and 
/or trainee positions. Furthermore, the Building Skills Policy did not recognise the off-
site training of apprentices and/or trainees: 
 
“The Policy required that we could only count people working on the site, we 
could only count people or trades that were actually working on the sites, so 
you had your cabinetmakers and refrigeration people that didn’t count, even 
though they were doing work for that building.” 
 
Hence, the incentive structures in the policy did not maximise the potential benefits of 
the policy, and could have actually had a disincentive affect on the employment of 
apprentices and/or trainees by companies whose work was mainly done off-site. 
 
A contracting agency: The Department of Main Roads 
 
The policy officer we interviewed in the Department of Main Roads also identified 
few (if any) benefits from the Building Skills Policy. He asserted that there was no 
evidence of any real change in the training culture or in the ability of contractors to 
maintain apprenticeship and/or traineeship programs. He also alleged that the policy 
was a ‘toothless tiger’ because there was no evidence of any real enforcement of the 
policy. He proffered that the Department had had some contractors who were non-
compliant with the policy, but no real action was taken against them.  
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Head Contractors 
 
From the interviews conducted, it appears that the incentive structure in the Building 
Skills Policy did not align the behaviour of the head contractors and subcontractors 
with the policy objectives. One of the head contractors interviewed noted that the 
requirements in the Building Skills Policy did not create incentives for contractors to 
take on additional apprentices and/or trainees. He gave an example of a head 
contractor that had a number of private construction projects and a government 
project, and had two apprentices. It was noted the head contractor could simply move 
the apprentices off the private construction projects and on to the government 
construction project in order to meet the requirements of the Building Skills Policy. 
The contractor asserted that the policy was simply a number counting exercise that 
did not actually change the outcome. 
 
“You get a hospital say, and you’ve got a  component for the mechanical 
contractor, whose got to provide so many training hours, and he’s got a DHW 
contract with us, and he’s got  15 others with a resource company, and he’s 
got two apprentices, he shoots those two apprentices over here, and meets all 
his requirements. He hasn’t actually gone forward. You know, so that’s where 
the whole system flounders.” 
 
Subcontractors 
 
It appears that the Building Skills Policy had no impact on the training behaviour of 
the subcontractors we interviewed. One subcontractor noted that the policy had not 
discouraged the company from training apprentices, but also noted that it had not 
encouraged the company to employ apprentices. He also commented that the 
company would not employ apprentices simply in order to get a government 
construction contract. 
“It wouldn’t encourage me to employ apprentices. We employ apprentices 
because we employ apprentices. I’m not going to employ an apprentice just 
because I want to get a government job.”  
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In summary, the information collected in our interviews with participants in the 
industry that there were few benefits generated by the Building Skills Policy. The 
Policy was not perceived by the interviewees as a significant influence on their 
training decisions. Other factors – such as confidence in future projects – were much 
stronger influences on these decisions. However, the policy was associated with 
administrative costs for both the government agencies and the contractors and 
concerns were expressed about the ability to monitor the policy impact. There is also 
some evidence in the interview transcripts that administrative deterred some 
contractors from bidding for government contracts. To the extent that this evidence is 
representative of the response of a number of contractors across the State, the policy 
can be seen to have reduced the pool of competitors for government contracts. This 
constitutes another important cost of the policy. The contractors who remained 
interested in tendering for government contracts appear likely to be those who were 
already committed to training and/or were able to spread the administrative and 
training costs across a range of projects. Those who dropped out were either less 
committed to training or less able to meet the administrative and/or training costs. The 
incidence of training on government projects may have increased due to these 
‘selection effects’ of the Building Skills Policy. There is no evidence in our transcript 
evidence that the policy altered the level of training investment in the State. 
 
Costs and Benefits of the Buy Local Policy 
  
The transcript evidence on the costs and benefits of the Buy Local Policy generally 
follows a similar pattern to that established in the discussion above. That is, the policy 
imposed small additional administrative costs but delivered few benefits. However, in 
contrast to some of the information presented thus far, the Buy Local Policy is 
perceived by some in the industry as producing substantial anti-competitive effects. 
Ideally, quantitative analysis – similar to that undertaken of the Priority Access Policy 
and the Building Skill Policy – would clarify these effects. However, at present, the 
Tender Registration System data base does not identify the particular zones where a 
project is located; nor does it accurately identify whether contractors are ‘local’. As a  
result, it is not possible at this time to fully assess the effects of Buy Local Policy on 
competition for public works contracts.  
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The sponsoring agency: The State Supply Commission 
 
The costs of the construction and works component of the Buy Local Policy imposed 
on the State Supply Commission appear to be very insignificant. Apparently the 
Department perceives its main role as being in relation to goods and services contracts 
and it has on limited involvement in construction contracts: 
 
“The State Supply Commission administers the Buy Local Policy on behalf of 
the Government. There are two components to it; there’s goods and services 
and there’s construction and works. Now, our main area of expertise is goods 
and services…. So, apart from handling any complaints that are received on 
the application of the Buy Local Policy in relation to works contracts, we 
really don’t have much input in it.” 
 
A contracting agency: The Department of Main Roads 
 
The policy officer that we interviewed in the Department of Main Roads estimated 
that the decisions on only a ‘very small’ number of the contracts it awarded were 
affected by the Buy Local Policy. He attributed this small impact to the size of the 
policy’s cap31 in relation to the size of the contract values.  
 
For this participant, weighed against these very small benefits were administrative 
costs associated with a more complicated assessment process. Apparently, his 
Department has to ensure that tenderers’ claims about local status and content are 
legitimate. In sum, the Buy Local Policy was perceived to increase the administration 
costs of the Department, without producing any significant benefits.  
 
Head Contractors 
 
From the interviews with contractors that we conducted an impression arose of the 
policy having substantial anti-competitive effects. To the extent that this limited 
sample is representative of the relevant section of the industry, this is likely to have 
                                                 
31
 A maximum ‘preference’ of $50,000 is allowed. 
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raised the cost of construction projects in remote or regional areas, but may have, via 
the protection afforded to local firms, encouraged local employment. 
 
One of the head contractors interviewed thought that the Buy Local Policy acted as a 
negative incentive for ‘external’ (non-local) companies to bid on government 
contracts in particular areas. His assessment was that non-local firms were placed at a 
5% to 10% disadvantage and that this reduced the number of bids for contracts subject 
to the policy. His own company had stopped bidding on regional contracts subject to 
the Buy Local Policy because of a perception that it gave local contractors an unfair 
advantage. 
 
Another head contractor that we interviewed asserted that the policy produced further 
inefficiencies. Specifically, he believed that local builders should be able to put in 
cheaper bid prices for local projects because they don’t have to pay travel and 
accommodation expenses. By further reducing the competitiveness of external 
bidders, the policy presumably reduces the pressure on local builders to reflect these 
cost advantages in their tender bids.  
 
The interviews explored whether the Buy Local Policy was also the source of 
administrative costs for head contractors. This was dismissed by two of the 
interviewees who had been subject to the policy. They asserted that the policy did not 
impose any costs on their companies. However, one of the interviewees noted that if a 
company had to setup an office in a regional area to comply with the policy, then the 
setup and operational costs of that office would be a significant cost. 
 
Against these costs, there was some evidence in the transcripts that the policy was 
effective in its aim of promoting local employment. One of the interviewees noted 
that the Buy Local policy gave his company a competitive advantage over companies 
that were external to his local area. Presumably this translated into increased 
employment within the local area. 
 
However, another interviewee alleged that the Buy Local Policy was subject to 
widespread rorting, with companies falsely claiming they have a business located and 
operating in the area. He gave the example of a company claiming they had a business 
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located and operating in a local area when in fact they only had a shed without any 
facilities. This interviewee also claimed that there is no monitoring or validation of 
values claimed against the Buy Local Policy. This is likely to cause the benefits of the 
policy to be overstated. 
 
“We had a project that was in … for ten or twelve houses, and a builder, I 
won’t give you his name, he had a so called registered office in …and he was 
going to turnaround and workout of that office. That office in … was a shed. 
He didn’t have anyone up there, he didn’t have a phone up there, he didn’t 
turnaround and have anything up there.” 
 
It is interesting to observe the stronger reaction of contractors to the Buy Local Policy 
– both in their expressed perception of its anti-competitive effects, and the efforts that 
are undertaken to appear to comply with the policy. In contrast with the Priority 
Access and Building Skills Policy, it appears that Buy Local has ‘registered’ with 
contractors and is affecting behaviour and outcomes. In this sense (and on the basis of 
the very limited information assembled thus far), the policy could be judged as having 
greater success in achieving its specified objectives. However, against this, it is 
important to weigh the cost impacts of the reduction in competition for construction 
projects. It is also important to consider the waste of resources associated with 
attempts to comply with the policy and the monitoring of this compliance.  
 
Costs and Benefits of the Aboriginal Enterprise & Employment Tendering Preference 
Policy 
 
This Policy also appears to have produced very few benefits in terms of affecting the 
outcome of tenders that included bids from indigenous enterprises. From the data 
provided in a personal communication on the 23/11/2007 by a policy officer at the 
Department of Housing and Works, the policy has only affected the awarding of one 
contract out of seventy (or 1.43% of contracts that included bids from indigenous 
enterprises).  
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The Training and Employment Policies of the Queensland 
Government: A Qualitative Analysis 
 
This section presents a costs and benefits analysis of the Queensland government‘s 
10% Training Policy, the Indigenous Employment for Queensland Government 
Building and Civil Construction Projects Policy, and the Local Industry Policy. The 
analysis is based on the costs and benefits as perceived by the main entities affected 
by these policies. These include sponsoring agencies, such as the Department of 
Education, Training and the Arts (DETA), the Department of Employment and 
Industrial Relations (DEIR) and the Department of State Development; contracting 
agencies, such as the Department of Public Works and the Department of Main 
Roads; and head building contractors and subcontractors.  
 
Sample and Method 
 
The evaluation of the costs and benefits of the various Queensland policies relies on 
qualitative data primarily because of the absence of reliable quantitative information. 
Although the DETA has a comprehensive data base for recording public construction 
contracts, it does not pre-date the introduction of the above policies. As such, it 
cannot be used to evaluate the effects of the introduction of the policies.  
 
The sample of head contractors interviewed was based on their size and location; with 
one small, medium, and large head contractor being selected from the Brisbane region 
and one small, medium, and large head contractor being selected from a region other 
than the Brisbane region. The subcontractors interviewed were drawn from both the 
Brisbane region and regions other than the Brisbane region, and also ranged in size 
from small to large.  
 
The interviews were based on a semi-structured format, with a standard set of 
questions being ask for each entity group, but allowing for other relevant issues to be 
discussed during the interview. All the interviews were conducted face-to-face and 
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digitally recorded to ensure the accuracy of the interview transcriptions and 
summaries.  
 
Costs and Benefits of the 10% Training Policy 
The costs associated with the 10% Training Policy appear to be of a similar 
magnitude and scope to those experienced in WA with the Building Skills Policy. 
That is, the size of the costs appears to be relatively small and relate primarily to 
incremental administrative costs. 
 
The sponsoring agency: Department of Education, Training and Arts (DETA). 
 
The main costs to the DETA from the implementation of the 10% Training Policy are 
the costs associated with developing a database to record relevant information and the 
costs associated with the staff resources allocated to the policy. In relation to these 
costs, the Department’s key policy officer noted that the database now automates a lot 
of the day-to-day tasks associated with the policy. Thus, ongoing staff costs 
associated with monitoring the policy are relatively small: 
 
“You’ve one staff member dedicated one hundred percent of the time to ten 
percent and monitoring the flow of reports….That’s not to say we don’t use 
our regional staff on an ad-hoc basis. So it’s hard to quantify how many 
people are there, but roughly two people full-time for ten percent, to monitor 
the whole lot.” 
 
This policy officer also expressed an opinion that the policy had negligible impact on 
the number of bids for government construction projects. He observed that the group 
of contractors subject to the 10% Training Policy has tended to remain relatively 
stable and apparently unaffected by the policy’s requirements. 
 
A contracting agency: The Department of Public Works 
 
The main costs that the Department of Public Works attributes to the 10% Training 
Policy are the staff costs associated with the implementation of the policy and these 
are considered to be relatively small. The policy officer that we interviewed 
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commented that the 10% Training Policy has not necessitated the creation of a full-
time position with the Department. Rather it has been associated with small, 
additional administrative tasks for existing employees. The following extract from a 
section of the interview that explored the staff costs associated with the policy 
illustrates this point. 
 
Policy Officer: “[It’s] very difficult to boil that down to full-time equivalents 
because it’s just a very small part of the whole process.” 
Interviewer: “I suppose it’s just part of the contract process.” 
Policy Officer: “There is no-one devoted to; it’s not really a full-time position              
devoted to the administration of this policy; there will be 
small parts of the people’s duties that I have mentioned like 
the PQC registrar, superintendents and their reps….” 
Interviewer: “So just in very general terms, do you think it would pose a large 
burden or a very small burden or a mentionable burden on the 
additional processing?” 
Policy Officer: “It’s a pretty small burden….” 
 
A contracting agency: The Department of Main Roads 
 
A similar assessment of the implementation costs of the 10% Training Policy emerged 
in the discussions with representatives from the Department of Main Roads. Staff 
costs were identified as the main category of costs and were seen to derive, first, from 
the requirement to include the policy provisions in its tender documents. The 
Department is also required to communicate to contractors a threat to terminate their 
pre-qualification status if they are identified by DETA as non-compliant. However, 
apparently, it has never got to the stage where a contractor has had its pre-
qualification status terminated. 
 
The assessment of the policy officer we interviewed was that these tasks only created 
“very minimal” additional demands on the Department’s staff resources.  
 
Head Contractors and Subcontractors 
 
The head contractors and subcontractors that we interviewed typically associated the 
10% Training Policy with the minimal additional costs caused by tasks involving the 
completion of paperwork on training undertaken. The small estimate of costs 
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appeared to derive mainly from the fact that a large proportion of the contractors that 
we interviewed already had a culture of training apprentices and, thus, did not 
associate the cost of training apprentices with the policy: the policy had not caused 
them to alter their training behaviour, only to record their training activities. In this 
sense the policy was not associated with a reduced willingness to bid on government 
construction contracts and was unlikely to have produced higher bid prices. 
 
However, there were a small number of contractors in our sample who had not 
previously employed apprentices and they did associate the policy with costs 
associated with the employment apprentices: 
 
Contractor: “It can be difficult at times to actually reach the target that is set.”  
Interviewer: “What is the main difficulty?” 
Contractor: “I think the industry having the apprentices on board. Basically, 
just getting the number of hours up through apprentices, and I’m 
not quite sure, myself, whether that is a function of that there is 
not enough apprentices or there are not enough apprentices 
being taken on by subcontractors.” 
Interviewer: “So some of the subcontractors you employ don’t have 
apprentices?” 
Contractor: “Yes, that’s right.” 
 
These difficulties are likely to contribute to some contractors avoiding bidding for 
public construction contracts with implications for contract prices and range of 
choice. However, all the contractors interviewed asserted that the 10% Training 
Policy had not affected their willingness to tender on government construction 
contracts. Furthermore, most of the contractors in our study asserted that the policy 
had not directly affected their tender pricing, as the cost of employing apprentices was 
not worked out on a project by project basis. 
 
The benefits of the 10% for Training Policy were typically perceived by our 
interviewees as deriving from gains in training numbers. However, the precise role or 
impact of the policy was often difficult to identify. 
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The sponsoring agency: DETA 
 
The policy officer we interviewed perceived wide-ranging benefits flowing from 
training investment to industry, contractors, and taxpayers. Benefit cited for industry 
and contractors included an increase in the number of skilled workers and a 
sustainable workforce. Taxpayers/community benefits included lower infrastructure 
costs due to reduced risks of skill shortages. However, the policy officer noted that the 
10% Training Policy did not necessarily drive these outcomes.  
 
The more specific benefits of the 10% Training Policy identified by the policy officer 
included its effect on contractors’ awareness of their need to provide training 
opportunities on government projects. He noted that the policy was not just about 
creating training opportunities on government projects, but was also about creating a 
training culture within the industry, and further noted that the policy was supported by 
all the peak organisations within the building and construction industry in 
Queensland. 
 
In general, his assessment of the effectiveness of the 10% Training Policy was 
positive, although precise benefits were hard to quantify: 
 
“I think it’s fairly successful. How you gauge that, once again, I think it 
becomes problematic in that 10% is but one of many strategies for the 
building and construction industry. So, which one contributes the most? You’d 
have to say how do you do that? You’ve got 10%, you’ve got the building and 
construction industry training fund, and you’ve got the  group training 
program. 
 
A contracting agency: The Department of Public Works 
 
A similar perspective on the benefits of the 10% Training Policy was apparent in the 
comments of the policy officer we interviewed at the Department of Public Works. 
That is, the policy was perceived to have had a positive impact on training outcomes, 
however, the precise contribution of the policy was difficult to identify. The following 
is an extract from part of the interview that probed the benefits of the policy. 
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Policy Officer:  “I can only quote back at you the objectives of training 
opportunities for apprentices, trainees, cadets and existing 
workers but obviously a lot of other parties benefit from that 
including ourselves.” 
Interviewer:      “Do you think that a few of the Departments benefit from that 
Policy?” 
Policy Officer: “Yeah I suspect that we do in terms of its overall aims....to 
improve skills development and training in the industry.  
Whether I could quote you anything on that ….it’s very 
subjective from that point of view.” 
 
A contracting agency: The Department of Main Roads 
 
The interview with a policy officer in the Department of Main Roads produced a 
similar theme. In this case the opinion expressed was that employees received a 
benefit from being trained; that contractors received benefits from having trained 
employees; and that industry received benefits from the increase in the number of 
skilled workers in the industry. However, it was also commented that while the policy 
may have increased the number of tradespersons, it had not focused on the quality of 
those tradespersons. 
 
Head Contractors and Subcontractors 
 
Within the group of head contractors and subcontractors that we interviewed, opinions 
on the benefits of the 10% Training Policy varied according with the head contractors/ 
subcontractors general attitude towards training. The head contractors and 
subcontractors who already committed to employing apprentices identified no impacts 
of the 10% Training Policy on apprentices/trainee numbers. As noted above, many of 
these firms already had a culture of training and, as such, the policy neither acted as 
an incentive nor disincentive to employ apprentices. In this sense, the 10% Training 
Policy was seen by many head contractors and subcontractors as having no benefits. 
 
These interviewees made a number of observations about the key determinants of 
their training decisions that are useful to briefly consider. They emphasised that 
apprentices were employed on the basis of expectations of future conditions in the 
building industry. Some contractors also noted that the building industry was a 
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competitive industry to operate in, and consequently, the decision to take on an 
apprentice was a commercial decision based on whether or not the company could 
afford it.  
 
Another factor that seemed to influence the training decision was the contractors’ 
expectations of the companies’ future human resources requirements and their ability 
to fill those requirements. Concerns were expressed about the current skills shortage 
and the perceived current and future impact of an aging labour force within the 
building and construction industry. These concerns appeared to be motivating 
investments in training, both to address a shortage of tradespersons, but also to secure 
a source of personnel able to move into supervisory and project management roles. 
The hiring of an apprentice was perceived to offer the opportunity to identify 
apprentices with above average ability who could be groomed for supervisory or 
project management roles.  
 
Costs and Benefits of the Indigenous Employment for Queensland Government 
Building and Civil Construction Projects Policy (‘Indigenous Employment Policy’) 
 
This Policy appears to be currently generating relatively high administrative and 
training costs, largely due to its relative short history. 
 
The sponsoring agency: The Department of Employment and Industrial Relations 
 
The main costs associated with the Indigenous Employment Policy for the 
Department of Employment and Industrial Relations (DEIR) are those associated with 
managing and coordinating the policy, and the costs associated with processing 
reports.  These appear to be larger than many of the other Policies we surveyed. In 
relation to the number of staff resources allocated to the policy, the key policy officer 
from DEIR that we interviewed observed that: 
 
“I’m more full-time than most.  Within our own Government department there 
are six IETM’s [Indigenous Employment Training Managers] and two are 
down here so that’s about eight and there’s someone else, we’ve got a 
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Memorandum of Understanding at the moment with the civil and construction 
industry, who’s trying to help us out a little bit, so about 10 perhaps.” 
 
However, the policy officer also noted that none of these positions worked full-time 
on the Indigenous Employment Policy. Furthermore, when the policy was first 
introduced, very few staff resources were allocated to its implementation, with the 
Indigenous Employment Training Managers only being employed in the last three to 
four years. 
 
The contracting agency: The Department of Public Works 
 
The main costs to the Department of Public Works associated with the Indigenous 
Employment Policy are those associated with the employment of staff resources in the 
implementation of the policy. In relation to these costs, the key policy officer that we 
interviewed observed that they were small and primarily due to ‘teething problems’ 
associated with the introduction/development of a new policy: 
 
“It’s still a small burden.  It’s probably not, as I said, as slick as the 10% now, 
I mean we are probably having to put more effort into making it work and 
again it’s still not a huge burden. I mean it wouldn’t take up too many hours 
of people’s life but it is a little bit more resource intensive because of it’s 
immaturity and the way it’s set up….” 
 
 
Head Contractors and Subcontractors 
 
From the interviews conducted, it appears that one of the costs imposed on the head 
contractors and/or subcontractors from the implementation of the Indigenous 
Employment Policy derives from an initial lower productivity of the unskilled 
indigenous labour employed as a result of the policy. One contractor stated that: 
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“There’s a disbenefit in taking an untrained indigenous person on, with no 
process to train them because what effectively you’re getting is 50% or less 
productivity.” 
 
However, he also noted that the costs from the lower in productivity can be reduced 
through training: 
 
“Whereas on the … thing, there’s the benefit of saying if I can get these guys 
trained up, particularly if I factored in some loss of productivity because I 
know these guys are really green and I can overcome that and actually get 
some productivity, then there’s a benefit.” 
 
The attitude of head contractors and/or subcontractors to the employment of 
indigenous workers was identified by a representative from Construction Skills 
Queensland as a further factor affecting the costs (and benefits) of the policy. This is 
reflected in the following exchange with the interviewer: 
 
Representative: “You had people coming in who were contractors and paying 
20% lip-service to the 20% and sitting them under a tree.” 
Interviewer:  “So not actually doing any training, just employing them but 
not actually doing anything?” 
Representative: “That’s it yeah.  And that didn’t work either.   They said “well 
they wouldn’t come back after the second week, and I said 
“well, if you were sitting under a tree for two weeks would 
you come back?” 
 
The willingness of indigenous communities to participate in the policy also appears, 
from our transcript evidence, to affect the policy’s costs. It appears that some 
communities are very willing to participate whilst others have been less than 
enthusiastic. One interviewee noted that the costs involved in coordinating resources 
and indigenous labour were high in communities that were less than enthusiastic 
about the policy. 
 
As was the case for the 10% Training Policy, there appears to be little in the way of 
quantitative measures of the benefits of the Indigenous Employment Policy. Most of 
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the participants in our study supported the policy’s aims but few were able to point to 
tangible benefits. Concerns were also raised about the possible transient nature of the 
employment and training opportunities created by the policy. 
 
The sponsoring agency: The Department of Employment and Industrial Relations 
 
The policy officer that we interviewed at DEIR attributed the lack of data on the 
policy effects to the lack of resources initially allocated to the policy. The Department 
was thus only able to provide information of job creation for the first half of 2006 
(although the policy has been in place since 2000), and it was only able to identify 
immediate, as opposed to on-going, employment benefits. In a personal 
communication, the policy officer stated that: 
 
“Available data from January 2006 to 30 June 2006 indicates that 410 jobs 
were created through the IEP (20% Policy) on 23 building construction 
projects and 43 civil construction projects.  It is expected that this figure 
would be higher if all agencies strengthened the reporting compliance 
obligations in their contracts with successful tenderers.” 
 
“I can’t really give statistics and data on the long term employment outcomes; 
I don’t capture that and it’s very hard to get someone to even report on that 
but I can see people are being utilised and from anecdotal stuff I can start 
seeing some capacity building and enterprises being used at the end of the day 
and some entrepreneurial stuff happening slowly.” 
 
A contracting agency: The Department of Public Works 
 
The problem of lack of evidence/reporting on the policy’s impact was also highlighted 
by the key policy officer we interviewed in the Department of Public Works: 
 
“I think because of its lack of reporting, it is very difficult to say how effective 
it’s been.” 
 
 
Head Contractors and Subcontractors 
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Several of the head contractors and subcontractors that we interviewed identified 
benefits from the Indigenous Employment Policy but highlighted problems associated 
with its focus only on short term employment creation. They perceived that the 
benefits of the policy disappeared with the completion of a government construction 
project, with this result being due, in large part to the lack of economic activity in 
remote Indigenous communities.  
 
One of the contractors stated that: 
 
“There have been some great positive outcomes. If we can go into a 
community and you’ve got eighteen, nineteen, twenty year old indigenous kids 
that tend to sit around the park and there is nothing for them to do. All of a 
sudden, having a reason to get up and come to work, even if it is only for six 
hours a day, look, that’s a great outcome. Not necessarily for the indigenous 
community themselves, but for that individual, all of a sudden they’ve got 
some purpose. What is the downside is when the project is finished? All of a 
sudden that kid’s back to sitting in the park, going now all of a sudden ‘I’ve 
got no self-esteem, again’.” 
 
On a positive note, one contractor commented that they had taken on some young 
indigenous people as apprentices, who had worked on government construction 
projects covered by the policy. However, he also noted that this meant that they had 
had to leave their remote communities. 
 
Costs and Benefits of the Local Industry Policy 
The Local Industry Policy applies not only to Queensland government building and 
construction projects, but also to the procurement of goods and services in other 
industries such as manufacturing. As such, the costs and benefits discussed in this 
section apply to all industries covered by the policy. 
 
As has been the case with most of the policies surveyed in this report, the Local 
Industry Policy appears to have generated small additional administrative costs and 
some concerns about anti-competitive effects. 
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The sponsoring agency: The Department of State Development 
 
The implementation of the Local Industry Policy imposed a number of costs on the 
Department of State Development. In relation to the staff resources allocated to the 
policy, the policy officer that we interviewed estimated that within the Department, 
there was probably the time of ½ a full-time position allocated to the day-to-day 
implementation of the policy. In terms of the staff resources in the Industry Capability 
Network, ICN, he noted that there was initially one full-time person, but there is now 
probably in the order of 3 to 3½ people.  Hence, between the Department and the ICN 
there are approximately four full-time positions associated with the day-to-day 
implementation of the Local Industry Policy.  
 
The implementation of the Local Industry Policy also generated costs associated with 
the development of the implementation guidelines for the policy. The policy officer 
noted that whilst the policy document had specific outcomes in it, the Department did 
not have any direction in terms of implementing the policy. The development of these 
guidelines apparently required the input of staff resources primarily from the 
Department of State Development and the Department of Public Works. Apparently 
the development required six meetings and, thus, in total, represented a relatively 
small additional cost. 
 
The policy officer that we interviewed asserted that a weakness of the policy, which 
could have imposed additional costs on the agencies that were subject to it, was its 
universal nature. That is, the policy did not take into account the need for or 
appropriateness of the policy in particular circumstances:  
 
“If you are putting up a $5 million school out in Longreach or somewhere like 
that, it’s going to be all Bessablock and it’s all going to be local.… So do we 
really want to go chasing that? And the answer is no, because it was putting 
an imposition on agencies to do something that wasn’t going to make a 
difference. And in developing the guidelines for implementing the policy, we 
developed a terminology in terms of generic projects, and a generic project 
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was defined as one were it was going to be 90% local content, anyway, and we 
were really not interested in them.” 
 
He noted that the policy guidelines had to be modified to ensure that agencies were 
not going to be put through a bureaucratic process that was not going to have any 
impact (benefit).  Hence, the design of the implementation guidelines ensured that the 
costs imposed by the policy were minimized because the guidelines excluded projects 
that, by their nature, already consisted of mainly local content.  
 
The policy officer also noted that if changes to the Local Industry Policy, which were 
currently before the Queensland government Cabinet, were approved, additional costs 
would be incurred. Specifically, the local committee would have to be re-established. 
Also, significant support would be expected from the Department of Public Works in 
accomplishing any required re-drafting of policy documents. The policy officer 
estimated that these additional tasks would require the contribution of a key person 
from each of the agencies impacted by the policy. He estimated that a ¼ of a full-time 
position over a 12 month period would be associated with the high-level 
implementation of the policy, as distinct from the day-to-day implementation of the 
policy.  
 
A contracting agency: The Department of Public Works 
 
The main costs imposed on the Department of Public Works from the implementation 
of the Local Industry Policy are the costs associated with preparing the Local Industry 
Participation Plans. The policy officer that we interviewed from the Department 
expressed a reluctance to estimate these costs because most of the Local Industry 
Participation Plans were produced in the Department’s Project Services Unit. 
However, he did note that the Department did not have any staff dedicated to working 
only on the requirements of the Local Industry Policy because the tasks associated 
with the policy had been widely disseminated throughout the Department. 
 
Although the above direct staff costs for the Department appear to be low, it 
apparently paid the Industry Capability Network to develop some of its Local Industry 
Participation Plans. The policy officer estimated that the cost of these plans was 
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between $1500 and $3000.  Hence, based on the policy applying only to projects with 
a value greater than $5 million, it appears that, at a maximum, the Local Industry 
Policy imposes costs on the Department equivalent to 0.06% of the total project cost.  
 
A further potential cost of the Local Industry Policy to the DPW is a reduction in 
competition for its projects. However, the policy officer we interviewed expressed a 
view that these effects were negligible. He observed that under the Department’s 
prequalification system, which covers both consultants and building contractors, the 
way in which the Department defines ‘local’ is in a geographical context, i.e. radial 
from where a project is located, and importantly the definition of ‘local’ is also based 
on the existence of a competitive pool of tenderers. Thus, for example, if there are 
enough suppliers within the Cairns’ area to form a competitive pool, then the Cairns’ 
area would be defined as local, and the tenders would not have to be advertised 
outside the Cairns area. However, if there weren’t enough tendered to form a 
competitive pool the boundaries of the local area would be expanded. Indeed, the 
policy officer asserted that if a hospital was being built in Cairns then the definition of 
local may encompass the whole of Australia because you may not get a competitive 
pool of building contractors to tender on the construction of that project in 
Queensland. In sum it appears that the flexibility in the definition of the term ‘local’ 
ensures that the requirements of the policy are implemented without affecting the 
competitive nature of the bidding process. 
 
A range of benefits  stemming from the Local Industry Policy were identified by the 
policy officers we interviewed. 
 
The Department of State Development 
 
The policy officer in the DSD thought that his Department’s key client base was the 
prime beneficiaries. Benefits for the project proponent (the government agency) were 
also identified, on the basis that the more work that can be done locally the more the 
overall lifecycle costs of a project would apparently be reduced.   
 
The policy officer did not identify significant impacts for the building and 
construction industry as many of these already have a high (90% plus) local content. 
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However, he did link the policy to “changing the culture”; of encouraging purchasers 
to think ‘why I should get something from off-shore if there is something local’.  
 
The policy officer also identified a positive role for the policy in addressing the 
marketing problem confronting SMEs. Specifically, the policy helps to promote the 
services of these firms to architects, and these were viewed by the officer as being the 
key players in the whole system. 
 
In terms of quantifying the success of the Local Industry Policy, the policy officer 
noted that as of 6 months ago the claimed successes of the policy were in excess of $2 
billion. That is, the policy was attributed a role in ensuring the supply of $2 billion 
‘contestable packages’ from local as opposed to other on-shore or off-shore suppliers. 
However, it must be noted that this value applied to all industries covered by the 
policy, not just the building and construction industry. 
 
In relation to estimating the employment benefits from the policy, the policy officer 
referred to an ICN employment multiplier, which apparently attributes 13 jobs to each 
million dollars of additional local contracts. Using this in combination with the $2 
billion of additional contracts referred to above results in a very large (26,000) 
employment impact. Again, these estimates apply to all industries affected by the 
policy, not just the construction and building industries. 
 
A contracting agency: The Department of Public Works 
 
The policy officer from the Department of Public Works provided a more 
conservative assessment of the benefits the Local Industry Policy. He noted that the 
90% local industry criteria rule applied to most government building and construction 
projects. As a result, the policy only had a distinct effect on the largest projects: 
 
“The reality is that [it is]a small number of big projects where the rubber 
really hits the road…where there is concern to ensure that particular parts of 
those projects, which may represent a fair value in terms of dollars… that the 
local suppliers and manufactures and so-on  have the opportunity to get 
involved.” 
  92
 
The flexibility involved in the implementation of the local industry policy meant that 
some of the increased purchasing costs, which can result from a strictly applied policy 
(see, for example, Martin, Hartley and Cox 1999) are avoided. 
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The Provision of Public Art as a Percentage of Capital Works 
Contracts: A Theoretical Analysis   
 
This section of the report focuses on the specific outcome of the provision of public 
art as a percentage of the total construction contract cost – what is typically termed 
‘percent for art’, although in Queensland this is referred to as Art Built-In32. Despite 
the differences in nomenclature, both ‘Percent for Art’ and Art Built-In policies 
involved the allocation of a percentage of the total construction cost to the provision 
of public art. The term ‘percent for art’, is used herein to explore the general notion of 
the allocation of a percentage of building contracts to public art works. When specific 
policies are referred to, these are capitalised (e.g. Percent for Art). The section begins 
by re-capping the theoretical framework developed for this project and by applying 
this to the particular circumstances of the Percent for Art schemes. Relevant literature 
from the specific schemes are also included in this section.   
 
As was noted earlier in the report, embedding of social outcomes in public works 
procurement contracts raises a number of challenges, as it adds to the complexity of 
the deliverables for a given contract and percent for art is no exception to this rule. 
Adding a requirement to produce functional, public artworks to the specification of 
contracts for the construction of public buildings is an innovative but complex policy 
instrument.  Firstly, the specification of the artwork is difficult as perceptions of the 
quality and style of the artwork are not easy to distil from the ‘public’. It is argued 
‘good art’ is difficult to achieve contractually beforehand (McCarthy 2006) due to 
different perceptions between stakeholders about what ‘good art’ looks like. Even 
after completion, considerable controversy can surround a particular piece of art 
(Heartney 2005), and this can result in ongoing expense to improve or remove the 
artwork (Conner, Brockway and Henning 1994). The difficulty in specification leads 
to what Globerman and Vining (1996) describe as task complexity. Another element 
which exacerbates the complexity of contracts is the specificity of the asset 
(Globerman and Vining 1996). Where the asset is highly specific to a particular 
locality, as is the case with percent for art (Fleming and Goldman 2005), this can 
                                                 
32
 The policy has recently been reviewed and the new policy is now called art+place which emphasises 
the impact that public art can have upon public spaces. As this policy is new, and no completed 
projects were available for evaluation, the Art Built In policy has been evaluated here.  
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greatly increase potential bargaining costs and risks, as the asset cannot be easily 
relocated or removed. The final issue which adds to the complexity of embedding 
public art in public works procurement contracts relates to the presence of significant 
externalities, whereby the main beneficiaries of public art are community members, 
not the immediate contract participants. These aspects are expanded on in the rest of 
this sub-section, following an introduction to the concept of public art. 
 
 
What is public art?  
 
Public art is aimed at the general community and is designed for open access viewing 
rather than viewing in galleries (Miles 1997; Fleming and Goldman 2005; Hein 
2006). Public art exists in different contexts and mediums which include traditional 
art, sculpture and installations as well as visual technological art pieces (Lacy 1995). 
Public art is typically installed in public space and public buildings (Armajani 2004). 
It is this very public, and often non-optional, viewing of pubic art which is a key 
distinction compared to private art which people choose to see. The classic example 
of this is that of a person who chooses to enter an art gallery and view the art on 
display there, as opposed to the person who enters a public building for another 
purpose, but is exposed to the art on display in that location (Fleming and Goldman 
2005). It is the propensity for art to challenge and critique the status quo, which 
presents a particular challenge for public art works, which clashes with the role of 
public space as an open community space that is free from confronting imagery33 
(Levine 2002). The visibility of public art thus creates difficulties due to its 
‘inescapability’ (Sharp, Pollock and Paddison 2005).  
 
Various funding mechanisms exist for the procurement of public art. The main 
approaches to the funding of public art are either through direct funding, in the form 
of tenders, subsidies, grants, and the various percent for art schemes, or to indirect 
funding, where government provides incentives or tax benefits for individuals and 
firms which subsequently invest in public art (Strom and Wyszomirski 2004). This 
                                                 
33
 It is this propensity for public art to confront and provoke, which can prove to be a major difficulty 
for government funding of public art, a point which shall be returned to later.   
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report examines percent for art programs as specific funding mechanism for public 
art.34  
 
Percent for art policies that require artworks to be included as part of the contractual 
arrangements for the construction of public buildings are prevalent in many countries 
of the world and form a significant part of funding for the visual arts (Hall and 
Roberston 2001). Buenders (2007, 49) notes that ‘percent of art’ policies in most 
countries in the West require that a certain percentage of the construction costs be 
spent on public, functional art in or outside a public building, and that these policies 
“were all about changing the environment – and the citizens themselves – for the 
better”.  As with the other public policies under examination in this report, the 
inclusion of functional art is part of the contractual arrangement for the procurement 
of public works by government. Thus, percent for art policies are explicitly concerned 
with achieving multiple social outcomes through the procurement of public works. A 
theoretical perspective on achieving these outcomes through public works contracts is 
discussed next.  
 
Perspectives on Percent for Art from Economic Theory  
As noted in earlier sections, the work of Globerman and Vining (1996) provides a 
useful framework for examining procurement contracts, particularly their concepts of 
task complexity, contestability and asset specificity which have particular 
applicability to the delivery of multi-outcomes through the percent for art process, 
which is embedded in public works contracts. These concepts, together with a 
discussion of how social outcomes are achieved through the allocation of a percentage 
of public works contracts for public art, are discussed below.  
 
Task complexity 
According to Globerman and Vining (1996), task complexity increases with the 
difficulty in specifying and measuring the quality of a particular service or product.  
For public art the specification and measurement of ‘good art’ is exceedingly difficult, 
as there can often be a difference of opinion between artists, government and 
                                                 
34
 It is important to distinguish between the various funding mechanisms for public art, as different 
funding mechanisms (e.g. funding from a single cash pool) may introduce different organisational 
dynamics which in turn may affect the outcomes of the policy.  
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community as to what constitutes ‘good art’. The difference of opinion as to what is 
‘good’ or ‘poor’ art takes a number of forms:  
 
• Public art that is viewed by artists as bland, or user friendly art (McCarthy 
2006).  The limitation here is that stakeholder bargaining sessions embedded 
in the procurement of Percent for Art process, tend to result in art that is more 
palatable to the majority of the public and is therefore less confronting or 
objectionable (Hein 2006), and, to artists, less like art.    
• A second difference of opinion is public art which is viewed by the 
community as objectionable (McCarthy 2006). Here the artist produces art 
without taking into consideration the needs, desires, or views of the 
community.  It is when public art is objected to by its intended audience, that 
governments have the most difficulty, particularly as it was paid for by public 
funds (Brooks 2001).  Many authors have argued that the best way to 
overcome this potential detrimental outcome, is to engage representatives of 
the community in the decision making process early and throughout the 
process of creating the public art (Lidman and Bisesi 2005).  
• A third difference has been termed the ‘commoditisation of art’ (Miles 1997), 
where art is viewed as a commodity as opposed to meaningful expression of 
the artist or local community. The commoditisation of art involves artwork 
that does not hold any meaning for the local community and is art for art’s 
sake, rather than public art. 
• A fourth difference is where public art as a replication of official aims of the 
public sector (McCarthy 2006), and not necessarily of the community it is 
placed within. Examples of this might be art whose purpose is to further the 
objectives of a given government, which meant that it is government art, or 
public sector art, rather than public art. Finally,  
• The last difference is where the art has multiple interpretations. The multiple 
interpretations may result in difficulty in reading and understanding public art 
(Hein 1996), or to a polarisation of the public perceptions on a particular piece 
of art.  
 
Summarising these differing views then, Brecknock (1992, 6–7) argues that  
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…the big question with regard to true Public Art is how to achieve a 
blend between high standards of artistic merit while at the same time 
developing public ownership of the work. The challenge is to find 
ways of providing mechanisms for community consultation and 
participation in decision making process. Without doubt this is one 
of the most complex issues facing the government agencies; they are 
caught between a rock and a hard place.   
 
Percent for Art as a policy attempts to address this difficulty as the art work is 
procured as a percentage of a larger suite of public works, which means that the 
procurement of the artwork often involves the inclusion of a large range of 
stakeholders – the owners of the building, the architect, the department of public 
works who are managing the construction process, together with end users of the 
building (Department of Culture and the Arts 2003). It is this "partnership in public 
procurement” (Erridge and Greer 2002) which is held to enhance trust and other 
positive externalities, important elements which shall be returned to at a later point.  
 
One of the potential sources of difficulties in engaging multiple parties to decision 
making process in Percent for Art projects, however, occurs when there are differing 
goals between artists, government and the public who are the end beneficiaries of any 
piece of public art (McCarthy 2006). Difficulties in this relationship emerge as the 
various stakeholders have different goals and these goals are in conflict (Trimarchi 
2003, 373). The end outcome of a given percent for art project is also typically quite 
difficult to specify contractually, due to potential differences of opinion among those 
who are involved in the process (Brecknock 1992, 6–7). In this sense, the outcomes of 
public art projects are considered highly complex, as the specific outcome cannot be 
predetermined, and in Globerman and Vining’s 1996) analysis this complexity raises 
bargaining costs and risks. This may undermine the efficiency of percent for art 
schemes. 
  
Information Asymmetry  
Another difficulty noted in public-agent theory is that any procurement, including the 
procurement of public art, can involve information asymmetry (Trimarachi 2003), as 
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differing parties have different information about relevant aspects of the contract 
under negotiation. The withholding of this information can result in significant 
bargaining costs (Globerman and Vining 1996). In percent for art projects, these 
information problems are typically compounded by the relatively large number of 
parties involved in the development of the art work. Parties include the artist, who is 
contracted to provide the art work; the art coordinator or curator, who provides expert 
advice on the planning and delivery of percent for art; community representatives – 
who provide specific information about the site, including information on the 
locality’s history and inhabitants; the architect – who has to accommodate the percent 
for art into the overall project, and the public works coordinator who has overall 
supervision of the construction process (Department of the Arts 1990).  
  
However, weighed against these contracting complexities are a number of other 
considerations. First, many percent for art schemes aim to promote an open dialogue 
between artists and the community members (Lidman and Bisesi 2005). That is, 
percent for art schemes aim, in part, to maximise the number of participants and 
should, therefore, be evaluated, in part, against this objective. Fleming and Goldman 
(2005) argue additionally that the involvement of multiple individuals in the decision 
making process improves the quality of the art work (Fleming and Goldman 2005). 
Supporting this, a number of authors have identified that the inclusion of community 
via percent for art schemes helps reduce the risk of ‘plop art’ or ‘plonk art’, that is, 
artwork that is neither integrated to the building nor into the culture of the 
community, and is therefore derided by the community it was meant to benefit 
(Conner, Brockway and Henning 1994; Heartney 2005; Anderson 1998). Adams 
(1997) asserts further that community participation within the commissioning process 
of public art provides benefits for the community members. Specifically, the 
experience of being part of the development of public art may provide the opportunity 
for community members to develop “their capabilities as active citizens in shaping the 
environment in the future” (Adams 1997, 237). 
 
In summary, whilst Globerman and Vining (1996) argue that when there are multiple 
individuals involved in the delivery of a project, there is an opportunity for one or 
other party to take advantage of the information asymmetries that inevitably arise. 
Against this, engagement with the community, the artist, and government is 
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considered essential to ensure that the art is relevant to the local community and thus 
is considered good art. Indeed the provision of information by the wider stakeholders 
enables the delivery of public art which is acceptable to the community in which it is 
located, thereby addressing the task complexity noted above. The successful 
resolution of this dilemma requires a high level of trust in order for the various parties 
to work effectively (Erridge and Greer 2002). The challenge here is how to provide 
appropriate incentive mechanisms which reduce information asymmetry and improve 
social outcomes (Mazza 2003). Giving stakeholders the opportunity to engage in the 
process of art work selection, and providing information which ‘shapes’ the final 
piece of public art work, in turn results in the delivery of a piece of public art which is 
acceptable to these stakeholders.  
 
Asset specificity  
Percent for art potentially adds further complexity to the bargaining of public 
construction contracts due to the high level of site specificity of public art. Unlike 
private art, public art is typically restricted to a single physical location. This lack of 
mobility adds to the risks associated with contracting the art work. That is, there is 
little to no ability to disinvest in an investment in a percent for art project. However, 
against this, it can also be said that the unique local characteristics of a particular 
public art project maximises community involvement in the commissioning process, 
and a strong relationship is able to develop between the context of the building, 
environment, and the artwork (Fleming and Goldman 2005). The strong relationship 
enables the public artwork to take into account the site’s symbolic, social and political 
meanings to ensure the site-specificity of the artwork (Deutsche 1998). In this way, 
public art will work with the ‘social content’ of the community (Armajani 2004, 70).  
 
Contestability 
Limits to the contestability of the ‘market’ for Percent for Art projects also adds to the 
potential costs and risks of these schemes. As was outlined in earlier sections, 
contestability refers to the ability of new market participants to compete effectively 
for contracts. It is a key component of market competition, which, of course, is 
commonly linked to market prices and efficiency. 
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Generally, there is very little evidence of a shortage of artists. However, the number 
of artists with the business and other skills needed to compete effectively for public 
art contracts in the initial stages of contracts may be relatively small and this may 
contribute costs and risks. Likewise, if the selection pool of suitable artists was 
limited by design (i.e. a low number of artists are permitted to tender for artworks in 
the first place) or by default (i.e. a large number of artists are ‘on the books’ but only 
a select few are selected from this pool repetitively), then contestability would also be 
quite low. Therefore the specific design of percent for art schemes may be critical in 
ensuring that a sufficient pool of potential artists is available, and that a diverse range 
of artists are commissioned to supply works of public art.  
  
Externalities  
Globerman and Vining (1996) argue that the presence of externalities in contract 
outcomes is yet another source of complexity in government contracts. This issue is 
particularly relevant to percent for art schemes because the primary benefits derived 
from this scheme are, in fact, external benefits. That is, the benefits of public art, in 
the main, accrue to (and are intended for) community members who are not included 
directly in the negotiation of the building contract (Frey 1999)35. However, as is 
outlined in the paragraph below, consideration of external benefits contribute a highly 
positive perspective on percent for art schemes. 
 
Phillips (2004) suggests that the key external benefits of public art projects include 
improvement in the amenity and aesthetics of a community. As a major proponent of 
public art, Robbins (1963) argues that a key external benefit is the cultural 
development of communities – who would not otherwise have access to public works 
of art. Specifically he argued that the beneficiaries of public art provision:  
 
are not restricted to those immediately prepared to pay cash 
but diffuse themselves to the benefit of much wider sections 
of the community in much the same way as the benefits of the 
                                                 
35
 Some economists have argued that there is no such thing as an externality for the arts, and therefore 
there is no need for government to support the arts (Grampp 1989), although this view is not shared by 
a majority of economist (Frey 1999).  
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apparatus of public hygiene or of a well-planned urban 
landscape (Robbins 1963, 59) 
 
The external benefits of public art derived fro the literature, have been grouped under 
six category headings: amenity; artist benefits; building benefits; community benefits; 
economic benefits; and social psychological benefits.  
 
Amenity  
Amenity is one of the main beneficial outcomes from public art, as public art is 
argued to improve the visual appeal or amenity of buildings. Amenity includes 
aesthetic and decorative benefits, the benefits obtained from reduced vandalism, and 
also benefits from increased public ownership. As any building can take on a drab and 
dour form, Percent for Art aims to improve the amenity of the building so that it is 
‘charming, sociable inspired and provides a decorative richness’ (Gopnik 2005, 11). 
As Robbins (1963, 55) noted “why should public buildings be the only buildings to be 
unadorned?” Public artwork is able to enhance the visual quality of the building, 
community and place through providing aesthetic and decorative features to the 
building (Adams 1997; Miles 1997, 113). Integration of artwork into the use and 
design of the public buildings or space can aid in the enhancement of public buildings 
and spaces, and also the physical environment (Eccles 2004). Public art is also argued 
to be useful in maintaining the appeal of the public spaces through alleviating graffiti 
and vandalism (Hall and Robertson 2001). Public art is able to reduce building wear 
and tear and the level of building vandalism through the increase of building pride and 
ownership (Adams 1997, Lally 1998; Sharp et al. 2005). Thus, public art is held to 
improve the amenity of buildings, which improves their appeal, aesthetics, and quality 
and can lead to reduced wear and tear and vandalism.  
 
Public art can also provide benefits to the public building itself beyond pure 
aesthetics. Public artwork has been argued to benefit buildings by enhancing the 
purpose for which the building was built. For example, artwork can be used to 
promote health benefits within hospitals or education outcomes with schools (Taylor 
2002). Secondly, the public artwork has also been argued to assist with the de-
pollicisation and de-institutionalisation of public buildings (Roberts and Marsh 1995; 
McCarthy 2006). Public art incorporated into buildings has been stated to reduce the 
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harshness of past architecture to create a more pleasant and user friendly environment 
(McCarthy 2006), which enhanced productivity of its inhabitants. Thus public art has 
a utilitarian value which can enhance the purpose of the buildings in which they are 
located.   
 
One of the more apparent benefits achieved from schemes that fund public art is the 
economic benefit for artists. Through percent for art projects, artists are contracted to 
design and deliver artwork. Apart from the immediate financial benefits which accrue 
from such activities, artists also stand to gain from skill development and also future 
employment opportunities (Kins 1998; Sharp et al. 2005). Artist skill development is 
a broad category that encompasses interpersonal skills, communication skills, and 
artistic skills, and business skills. Interpersonal skills are able to be developed through 
the experience of working in collaborative project teams, which can involve the artist 
working with the architects, construction teams and clients (Taylor 2002). 
Communication skills are also able to be gained through the artist working across 
disciplines for example with architects and engineers (Hein 2006). Business skills are 
derived from having to tender for new businesses and operate at a scale of other small 
business enterprises.  
 
Another espoused benefit of public art that it can provide memorial, historical, and 
education benefits to the community. Memorial benefits arise from the artwork being 
able to act as a reminder of past events or memorialise significant historical events 
(Hein 1996; Hein 2006; Eccles 2004, 12). The artwork can also provide community 
education and other benefits by providing a focal point for community history 
(Phillips 1995; McCarthy 2006)36.  
 
Public art is also held to be able to provide economic benefits through helping the 
regeneration of urban areas (Miles 1997; Sharp et al. 2005; McCarthy 2006; Coakley 
2007). Cultural tourism37, promoted through the creation of public art can also 
                                                 
36
 An example of this is the maritime town of Cobh in Ireland which uses public art as a memorial to a 
number of important maritime incidents which the town played a part, particularly the Lusitania and 
Titanic disasters (Coakley 2007). 
37
 An example of this is the major annual public art displays at Rhode Island, which resulted in 
significant growth in tourism, and a flow on of economic benefits to the wider community, valued in 
the millions of dollars (Goldblatt and Perry 2002).     
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provide important economic benefits for local communities (Hall and Robertson 
2001). Public art has also been linked to enhanced land values and the attraction of 
local investment (Sharp et al. 2005; McCarthy 2006). 
 
Increased employment or marketing of a specific community can arise from the 
cultural investment in public art (Roberts and Marsh 1995; Adams 1997; Kins 1998). 
Public art is perceived to assist with the branding and marketing through creating a 
point of difference for the community and creating a community characteristic and 
community expression (Sharp et al. 2005; McCarthy 2006). 
 
Public art is also held to provide psychological benefits. Psychological benefits 
include the enhancement of civic pride and identity, and social inclusion. Public art is 
argued to increase civic pride and identity through a combination of enhanced visual 
quality, local distinctiveness and awareness of a community (Adams 1997; Miles 
1997; Goodling 1998; Sharp et al 2005; McCarthy 2006). Similar to economic 
benefits, the promotion of the city image not only helps tourism but also the 
development of a sense of community and place, by attracting community members 
through creating more visually pleasing environment (Miles 1997; McCarthy 2006). 
Public art can also promote civic awareness by enhancing the building and 
environment. The artwork is able to create a sense of place or identity and may also 
alter the community perception about the place (Adams 1997; McCarthy 2006). In 
particular, the artwork has the ability to link individual and collective identities to 
enhance community members’ sense of belonging (McCarthy 2006).  
 
Social inclusion is held to be another benefit of public art, in particular, when the 
community is involved within the commissioning process of the project. The 
involvement of community members within public art has the ability to integrate 
marginalised groups and encourage community engagement (Sharp et al 2005; 
McCarthy 2006).Therefore, public art also been argued to provide social and 
emotional satisfaction for community members. Public art is able to deliver social and 
emotional satisfaction through providing a sense of identity, engaging the non-verbal 
parts of the mind, enhancing and enriching the natural and human made environment, 
providing pleasure and enjoyment, and also the ability to stimulate higher levels of 
consciousness (Dissanayake 2001, 27-28).   
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Percent for Art appears to be a useful vehicle for the delivery of many of these social 
benefits associated with public art, due to the engagement of key stakeholders in the 
procurement process and the embedding of the artwork into specific public works 
project. These elements of the Percent for Art process result in community 
engagement, relevant artworks, income for artists, and input from building owners 
and architects in the delivery of  artwork which is functional, attractive, and well 
regarded – positive externalities which are critical to consideration of the art work as 
‘good’.  A summary of the benefits of Public Art identified in the literature is 
provided in Table 7 below.  
 
Table 7: Public Art – Benefits identified from the academic literature 
Benefits  Description  
Amenity  Enhanced public spaces – aesthetically, functionally, and by 
adding meaning 
Artist  Skill development, employment opportunities, and creative 
opportunities 
Economic  Tourism and urban regeneration and flow on effects to 
suppliers and manufacturers. Local branding or marketing 
benefits. 
Building  Building design and complement architecture.   
Community  Provide memorial, historical, and education benefits. 
Importantly to promote an appreciation of the arts in the wider 
community, promoting new relationships and new audiences 
for art.  
Social psychological  Enhancement of civic pride and identity, through the 
specificity of the artwork. Enhancement of social inclusion, 
emotional satisfaction and enjoyment.  
 
Summary of Economic Perspectives of Percent for Art  
This section has outlined the potential value of Globerman’s and Vining’s (1996) 
framework in guiding an examination of the costs and benefits contributed by Percent 
for Art schemes. The literature that has been summarised suggests that Percent for Art 
schemes potential add to the costs and risks associated with asset specificity, task 
complexity, information asymmetry and low contestability. Globerman and Vining 
(1996, 582) indicate that, as such, the environment for contracts associated with 
Percent for Art schemes “is the most problematic environment in which to contract 
out, because all forms of bargaining and opportunism costs are present”. In order for 
these problems to be addressed, Globerman and Vining advocate the development of 
  105
‘new’ approaches to such contracting environments, such as the use of prototypes, 
multiple sourcing and joint governance arrangements. 
 
However, the literature summarised in this section also indicates that the costs and 
risks associated with percent for art schemes may also be balanced by important 
benefits. A wide range of external benefits are associated with public art. 
Furthermore, the objectives of percent for art schemes clearly extend beyond asset 
procurement and include, importantly, community involvement and development. As 
such, concerns for the added contract complexity caused by percent for art needs to be 
weighed against its positive contributions to the community.  
 
The Percent for Art Policy of the Western Australian Government: 
A Qualitative Analysis 
 
This section sets out an analysis of the Percent for Art scheme in Western Australia – 
focussing on the costs and benefits of such a scheme as perceived by the various 
stakeholders. The costs and benefits associated with the WA Percent for Art policy 
are analysed based on data collected through interviews with significant financial and 
non-financial stakeholder groups, including Artists, Art Coordinators, Building User 
Representatives, Clients, DHW Contract Managers, DHW Policy Officers and Project 
Architects. This data identified each group’s perceptions of the costs and benefits 
involved with the policy.  
 
The costs and benefits associated with the Percent for Art scheme varied depending 
on the stakeholder group which was being identified. Within the report, costs and 
benefits mentioned are considered significant if the costs and benefits have occurred 
across at least three interviewees within each interview category. A full list of the 
interviews, which have been de-identified, can be found in Appendix A.  
 
Costs Associated with the Percent for Art Scheme in Western Australia 
Costs tended to be viewed differently, depending on the stakeholder who was 
interviewed, although time was the predominant cost identified. These aspects are 
discussed in detail below: 
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Costs according to Art Coordinators  
Aside from the actual direct costs associated with the delivery of the artworks 
themselves, the major cost involved within the implementation of the WA Percent for 
Art policy was time – particularly the time involved in preparing for, and travel to, 
meetings and the time required to managing and coordinate the percent art selection 
process. The arts coordinators also noted that there were costs involved within the 
WA Percent for Art policy due to the need for the maintenance of the artwork, which 
often was not included in the original budget. The time costs involved were 
principally due to administration time, time costs from clients, and the time required 
to prepare for, travel to, and participate in Artwork Selection Committees, which 
included the time of submission preparation for the artist. Interestingly, although the 
majority of Art Coordinators stated that time was the largest cost involved within the 
implementation, everyone involved within the project did not raise significant 
objections to this cost, primarily due to the enjoyment and benefits gained from the 
WA Percent for Art projects.  
 
According to Art Coordinator 1, engaging with the art projects within the Percent for 
Art policy is an ‘infectious’ process. Art Coordinator 1 continued by stating that 
although extra time was involved within the implementation of the Percent for Art 
projects, the enjoyment and positive attitudes of all involved influences people to “go 
the extra mile”.  
 
Art Coordinator 5 suggested that occasionally the art work itself suffered from the 
consultative process, so the more controversial art was filtered out in the process. 
They also suggested that the lure of government contracts could detract from the 
generation of a portfolio of artworks which could be displayed in a gallery, so the cost 
was the lost opportunity of developing and displaying an independent body of work.  
 
Costs according to Artists 
The major cost involved within the WA Percent for Art policy is the large learning 
curve that the policy imposes upon the Artist. A learning curve refers to the amount of 
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self education that the Artist must undergo to be able to participate within the WA 
Percent for Art project.  The learning curve imposes extra challenges onto the Artist 
above and beyond their training as artists.  
 
Examples of the types of additional skills required are: 
• Conduct of research 
• Competitive tendering – including communication and presentation skills 
• Working with government, subcontractors and builders  
• Contract management 
• Small business management  
• Learning to work with new materials  
 
At present, comprehensive formal training is not provided to artists to work on public 
art or within programs such as the WA Percent for Art policy. As a result, working on 
the WA Percent for Art policy is a steep learning curve for an artist as they are 
constantly learning and developing new skills.  
 
According to Artist 2 “Public art is difficult in that there really isn’t any training for it, 
and you have got to be able to be an artist and come up with ideas and be critical, you 
have also then got to be a communicator of those ideas, otherwise you are not 
successful in public art”.  
 
Artist 2 continued by stating “You have got to learn new things all the time, there are 
certain materials, you have got to learn how building materials work, and what the 
difference is between that grade of stainless steel and that grade of stainless steel 
beside cost, and stuff like that, you have got to learn to be a small business person, 
you have got to take on all those kinds of insurances, taxation, employ people, 
superannuation”.  
 
Moreover, the learning curve also involves the extra challenges that can arise from 
working with builders or cooperating with building programs, and also working with 
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different materials and building strategies compared to the ‘normally’ considered art 
materials. For example “building materials are not traditionally used for making art. 
One difference is that building materials generally last 30 years compared to art 
materials that last a life time. When buildings and artworks are integrated, the art 
work is required to be made from building materials. As a result the art can suffer due 
to the building materials, and creates an extra challenge for the artist”. According to 
Artist 2 “to be successful, have to be a reasonable artist and operate skills of artists in 
a new context”.  
 
Learning curve also involves the costs from technical complications. Artist 1 stated 
that they have made a point of researching all the possibilities that could go wrong 
with miscommunication from business materials. It was only from past experience 
and a steep learning curve that the artist has learnt to research. During the learning 
curve the artist underwent financial and psychological stress costs. This involves 
miscommunication between the artist and the builders that results in incorrect art 
work surfaces prepared.  
 
The majority of Artists stated that another major cost involved within the WA Percent 
for Art projects is learning how to work within a competitive environment. In 
particular, the Artists were referring to learning how to deal with rejection and the 
increasing level of competition involved within the WA Percent for Art projects. 
Dealing with rejection can also be difficult process, as competition is also increasing. 
However, the opportunities for artists are also increasing with percent art projects as, 
according to one interviewee “artists are becoming more aware and directing their 
creative abilities, because they know it is an area where you can get real work”.  
 
Costs according to Building user representatives 
Time considerations were the largest cost described by the majority of interviewees 
and refer to the financial and stressful costs that arise from the extra time required to 
implement the WA Percent for Art project. All building user interviewees stated that 
although time was an issue and encompassed both tangible and intangible costs, they 
did not begrudge it as the Percent for Art project is a ‘fun process’.  
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Building user representative 1 stated that the time that people spent on the WA 
Percent for Art process was a high cost. However the Building user representative 1 
also stated that “I don’t think people thought of that, as it was kept as a fun process 
involving the staff and kids”. Building user representative 1 further stated “it was 
time, but it was time that people felt was well spent because the end product was 
beneficial to the school”.   
 
Building user representative 2 also stated that time was a high cost. For example 
Building user representative 2 stated “that the primarily cost is the budget and the 
time, but I don’t at any point of time begrudge the fact that the budget was going into 
art work, I think that is a positive thing, so do I support Percent for Art? Absolutely. I 
think it is a great policy, and I think having a good process to follow, I don’t see too 
many downsides to it, it can be lengthy, a bit complicated, can be challenging to get 
your head around, but I think the eventual outcome is a very positive one, and there is 
some very good public art work as part of school buildings”.  
 
Costs according to Client representatives 
Time and maintenance were the major costs recognised by the client representatives.  
The majority of interviewees reported that the extra time required within the 
implementation of the WA Percent for Art policy was a significant cost of the policy. 
Similar to the other responses, the client representatives found that although there 
were real time issues within the implementation, no one really minded.   
 
According to Client 1 “the project budget does not include the time of the people 
sitting on committees. However because everybody really sees it as art, and we all 
bend the rules to accommodate it, it is just one of those funny things”. Client 7 also 
acknowledged the time comment costs involved within the implementation of the WA 
Percent for Art policy. However, Client 7 stated that the time commitment was 
“nothing different to any other policy”, and was therefore was not viewed as a 
problem.  
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Client 2 represented education and stated that the biggest time problems were faced 
by the end user representative. For example it was reported that “most of the meetings 
tended to be held during school time. This meant that the parent representatives would 
have to be available to get away from work and teachers representatives away from 
class”. Likewise the participation of students required their absence from other 
classes.  
 
Another cost involved within the WA Percent for Art policy is the extra costs 
involved with the maintenance of the artwork. According to the Clients, maintenance 
of the artwork is a financial cost.  For example, Client 5 “as a client group, we are 
reluctant to do maintenance on something that we did not want to have in the first 
place”.    
 
Moreover, according to Client 6 “problems arise with the Percent for Art projects 
when the artwork is too complicated”. For example, one project featured music, 
however the music failed to play and maintenance became too expensive. The result 
was that the artwork was turned into a static display. In this way, the art became more 
‘Plonk Art’ because the majority of the meaning was located within the music which 
didn’t work, so the art was no longer understandable in that context. Client 5 also 
mentioned that the art work did not have any meaning for the anticipated users of the 
building, and they felt the money could have been better spent on equipment. It is 
worth noting that these concerns were a minor refrain in the interviews, and in general 
‘plonk art’ was avoided in the arts projects, largely due to the engagement of 
stakeholders early in the projects.   
 
Costs according to DHW contract managers 
The major costs involved within the implementation of the WA Percent for Art policy 
was the time involved with policy implementation. However, similar to the results 
within the other stakeholder groups, the enjoyable process and the benefits achieved 
from the WA Percent for Art policy outweighed the costs incurred from the extra 
time. For example, according to DHW Contract Manager 3, “the implementation does 
take a little more time, because of our briefing and coordination, but it is not huge, 
and the returns that we get for it is one hundred fold”.  
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Costs according to DHW Policy Officers 
Time and resources were listed by the majority of DHW Policy Officers as the major 
costs involved within the implementation of the WA Percent for Art policy. 
According to the DHW Policy Officer 3, the costs involved within the WA Percent 
for Art policy include costs to the agencies, their budgets, and time costs. However, it 
was acknowledged “the costs involved are the direct costs that are budgeted for so 
there is no stress on that”. The DHW Policy Officer 3 stated that the only problem is 
on high value projects, “where one percent of the construction cost equals close to 
$10million. That is the only time there is project resistance”.   
 
Similar to the responses of the other stakeholder groups, the majority of DHW Policy 
Officers concluded that although time was a definite issue, no one minded because of 
the enjoyment gained from participating within the WA Percent for Art policy.  
  
According to DHW Policy Officer 2, although there was time and resources problem, 
it’s a ‘fun process’. DHW Policy Officer 2 stated that “the process is really fun and 
everyone wants to do it. It kind of runs itself, because people make the extra time”. 
 
DHW Policy Officer 1 argued that respect was the key requirement to overcome the 
costs incurred from the extra time of implementation. According to the DHW Policy 
Officer 1 “The onus of the scheme is to convince a person that that is the most 
valuable way they could possibly spend that hour, and to make sure you don’t waste 
any time. You make sure it is respectful of people’s time, you know and I find that if 
you respect people’s time, you respect their position, their burden, their 
responsibilities, they will be very receptive and very grateful for that, I think there is a 
lot of communication that goes on today, that lacks that basic implied respect”.   
 
Costs according to Project Architect 
The major costs described by the project architect involved the coordination and 
distance of projects. Project Architect 1 states “There are certainly coordination issues 
there with Percent for Art, and ensuring, because artists work at one level and we 
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work at another level at times, and we are very technical about things, and so they 
don’t quite understand that it is not just leave a space out there, and things like that, it 
is not as easy”. However, Project Architect 1 stated that interacting early with the 
artist team was really important to achieving an integrated building artwork.  
 
According to the Project Architect 1, “Distance is also another issue. The remoteness 
of building locations and make the process a little bit more difficult. The problem of 
distance is then compounded when the implementation team is uncoordinated”  
 
Summary of Costs 
The actual percentage of funding involved in Percent for Art is the most obvious 
direct cost involved in the implementation of the Percent for Art scheme. In line with 
the observations made in the previous section, additional costs are generated via the 
scheme’s contribution to low contestability, high asset specificity and high task 
complexity involved in contracting for the provision of public art.  
 
The low contestability of Percent for Art contracts was borne out in the interviews – 
particularly with artists who argue that in order to tender for government projects in 
the Percent for Art scheme successfully, a range of additional skills need to be 
developed. However, competition is increasing as more and more artists become 
aware of the funding opportunities and see the potential of earning income from 
government contracts. In the absence of quantitative data, the extent of increased 
competition has yet to be determined. Qualitative data suggests that competition is 
increasing, and artists are finding it more difficult to get work.  
 
Limits on contestability are, however, also a formal feature of Percent for Art policy, 
in that there is a short list of artists and their proposed artwork. This feature of the 
scheme may be justified by a concern to minimize the transaction costs associated 
with reviewing a large number of proposals. The risks of low contestability are also 
reduced by having the Art Coordinators scan the art environment for new work. 
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Numerous interviewees noted that the main costs associated with the Percent for Art 
policy include that of time. For project officers this was time involved in managing of 
the project. For artists, it is the time needed to develop the proposals, and build the 
specified business and team –working skills to carry out the art project.   
 
The requirement to invest time in developing a highly specific piece of public art 
necessitated the involvement of a large number of individuals in the planning and 
delivery of the piece of art, which resulted in unique pieces of artwork which are 
highly locality specific. Interestingly, this was not seen as a cost, but rather a benefit 
by interviewees. One of the outcomes and controversies which emerge from the 
specificity of the public art asset focus on whether the art is ‘poor art’ either because it 
does not provide a high level of artistic endeavour, or it does not meet community 
expectations. This cost was not mentioned by interviewers, and instead a picture 
emerges of high level of creativity and collaboration in the development of Percent 
for Art in Western Australia.  The only comment noted in this respect is that 
undertaking Percent for Art projects, required the foregoing of other art projects or 
developing independent portfolios. Forgoing one project in favour of another can be 
construed as more of an exchange arrangement rather than a ‘loss’, as something was 
gained in return.  
 
The large number of individuals involved (principals and agents), who held differing 
information (information asymmetry) and the inability to specify outcomes in 
contracts from the start greatly increased the task complexity of Percent for Art 
projects. Hence, time was indicated from the interviewees as one of the main costs 
associated with participation. A summary of the costs indicated in the interviews is 
provided in Table 8:  
 
Table 8: Costs of the Percent for Art Policy According to Key Stakeholder Groups 
Stakeholder group  Costs  
Art Coordinators  Time – planning, preparation, travel and 
coordination  
Artists  Learning curve to develop new skills for 
tendering, management and delivery of 
the public art work  
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Stakeholder group  Costs  
Time – to prepare and submit proposals, 
cope with rejection and the competitive 
environment  
Having to adjust schedules to work with 
construction teams  
Building user representative  Time involved with participation of the 
artwork selection committee 
Client representatives Time – involved with the artwork 
selection committee 
Artwork maintenance 
DHW contract manager Time – additional responsibility of 
managing the artwork on top of the rest 
of the building contract 
DHW Policy Officers  Time and resources to implement and 
monitor the policy 
Project Architect Time - Coordination and travel time 
involved in the artwork selection 
 
Benefits of the Percent for Art Scheme in Western Australia 
The major benefits derived from the WA Percent for Art policy were the economic 
benefits, a range of benefits for artists, for benefits for the amenity, quality and 
functionality of the building. Additionally the extended collaborations across industry 
and developed appreciation of the arts in society were noted.  
 
Benefits according to Art Coordinators  
The majority of Art Coordinators interviewed also stated that the WA Percent for Art 
policy provided direct benefits for the artists. Artist benefits were either in the form of 
economic benefits or skill development benefits. The WA Percent for Art policy is 
argued to provide a real income for WA Artists. According to Art Coordinator 3 “In 
terms of Percent for Art in WA, you definitely have to say that artists have benefited 
in a monetary sense in being able to make a living from working on public art 
projects. There is a lot of money being spent on public art”.  
 
The generation of financial income for artists was an important part of the Percent for 
Art scheme, as was the extended supply of finances from percent art projects to a 
wider supply chain of sub-contracted personnel was noted by arts coordinators. 
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Additionally, the skill development of artists themselves was seen as a positive 
outcome from the percent art policy. These skills included tendering and submission 
preparation, and negotiation in arts projects. Arts Coordinator 3 also noted that the 
opportunity for participation in Percent for Art projects means that artists work was 
seen by a greater number of people, which helped to provide additional work 
opportunities for artists. This concept has not been noted in the literature to date.  
 
The second benefit for Artist was described as skill development. Skill development 
refers to the artist gaining a range of diverse skills through their experience working 
on a WA Percent for Art project. Skills include time management, presentation and 
interpersonal skills. According to Art Coordinator 3, “These benefits for artist are 
obtained from the new working collaborations. The projects enable the artist to work 
more collectively and bring the artists in contact within people and out of isolation. 
The policy enables artist to work with people from different disciplines compared to 
the traditional isolating system of art that involves the individual artist working alone 
in their studio. It really brings them into contact with other people, and I think that is 
really exciting”.   
 
The skill development of artists was also likened by the Art Coordinators as assisting 
the artist to engage within society. According to Art Coordinator 5 “It is important for 
artists to contribute back into society rather then solely in studio. This concept 
challenges the 19th and 20th century vision of arts as a sole agent or the romantic ideal 
of struggling artist. The WA Percent for Art policy introduces different spheres of life 
to the artist, and can change the artist’s perspective from inward to outward”. The 
majority of Art Coordinators also stated that another benefit from the WA Percent for 
Art policy was the multidisciplinary collaboration between the different construction 
disciplines. The interaction required within the implementation of the WA Percent for 
Art policy created the opportunity for previously separated construction and art 
disciplines to collaborate.  
 
The majority of Art Coordinators stated that the WA Percent for Art policy provided 
benefits for the building in which it was located as well. These benefits related to 
increased aesthetics of the building itself, and an improved quality of the building as 
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an entirety. The other benefits for the building was that the Percent for Art project 
increased community ownership of the building, strengthening of community identity 
or increasing community engagement. There is an increased pride and ownership of 
the art work and the building to which it is integrated that filters back throughout the 
community. The increased sense of pride is created during the implementation process 
of the WA Percent for Art project. Furthermore the WA Percent for Art projects are 
able to benefit the community through creating the opportunity for engagement with 
the art. According to Art Coordinator 3, “Public art is about encouraging public 
engagement. It is not always a comfortable process”. The engagement with the art 
increases the sense of ownership and pride to the building.  
 
According to the Art Coordinator 1, through the implementation process, people 
constantly go the extra mile and as a result the outcome from the artwork is often 
more than expected. The Art Coordinator 1 provided an example of a small project 
where the all people involved went the extra mile that resulted in the achievement of 
unexpected social outcomes – the preservation of history. Art Coordinator 1 provided 
a detailed example: 
 “DHW was applying the Percent for Art Policy to a hostel for mentally 
impaired men on the site of the hospital. The significance of the hostel was 
that it was to be open to anybody in the community, even though the house 
where the hostel was being built was historically a place that had a reputation 
for people never got turned away. DHW had attained the house on behalf of [a 
not-for-profit organisation]. For the Artwork, they wanted to preserve basalt 
stones that been mounted used as ballast in some ship, and they wanted to 
have a plaque with the original owners of the nursing home. The Artist 
designed a bench as a seat, and made a metal grid on legs sitting in the 
landscape. The hostel inmates got all this ballast from the flatbed, and their job 
was to chip off the mortar and clean it all up. The Artist then took the ballast 
because it was cut into squares, and dropped it into the grid and he made a 
really nice little photo edged plate that told the story. By then the project had 
run out of money and we had to fabricate the metal, so the Artist approached a 
local ship building company. One of the directors was very supportive and 
volunteered their pattern cutters. So the project artwork was able to be welded, 
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and so we have got a very nice outcome, a very modern sophisticated bench, 
but it has got all those things that tug at the heart strings for [non-profit 
agency] people, and a plaque as well, so we have managed to I suppose make 
that money behave functionally in a way, contribute to the aesthetics and use 
of the place, and we have involved people in it, so they have a sense of pride” 
 
Here the artwork preserves historically important artefacts, as well as providing a 
functional bench.  
 
According to Art Coordinator 5, “relationships developed between the different 
construction and art disciplines from working closely together – particularly artists 
and sub contractors and landscape architects” Art Coordinator 5.   
 
An important by-product of all of the benefits of the Percent for Art program in 
Western Australia is the development of a wider appreciation of the arts by the public 
(Arts Coordinator 3 and 5).  Additionally the percent art policy functioned as a 
‘flagship’ program which prompted other local councils and private developers to 
include a Percent for Art in their developments, even though they were not required to 
by the policy. It is these wider externalities which have been held by various 
economists to provide the strongest support for public art projects (e.g. Robbins 
1963).  
 
Benefits according to Artists 
The major benefits cited by this group of stakeholders included: the scale of the 
project and its ownership; artist skill development; working with people and increased 
artist network (2/3); and the economic benefits for artists.   
 
The scale and ownership of the project refers to the benefit that is achieved from 
being able to work on own projects not possible without the WA Percent for Art 
scheme. The benefit is both economic and intangible. According to Artist 3, the 
opportunity to develop a large scale art project is rare and that the opportunity 
provided by the WA Percent for Art project to have your own large scale project is 
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really special. Artist 3 also stated that with the Percent for Art project “You have time 
to get through your work and they let you have a project. It’s great”. According to the 
Artist 2 “the WA Percent for Art project has been beneficial in terms of exposure, and 
being able to create art work on a much larger scale. I have been able to tackle issues 
that I only dreamt about, engaging landscape, how people walk through work”.  
 
Artist 2 provided an example of this by stating “I could work in the studio and nobody 
would ever know I am here. Perhaps every two years, I would have an exhibition 
somewhere and if I am successful, I might sell half of it, you know, the pinnacle of 
my life would be getting a $30,000 grant that I am meant to live off for a year with a 
family. Or doing public art, I can actually expand my practice, so instead of having $7 
000 and playing with stuff in here, I’ve got $70 000 to make some great big thing in 
front of people. That’s great. That strokes the ego, just to be able to have that”.    
 
Furthermore, the large scale of the art projects also provides trickle down effect of 
artist employment. According to the Artist 2 “the WA Percent for Art policy has also 
helped in all other sorts of areas, most artists actually employ other artists when they 
have got large projects on, so that is beneficial, as it has got quite a sort of trickle 
down effect. For example, a few years ago, I was working on a project and I 
employed another artist just to do the small project I had at the beginning. He earned 
more money doing art work for me, than he had ever earned through his own art. So it 
is very beneficial”.   
 
The Artists skill development refers to the development of small business and 
interaction skills learnt by the artist from their involvement within the WA Percent for 
Art policy. Benefits from the WA Percent for Art policy include the development of 
skills in developing and delivering presentations, along with the development of skills 
in application writing. According to Artist 3 “Presentations are a great skill to learn, I 
find them quite creative when I get started on them.”.  Artist 3 also notes that research 
is an important part of preparing for the tender process, and with each application 
better skills are developed.  
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The development of communication, presentation, application and small business 
skills is a real benefit from the WA Percent for Art policy. According to the Artist 2 
“The more skills you develop, the more you grow, and whether you remain a sort of 
artist that sits in their studio all alone or you actually become a quasi small business 
person and you are out there doing all sorts of other interesting things”.   
 
The majority of Artist stated that another benefit gained from the WA Percent for Art 
policy was the opportunity to work within different collaborations. The Artists were 
referring to the collaboration of Artist with Artist, and the cross cultural collaboration. 
Participating within the WA Percent for Art projects provides the opportunity to meet 
with and also see what other WA Artists are working on and creating. The Percent for 
Art policy also provided the opportunity for cross cultural collaborations and work 
teams.  
 
According to Artist 1 stated that the cross cultural collaboration as “a hugely 
empowering to produce artwork together”. Artist 1 was particular referring to the 
inclusiveness of local Indigenous people in the art projects. The art projects not only 
joined the Indigenous and non Indigenous people together, but also joined other 
Indigenous tribes together. Artist 1 concluded that this was an important prospect for 
WA.  
 
Economic benefits refer to the opportunity provided by the WA Percent for Art policy 
for the artist to earn a liveable income. According to Artist 2 “The other real benefit is 
that for the first time in a long time, artists can actually earn a real wage, and engage 
with the real world. They (the artist) can buy a house; have kids etc which are things 
that artists haven’t been able to take up, because you are basically pretty poor”.  
 
Moreover while economic benefits finish with the completion of the Artwork they 
continue on through the economic benefits gained from recognition. According to 
Artist 2 “there are benefits for recognition, you see it out there a lot longer, you get to 
meet fairly interesting and important people and that might create a roll on effect, 
somebody might ring you up because they are putting together a submission for a 
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hotel and they suddenly think oh okay, we could call so and so, we know that person, 
because we’ve seen their work. Architects, you know suddenly start ringing up and 
saying we have got this interesting project, so recognition is important for it as well”  
 
This expanded opportunity for developing increased business opportunities from a 
network of contacts developed through Percent for Art projects, what has been called 
a ‘roll on effect’ is an element which has not been noted in the literature to date. Roll-
effects, especially those achieved by policy diffusion through private contractors 
undertaking functional art projects without Percent for Art prescriptions is a critical 
indicator of the utility of the policy in shaping better contracting regimes. 
 
Benefits according to Building Users 
The major benefits cited by this group included: artist benefits; and the benefits to the 
public building purpose or design, which included the artwork enhancing the school 
curriculum, or the wellness of patients within hospitals.   
 
The majority of building users interviewed stated that artists benefited from the WA 
Percent for Art projects in terms of enhanced skill opportunity and development, and 
flow on effect of employment opportunities for artists. Artist were argued to benefit 
both economically and skill developmentally.  
 
Building User Representative 3 stated that benefits for artists also included a flow-on 
effect of employment and training to other artists. The influx of working artists has 
resulted on flow on employment and training opportunities for other artists. Thus the 
benefits do not just flow to an individual artists, but benefit a wider network of artists 
both financially and in providing opportunities for skill development of nascent 
artists. For example, Building user representative 3 stated that “Some of our staff go 
out and do work at the Prison, one of the sisters goes out there Monday and Friday. 
One of the big rehab forms out there I suppose for prisons is art. They’ve got public 
artists go out there and teach the prisoners. That would never happen previously”.  
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The majority of Building User Representatives stated that a main benefit derived from 
the WA Percent for Art policy was the artwork enhancing the design and purpose of 
the building, or by adding another dimension to the building. For example, Building 
User Representative 1 stated that “the art project provides educational opportunities 
for children to learn about art from real artists”.  
 
Building User Representative 2 also mentioned the educational benefit achieved 
through the WA Percent for Art projects. According to Building User Representative 
2, “the development of educational processes about what art was always a major 
benefit from the program. The Artwork was able to impact on curriculum and 
provides educational program.   
 
Building User Representative 3 provided a health example by discussing how the 
artwork created within the WA Percent for Art projects are able to further the health 
outcomes of the hospital. According to Building User Representative 3 “art provides 
soothing benefits. Patients will sit there and look at it, and it will take their mind off 
what they are currently thinking about, their illness. Basically, the visitors and 
patients come out and it is something different for them to do, those that are bedridden 
come out in a wheelchair. Art is strongly realised as holistic health.  Art impacts on 
the wellness of the person and on their frame of mind”.  Percent for art thus enhances 
the purpose of the building in which it is built – whether providing education 
opportunities in education buildings, or health benefits in health facilities. In this 
sense, art does more than make a building look nice – it enhances the functionality of 
the building itself to achieve the purpose of the building.  
 
Building User Representative 2 stated that “art can add a dimension to a building, 
gives a heart to it. We tend to get caught up into boxes and squares and bricks and 
mortar, and I think having an art project in it can be an exciting project, to sort of 
bring it to a conclusion and can add so much more richness to the building project. I 
think it makes the school a richer place, art after all is a very important curriculum in 
a school - it is built into it”. 
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Other benefits which were only noted by a small number of building users included 
the opportunity to record history of a particular place or activity (Building User 
Representative 1).  
 
Benefits according to Clients 
The major benefits described by the client representative included: increased 
community ownership; increased building design and purpose; and artist benefits.   
 
The majority of Client interviewees stated that the Percent for Art project creates 
benefits such as increased building ownership and pride, and also creating community 
icons. The incorporated building artwork also increases community ownership. For 
example, Client 2 who works in education stated that the artwork incorporated into 
the school building “has value because the artwork adds another dimension to the 
institution. The artwork is a point of difference for the school”. Client 2 also stated the 
having the artwork within the community building not only impacts on the users but 
filters through the entire community. The community is able to gain new perspectives 
on art which impacts on the way people perceive life. According to the interviewee 
“interaction with the art can change the way people look at things”.   
 
Client 3 also states that “the community is able to benefit from ownership and pride. 
Ownership of the artwork and building is important as it can work to reduce building 
and art vandalism and graffiti. According to Client 4 “the Percent for Art policy 
provides benefits for the community through enhancing community identity and 
awareness”. Also similar to Client 3, Client 4 stated that the Percent for Art policy can 
also increase community ownership “through being able to create their own image”. 
Community can also benefit through aesthetically pleasing artworks.   
 
According to Client 6, the Percent for Art project can enhance community 
engagement. For example, “the Percent for Art projects involve the community within 
the fun and colourful process”. Client 6 also stated that the Percent for Art policy can 
enhance the culture of the local community. According to Client 6, public buildings 
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are all the same, and the Percent for Art policy is ale to make people start thinking 
about their own culture and community. This process has been a positive change”.  
 
Furthermore, the artworks created under the WA Percent for Art scheme become local 
icons that increase local identity and tourism benefits. For example, according to 
Client 1 “there is one artwork that is a Pink Sea Container that is half in and half out. 
People often use the artwork as an iconic meeting point “I will meet you at the pink 
sea container”.   
 
Similar to the previous stakeholder response, the majority of client interviewees stated 
a major benefit gained from the WA Percent for Art policy is the enhancement of the 
building design and purpose. For example, Client 1 represented education within 
several WA Percent for Art projects and discussed how incorporating the artwork into 
the school can enhance the purpose of the building. “The school community probably 
get the most benefit from the Percent for Art project, either the artwork is useful 
where the children can play on it, or the artwork is used in science, or it is used in the 
curriculum, within Art, English, or even in Math Classes.”  
 
From their experience within education, Client 2 stated that the Percent for Art policy 
can create learning opportunities for the students. For example “the artist will engage 
with the students through workshops of presentations which will form the basis of 
student assignments or projects”. Client 2 also argued that while percent art enhanced 
the aesthetics of the building, having to incorporate a Percent for Art project helped 
the project team to consider a range of additional issues which improved the overall 
quality of the building itself.  
 
For Client 7, who was involved within sport and recreation, the biggest benefit of the 
WA Percent for Art policy was the ability of the policy to enhance the purpose of the 
building. According to Client 7, “the Percent for Art policy provided the opportunity 
to for non sporting people to gain an appreciation of local sporting achievements, also 
provide the opportunity to sell sports facilities to the community, sell the sporting 
identity, and provide a change to reinvigorate sports”.  
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The majority of clients interviewed also stated that another major benefit gained from 
the WA Percent for Art policy was for the Artists. According to Client 5 “the Percent 
for Art policy creates benefits for the artist in terms of exposure and commissions”. 
Furthermore, Client 7 stated that that the WA Percent for Art policy creates unique 
opportunities for artists through the scale and diversity of the artworks.  
 
Benefits according to DHW contract managers 
The majority of benefits achieved from the policy identified by this stakeholder group 
include: artist benefits; community benefits; and client and end user benefits. 
 
The majority of DHW Contract Managers stated that one of the major benefits 
achieved from the WA Percent for Art policy was for the artists via the skill 
development opportunity that is provided. For example, according to DHW Contract 
Manager 1, “I think the WA Percent for Art scheme has done wonders for the art 
community through having this opportunity which is part of Government policy”.  
 
According to DHW Contract Manager 5, Artist benefits include development of 
business skills, such as interaction, negotiation, pitching and marketing, supply chain, 
managing groups and sub contracting. Also it was considered to provide economic 
benefits for the artist. Moreover, DHW Contract Manager 4 stated that the skill 
development is coupled with the knowledge development gained from working with 
different material.  
 
The majority of interviewee stated that the WA Percent for Art policy provided 
benefits for the community in the shape of increased building ownership and would 
help towards enhancing public access to public buildings and enhanced community 
identity. Community benefits also include the benefits of increased tourism and 
building aesthetics.  
 
DHW Contract Managers have argued that the increase in building ownership that 
occurs through the WA Percent for Art process has been linked to the decrease in 
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vandalism on WA Percent for Art buildings. Increased ownership and pride have 
acted as a deterrent for the usually high amount of building vandalism.  
 
An example of enhanced building ownership was provided by the DHW Contract 
Manager 3. According to the DHW Contract Manager 3 “I always remember the first 
one I did at a child care centre, the kids came out of their activity spaces internally 
and went outside to the playground, and everyone wanted to be next to, it was a 
carving of Indians or something, their power poles had been carved out, they all 
wanted to stand there, and touch and feel and hug it. There were swings and slides, 
but they wanted to go to the art, I thought wow, this is good”.  
 
Moreover, the WA Percent for Art policy has been argued to help enhance public 
access to public buildings.  According to the DHW Contract Manager 2, “the WA 
Percent for Art projects combined with developments in architecture and design are 
working to deinstitutionalise public buildings. Back in the 60’s and 70’s government 
buildings were gaunt, dark, no colour, people went in and never come out, everyone 
was in black suits and white shirts, it is a more lively space that is being created now, 
spaces which draw people into, they become interesting and exciting to wander 
through and look at, a nice feeling, hotel like for hospital”.  
 
Furthermore, the majority of DHW Contract Managers stated that the community 
benefit from the WA Percent for Art policy has been evident within the community 
reactions. For example, DHW Contract Manager 2 stated “People are now accepting 
and looking for Percent for Art in their buildings and as a part of their work. They are 
not saying that we could spend the $80 000 on extra computers, they are saying the 
opposite, we want the Percent for Art, and we want to be part of that process”.    
 
Another benefit gained from the WA Percent for Art policy is the ability of the 
artwork to further the purpose and design of the public building. According to DHW 
Contract Manager 4,”the incorporated artwork provides aesthetic benefit while also 
providing benefit to the building through adding the function of the building and 
helping achieve its social outcomes. For example aids learning with schools”. In other 
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words, while improving aesthetics, Percent for Art also improved the building as a 
whole, and enhanced the ability of the building to achieve its purpose. This is 
exemplified by DHW Contract Manager 5 who noted that within a mental health 
institution, the art can be used as therapy for the patients. 
 
Benefits according to DHW policy officers 
This group cited some additional interesting benefits obtained from the WA Percent 
for Art policy. These included: the benefits achieved to aid the purpose of the 
building; and the citizen versus consumer debate. 
 
The majority of DHW Policy Officers stated that the major benefit from the WA 
Percent for Art policy was the enhancement of the building’s design or purpose. 
According to the DHW Policy Officer 3, the WA Percent for Art policy provides 
benefits for the community. For example, “It is interesting that it’s really low impact 
to implement, but it has such a big impact on the community, like everyone was 
talking about what the art does for them, it becomes an icon, it gives the school an 
identity”.  
 
Moreover, the DHW Policy Officer 3 stated “It becomes part of the building, the 
Indigenous art work, it makes the place beautiful, a safe place to come, you get all 
those sorts of stories,  that is what stops the vandals from destroying it, because there 
is some sort of cultural identity with the building. It is quite a successful policy”.  
 
Similar to the response provided by Building User representative 2, who stated that 
the artwork created from the WA Percent for Art policy can add another dimension to 
the building, DHW Policy Officer 2 stated that the artwork can help transform 
previously sterile buildings into a pleasant environment. DHW Policy Officer 2 stated 
that the art was also described as the ‘props to life’. The public art being able to soften 
the harsh architect styles of public buildings to create a softer and more pleasant 
environment.   
 
Benefits according to Project architect 
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The major benefits achieved by the WA Percent for Art project involved ownership 
and pride and improvement to school retention. Community ownership and pride  
According to the Project Architect 1, reduced school vandalism is a benefit obtained 
from the WA Percent for Art policy. For example, “within one primary school project, 
there was some graffiti very early on in the process, and it was the kids who actually 
raised it with the teachers”. The example demonstrates the strong connection and 
school pride that is achieved from the WA Percent for Art project. Increased 
ownership of the building can also improve attendance and retention.  
 
According to the Project Architect 1, the WA Percent for Art policy can also enhance 
the function of the building. For example, the WA Percent for Art policy process can 
be used as education for school children.  
 
Summary of Benefits  
A number of benefits from the Percent for Art policy have been identified through the 
interview process. These are summarised in the Table 9 below. 
 
Table 9: Benefits of the Percent for Art Policy According to Key Stakeholder Groups 
Stakeholder group  Benefits  
Art Coordinators  Social benefits  
o Community engagement with the arts 
o Increased pride in the building due to the artwork 
o Development of a local / community identity  
Artist skill development –  
o particularly engagement with the community 
o collaboration with other artists and building 
contractors 
o tendering, presentation 
Artist economic benefits  
o income for artists and for their subcontractors  
Enhanced appreciation of the arts in the wider 
community 
Adoption of the percent art policy by local governments 
and private developers  
Preservation of history  
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Stakeholder group  Benefits  
Artists  Large scale of art project  
Artist skill development  
o small business skills 
o tendering and presenting to government 
o employment and mentoring of other artists 
Work collaborations  
o Artist and artist  
o Cross cultural  
Artist economic benefits  
o Direct to artist and also for subcontractors  
‘Roll on’ effect where initial large scale works promote 
the artist in the community leading to additional work 
Building user 
representative  
Artist skill development  
o Direct to the artist, and also to sub-contractors 
Artist economic benefits  
Building design and purpose  
o Aesthetics of the building itself 
o Enhancing the purpose of the building itself  
Client representatives Community benefit 
o Enhanced engagement with the community  
o Development of local identity  
Building design and purpose  
o Reduced graffiti and vandalism  
o Better buildings as a result of Percent for Art  
Artist benefits 
o Direct income  
o Additional work due to increased visibility in the 
local community  
o Scale and diversity of the work  
Enhanced appreciation of the arts by community  
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Stakeholder group  Benefits  
DHW contract manager Artist benefits 
o Enhanced skills – particularly business and 
contracting  
o Enhanced sources of income 
Community benefits 
o Increased ownership of the building 
o Enhance public access to public buildings 
o Increase cultural tourism  
Building design and purpose  
o Enhanced aesthetics of buildings 
o Reduced vandalism  
o Enhancement purpose of the building (eg health 
institute using art to promote healing 
DHW Policy Officers  Building design and purpose  
o Enhanced functionality  
o Reduced vandalism  
Project Architect Community ownership and pride  
Building design and purpose  
o Enhanced functionality of buildings  
 
Summary of Costs and Benefits of the Percent for Art Policy in Western Australia  
The literature concerning principal agent theory focused on the costs and ways of 
minimising risk in the procurement of public art. The authors of the report cannot help 
but be impressed by the level of support and enthusiasm which the Percent for Art 
policy has been implemented in Western Australia, and note that the policy has been 
adopted beyond state governments into local governments as well (Baxter 1998). 
While costs were noted in the interviews, the outcome was almost invariably seen as 
worth the investment. A point made by a number of respondents was that the whole 
process of procuring public art through the Percent for Art process was that it was fun 
– a concept which was not identified at all in the literature review.  
 
There are a number of recurrent themes in the interviews of the Percent for Art policy 
in Western Australia. It is important to identify recurrent themes in qualitative 
interviews as this helps to ensure the reporting is not biased by one particular group or 
other. These costs and benefits are summarised in the following table.  
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Table 9: Overall summary of the costs and benefits of the WA Percent for Art Policy 
compared to the literature review  
WA Percent for Art Outcomes  
Costs  Benefits  
Time (expected)  
o while time for the volunteers was 
expected, the additional time of 
the arts coordinator, clients, 
artists and project coordinators 
was not expected. It should be 
noted that this time was not 
begrudged and contributed to 
beneficial outcomes.  
Artwork maintenance (unexpected)  
Artist Learning curve (unexpected)  
The competitive environment 
(unexpected) 
% of the building cost (expected) 
 
A fun process (unexpected) 
Artist skill development (expected) 
Artist economic benefits 
o Direct income from percent art 
schemes (expected)  
o ‘Roll on’ effects due to enhanced 
visibility as an artist (unexpected) 
o Income for other artists and 
suppliers sub-contracted to main 
artist (unexpected) 
Buildings  
o Aesthetics (Expected)  
o Enhancing the functionality and 
purpose of the building 
(unexpected) 
o Enhancing the overall quality of 
the building (unexpected)  
Community benefits and engagement  
o Increased ownership of public 
buildings (unexpected) 
o Enhanced public access to public 
buildings (unexpected)  
o Increased cultural tourism 
(expected)  
Enhanced community appreciation of arts 
(expected)  
Adoption of the Percent art policy by 
local authorities and private developers 
(unexpected)  
Work collaborations (unexpected) 
o Between Artist and artist 
o Cross cultural  
o Getting stakeholders together  
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The Art Built-In Policy of the Queensland Government: A 
Qualitative Analysis 
 
This section sets out an analysis of the Art Built-in policy in Queensland.  
 
The Art Built-in policy allocates 2% “of the total value of capital works building 
budgets of State Government Departments to public art” (Art Built-in Policy and 
Guidelines 2004). The Art Built-in policy is designed to “ensure that cultural 
expertise and contemporary discourse are an integral part of shaping the built 
environment and influencing the sprit of the place” (Art Built-in Policy and 
Guidelines 2004, 5). 
 
- The categories of interviewees are slightly different between the WA Percent for 
Art policy and the Qld Art Built-in policy. The interviewee categories are slightly 
different due to the slightly different delivery method of the two polices.    
- The Art Built-in policy uses a Public Art Advisory Group (PAAG) opposed to the 
WA Percent for Art policy Artwork Selection Committee (ASC).  
- The major difference is that there is no Art Coordinator position within the Qld 
Art Built-in policy. Instead of an Art Coordinator, the Qld Art Built-in policy has 
a Qld Department of Public Works (DPW) Project or Procurement Managers in 
the DPW Public Art Unit, and also has Curators which work with the DPW 
Project Managers on larger public art projects.  
 
The focus of the analysis is on the costs and benefits of the Art Built-in policy as 
perceived by the various stakeholders. The costs and benefits associated with the Art 
Built-in policy are analysed based on data collected through interviews with 
significant financial and non financial stakeholder groups, including artists, client 
representatives, curators, project managers and policy officers. This data identified 
each groups’ perceptions of the costs and benefits involved with the policy.  
 
The costs and benefits associated with the Art Built-in policy varied depending on the 
stakeholder group involved. Within the report, costs and benefits mentioned are 
considered significant if the costs and benefits have occurred across at least three 
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interviewees within each interview category. A full list of the interviews, which have 
been de-identified, can be found in Appendix B.  
 
 
Costs Associated with the Art Built-in policy in Queensland  
Costs according to Artists  
The major costs involved within the implementation of the Art Built-in policy was the 
time and financial pressures faced by the interviewees and the high level of skill 
development required by the Artists. The interviewees also recognised that the Art 
Built-in projects can be particularly challenging for new artist who lack project 
management experience or articulation skills.  
 
Time  
Time pressures arise from extended or extra project meetings and time delays within 
the project schedule. Meetings within the project become a problem when the 
meetings constantly run over time or when are held up by other parties. Time 
pressures also arise from time line blow outs and time line delays. The larger project 
is often the cause of project timeline delays. Time line delays are an aspect of Art 
Built-in projects that the artist needs to learn about and how to budget for its 
contingencies.  
 
Time delays within the Art Built-in project can have repercussion to other jobs 
timelines or other commitments of the Artists. According to the Artists, an Artist 
generally has one or two projects on the go at the same time to work as a public artist. 
The artists also work on very strictly managed timelines and are always working to a 
deadline. Therefore a project delay on one project can create delays for the artist’s 
other projects.  
 
Financial pressures  
The time pressures are also related to the financial pressures faced by the artist’s. The 
extra time required to complete projects was also combined with the extra budget 
expanses required to complete projects. The extra time involved the longer working 
hours and extra meetings required by stakeholders, which are generally not financially 
compensated for artists. According to the Artist 3, there is never enough money to 
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cover the concept design. The commission never covers the time and effort involved 
of the artist. For example, the artist needs to know manufacturing and technical issues, 
and material information to be able to design a piece of public artwork.   
 
Financial pressures arise from the amount of remuneration involved within Art Built-
in projects. The projects are often completed in stages with the 2% coming out of a 
project stage. As a result an artist is unable to live solely off the remuneration of a 
single Art Built-in project, and as previously mentioned an artist generally have to 
have other jobs going at the same time as the Art Built-in project to support 
themselves.  
 
Organising finances and payment and taxation structures are also another difficult 
area to master and juggling finances can be a cost to the artists as well. For example, 
within Art Built-in projects, Artists generally only receive payment after the public art 
stage.  Therefore suddenly receiving large amounts of payment in an account would 
take the artist over the taxation threshold across a few GST periods. Therefore, the 
artist has to learn how to manage their income, and also how to work with 
accountants.  
 
Financial expanses for the artist also include the initial outlay of money. Artists have 
to outlay thousand of dollars at the start of project for project expanses without 
receiving payment for a few months after that. This can be especially hazardous to 
new artists with no economic backup and but can also be a burden for more 
established artists. 
 
However the extra time and financial pressures are common on all projects. As 
described by the Artist 2 “I don’t think you ever get paid the whole cost, you end up 
working longer hours, on most projects, and it ends up costing more. There are also 
other factors, you need the crane for two day’s longer than you anticipated, or having 
to install the artwork on the weekend because of traffic, because we had to have a 
crane, and then that means penalty rates, and other anticipated expenses”. Therefore, 
the artists stated that it was important for the artist to set aside contingencies for the 
extra time and costs involved in Art Built-in projects. Also, according to the 
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interviewees, Artist’s generally always go the extra step to do a good job. The passion 
of artist to go the extra step is something different that the artists bring to public art.  
 
Skill development  
Skill development was the other major cost recognised by the Artist. According to the 
Artist, the Art Built-in projects place pressure on the Artist’s to develop their skills in 
administration and project management quickly and effectively.  
 
Artist administration costs can include printing costs, insurance, fabrication and 
project management. However, although the administration tasks are challenging, 
once mastered they can also be a benefit for the artist, as the artist has been able to 
develop new skills. In particular, Artist can learn how to budget and plan for potential 
contingencies on the Art Built-in projects.   
 
Project management skill development involves learning contract skills, 
implementation skills, and project skills. Also due to the time pressures on projects, 
these skills also need to be developed quickly. The artist is under pressure in Art 
Built-in projects to develop project management and contract skills quickly within the 
projects. As a public artist, the artist is required to understand the contract, understand 
the budget, and understand the timeline. In particular, to understand that timelines and 
budget can change throughout the projects. As described by Artist 3 “if I hadn’t 
locked in and organised things properly, all of those costs would have gone up in that 
new time, and my budget wouldn’t have meant anything, so those sort of things are 
very important”. For artists who lack this experience, developing the project 
management skills required for a public art project can be a difficult learning curve. 
 
The skill development pressures are increased because every project is different; 
requiring a new skill set, material knowledge and research time However the Artist’s 
interviewed noted that this is both a cost and a benefit.  It is a cost because the 
learning curve is difficult, but once the skills are obtained it becomes a benefit for 
future projects  
 
Skill development is particularly difficult for new artists. New artists are under 
pressure to develop their skills and also to self educate in order to understand public 
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artwork and project management. According to Artist 2, the development of public art 
education at university would help new artists into the field of public art, as “it is the 
questions that they have not asked which generally causes the problems” for new 
artists. The experience of the artist is also important within the artist selection process. 
The artist is being assessed on artistic ability and project management experience. 
Project management experience is important because “the projects are ‘real’ jobs that 
can have serious impacts”.   
 
It would be hard to be accepted for a job if the artists are not particularly articulate. 
For example, if they could not explain the art and the connection between this art and 
the building project. Art Built-in projects can be particularly hard for new or 
unexperienced artists. As described by Artist 5 “I think the process can place a lot of 
limitations on certain artists, who probably create great work, but are not probably the 
most articulate people, and it would be very difficult for them in these circumstances, 
going on what we have experienced, you know, like the maintenance issues, it is one 
hurdle after another, and there are a lot of artists who are quite introverted, and don’t 
have great personalities or whatever it would be very difficult for them to convince 
the client, like this is going to work”. 
 
According to the majority of Artist’s interviewed, to work as an public artist, an artist 
is generally required to have to have one or two projects on the go at the same time, 
need to be available throughout all stages of the process, need to be flexible, and also 
have a working lifestyle so that the artist is always available throughout the changing 
timelines of the project and installations. 
 
Costs according to Client representatives 
According to the Client representatives, time was the major costs involved within the 
implementation of the Art Built-in policy. Time can become a problem if the projects 
take extra time and energy to complete.  Time pressure can arise from project time 
delays and the project requiring extra meetings, or from organisational problems such 
as the difficulty of coordinating jobs and balancing the work load of other jobs, 
problems with souring correct materials in the time frame 
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Time pressure are also a problem because they take extra time taken away from core 
business tasks and the unexpected time problems can cause stress for the people 
involved. For Client 2, the major time issue was with the extra and unexpected tasks 
that can end up being the responsibility of the clients. The extra time required to 
complete task become very frustrating and time consuming for the client. However, 
the majority of interviewees stated that the extra time involved is always seen as an 
investment rather than a cost.  
 
An example of time delays causing stress and frustration was the maintenance issues 
at a public art installation at an emergency services station.  The issue was that the 
concrete around the artwork was not reinforced and cracked when the artwork was 
moved to replace the lighting. This issue was increased by when the concrete slab was 
dug up; the concrete was left on the site for a long time. The problem was the time it 
took for the concrete slab around the artwork to be repaired. The time involved 
became an issue due to the ongoing conversations required to organise the 
maintenance work to be done. The communications going back and forth between the 
emergency services station and the people involved within the maintenance was 
another cause of frustration for the interviewee and the building users. The building 
users were very proud of the artwork and took great ownership of the artwork. 
Therefore when the artwork was hindered by the cracked concrete, and the 
maintenance people took a very long time to fix it, which involved the concrete slab 
being dug up and left outside the Fire Station for a few months, it really frustrated the 
building users. This issue of maintenance of public artworks is under reported in the 
academic literature, but is a practical cost which should be incorporated into public art 
programmes.  
 
Costs according to Curators 
The major cost described by the Project Curator was the extra time and effort required 
by the Artists. The problem is that the remuneration received from working on an Art 
Built-in project does not cover the extra time and effort required to complete a 
project. The remuneration is based on only a percent of the stage and not the entire 
project budget. The amount provided is not a liveable wage and the majority of artists 
generally have to juggle at least two jobs to survive.  
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Moreover, according to the Interviewee most artists will not sacrifice their art for a 
larger amount of pay. Artists receive a budget that is for their entire project including 
materials and the artist’s wage. Therefore, a good artist is most likely to do the best 
possible job and receive less money for it.  
 
Costs according to Project managers  
The major cost described by the Project Manager was the extra time and effort 
involved within Art Built-in projects. However, although the extra time can be a 
burden it can also be a positive, as the extra time helps to develop closer relationships 
with the other stakeholders. The forming of relationship helps future projects and 
work. Building relationships was important to reduce time and stress. As described by 
the Project Manager 1 “Building those kinds of relationships are important in 
reducing the costs of time, because if you connect people face to face, and call up to 
get a question answered quickly, it makes it different than cold ringing and waiting 
two weeks for something”. 
 
Costs according to Policy officers 
According to Policy Officers, the costs involved in the Art-Built-In were primarily 
around time – although like other stake holders, this was seen as a necessary 
investment which was needed in order to produce a god outcome. The other costs 
were involved in the costs for the art work itself (planning, delivery, materials, etc.), 
and the administrative costs for the department. Policy officers in Queensland felt that 
the main costs for artists where around the process of tendering for public art projects 
which were the most significant, together with the public, political and media scrutiny 
which can also occur. (It is important to note that the threshold for public art projects 
in Queensland was lower than in Western Australia, which may have made 
administration for very small projects the same as for large projects. 
 
Summary of Costs  
Time was the main coast associated with the Art Built-in policy. Time involved the 
extra time required to complete projects, project delays, and the time to coordinate 
meetings. For Artist’s it is the time needed to research concept ideas and artwork 
materials, and for Clients it is the time required within extra meetings.  
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Similar to the Costs within the WA Percent for Art policy, the extra time and effort 
required by individuals to complete projects was seen overall as an investment. 
Although time was seen as a cost, the extra time was seen as a investment in building 
working relationships that continue onto future projects, and also to creating a ‘good’ 
outcome for the project.  
 
Another cost associated with the Art Built-in policy was the financial pressure on the 
Artists, and the costs involved in developing new skills.  
 
A summary of the costs indicated in the interviews is provided in Table 10, below. 
Table 10: Costs of the Art Built-In policy According to Key Stakeholder Groups  
Stakeholder 
group  
Costs  
Artists Time and financial pressures  
o Project schedule delays. The delays have further impacts 
on the other jobs of the artists  
o Also not enough research time for artists  
 
Financial pressures  
o Extra outlay of expanses by artists 
o artists are unable to ‘live off’ payment from a single Art 
Built-in project 
 
Skill development demands 
o Artists are required to quickly develop skills in 
administration and project management 
o This can be particularly difficult for new artists 
Client 
Representative 
Time pressures  
o Extra meetings 
o Coordination difficulties 
o Extra time and effort required to complete projects 
Curators Extra time and effort required by the Artist 
o Remuneration does not cover the extra time and effort of 
the Artists 
Project Managers Time and effort  
o Extra time and effort to complete projects 
o Although a burden, can also be appositive as the extra time 
and effort helps to develop closer working relationships 
Policy officers  Time and effort: 
o Time required to produce a good outcome 
o Tendering time required 
Administrative costs 
Costs for the art work itself  
Skill development for artists  
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Benefits of the Art Built-in policy in Queensland  
The major benefits derived from the Art Built-in policy included benefits for the 
Artist’s, benefits for the building, cultural benefits and potential benefits.  
 
Benefits According to Artists  
The majority of Artists interviewed stated that the Art Built-in policy provided 
benefits for Artists, benefits for the building, cultural and community benefits, as well 
as personal benefits for the interviewees.  
 
Artist benefits  
Artists can benefit from the Art Built-in projects through gaining exposure, enhancing 
or diversifying their Curriculum Vitae (CV), learning or developing a different set of 
skills, provides a mechanism to get the artist’s work out in another development, and 
also gain public recognition from working on an iconic building or a high profile job.. 
According to Artist 2, working on an iconic building can help contacts, as it makes an 
impression on people and also help the artist’s job profile. This relationship building 
between artists in collaborative work teams was an unexpected benefit of the scheme 
 
The Art Built-in policy also provides a learning curve for the Artist to learn new skills 
such as business skill and project management skills. Project management skills can 
help efficiency within the artist’s personal work. Also, Artists are able to gain project 
management experience with installations, engineering, and technical processes. 
 
Artists can also achieve satisfaction and pride from working on a public art project 
and gaining a big commission. The commission is able to complement the artist’s own 
work. As described by Artist 2 “I really appreciate the opportunity of working for 
public art, I don’t see it as any kind of compromise or anything, if you look on my 
website there is a public art side, and an exhibition side, and the money allows me to 
do other things, and make more work”.  
 
Furthermore, according to Artist 3, the commission that gives the artist a little 
“bankable” money, which allows the artist to develop their private studio, and provide 
studio time. The artists can gain a little economic benefit that helps with their studio 
work.  
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Building benefits  
The building is able to benefit from the artwork created by the Art Built-in project. 
The artwork is able to function in several ways to add to the atmosphere of the 
building and enhance the experience for the people using the building.  Art is able to 
help the building environment by improving the quality of the building. For example, 
artwork in a hospital can improve the environment which could lead to health benefits 
for the patients.  
 
The artwork is also able to name the site and create something that people can identify 
with. The artwork is also able to educate about the history of the building and also add 
to the people’s experience of the site. For example, the poetry within the Gabba 
artwork is able to provide a memory of past events.  As described by Artist 3 “The 
way public artwork should work is that it is not something that should hit you in the 
face. For me, public art is a lot like that, people are getting on with their lives, they 
don’t come to look at the art, but it is something that is there for a moment in time, 
when they might just notice it, and then they can experience that in some way, and it 
changes their day”. 
 
Cultural and Community benefits  
According to the Artist interviewee, the Art Built-in policy is able to benefit the 
community in several ways.  
 
The artwork produced from the Art Built-in project exposes the community to art. The 
policy introduces the art to the community, exposing art to the audience in a different 
environment, a less sterile environment and less elitist. As described by Artist 1 “Art 
Built-in is able to take art to a much wider audience and in a different sort of 
environment. It is not that sterile environment that art has a reputation for having; it is 
not an elitist thing at all. I think it makes people more aware that it is there. 
Everybody can enjoy it”. 
 
The artwork is able to educate the community, which enriches the community 
ambience. The community includes the inner community, wider community, 
government, the building users and others involved in the implementation.  
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Public art can enrich public culture. Generally there are two positions about public art. 
The first are those who see culture as fundamental, intrinsic ingredient of the cake and 
those who see culture as the icing of the (economic) cake. According to Artist 2 
“There are two positions on this, either you see like I do, culture as an ingredient of 
the cake, or you see culture as the icing as what is essentially an economic cake. We 
can do without the icing as long as we have the cake. Now some people see the 
culture as kind of an intrinsic ingredient in life, and others see it as a kind of add on 
optional extra”.  
 
Art is able to provide cultural benefits through enriching the cultural environment. Art 
can add quality to the environment. According to the Artist 2, art has a quiet quality, 
similar to the tress in the public parks, in which they are not noticed until they have 
been removed. Public art should educate but not preach social justice. As described by 
Artist 2 “It can educate, I don’t think the public like to be preached at, about 
whatever, equity and social justice, I don’t think public art should do that, you can 
find other ways of  influencing people, so I don’t think the public see art in that way. 
Someone explained it to me like this once, often art is emotive, and I’m sure people 
drive past the Gabba everyday and don’t notice the art, but they don’t notice the trees 
in the park either, but if you cut them down, they would notice they were gone, so I 
think art and architecture adds to the quality of an environment”.   
 
The artwork can provide iconic features to the building. The community is able to 
benefit from having an iconic building. The building can further become a landmark 
for future tourism. Artwork is also able to impact on Brisbane. Artist 3 offers the 
comparison to New York City, “I went to New York a couple of years ago, and I was 
so excited by all this huge public sculpture they had everywhere, every building you 
had something that named it, and there were contemporary artists, modernist, and 
minimalist, fantastic work, and I think it is really important for Brisbane to have, that 
Brisbane names itself”. 
 
The artwork created through Art Built-in projects is able to provide community 
benefits through being able to enrich the cultural environment. The artwork is able to 
provide an intrinsic link between art and society and work to engage people with the 
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art. As described by Artist 5 “You like to think there is some kind of enrichment. In 
other cultures and other places there is an intrinsic linkage between art and happening 
in society that I don’t think historically is here in Australia. What is really important 
about public art is that it does engage people that potentially would not come in 
contact with what would be considered art, and it is trying to prevent that cultural 
decay. There is this more innate existence of art as a party of society, even if it is 
being going to a space that contains art and you experience the art. It comes from the 
environment, the architect, and the space”. 
 
However, the Artist 2 did note that although public art can enrich people’s lives, it can 
also detract if the art is bad. The successfulness of artwork depends on the people 
involved. More successful public art could be achieved through collaboration with 
designers and architects.  As described by Artist 2 “It can enrich, it can detract as 
well. In a way, the core constituency are architects, I think we over estimate the 
importance of art and we under estimate the importance of design. Design impacts on 
everybody’s life everyday, whether they know it or not, everything, your clothes, car, 
furniture, phone, everything is designed and it has an enormous impact on people’s 
lives, so an architect has an enormous impact through the built environment. So 
designers have a huge impact on people’s lives and really I think if you want to get 
people more connected with art you can do it through connecting through designers, 
which includes architects”.  
 
Personal benefits  
Personal benefits included the enjoyment of working on challenging and interesting 
projects, the satisfaction and pride from working on a public artwork, and the 
satisfaction from gaining the opportunity to work on a public project. According to 
the interviewees, Art Built-in projects are generally very satisfying projects to work 
on. Money is not the main motivator on Art Built-in projects, and artists generally 
have other, personal reasons for working on an Art Built-in project.  
 
Artist 1 benefited personally from being able to work on a fascinating and interesting 
project. The Old Museum project provided Artist 1 with the opportunity to work with 
an array of different people, while also working on a project that had both new 
building and heritage building challenges. The challenge of the projects enabled Artist 
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3 to discover skills that they had before or that they did not recognise. For example, to 
budget, manage and negotiate.  According to Artist 3, the learning curve is exciting 
and interesting as it pushes the artist further. Artist 5 stated that they enjoy the 
challenge of working with different people and the challenge of justifying abstract 
artwork to other people. As described Artist 5 “I like the challenge of having to justify 
potentially quite abstract ideas and articulate them in a way that will assist the client 
in understanding the scope of the artwork”.  
 
Personal benefits also included satisfaction and pride from doing an artwork in the 
public. Overall for the interviewee, there were no real ‘costs’ involved in the Art 
Built-in projects as the practice “builds your experience”. As described by Artist 2 
“Yes, there has been the satisfaction and pride of doing something public. It is really 
nice to get a big commission; someone is prepared to pay for your work, and that is a 
really nice deal and a really nice feeling”. Also, Artist 4 stated that working on large 
scale projects are challenging and very rewarding.  
 
Another personal benefit was the satisfaction gained from the opportunity to work on 
a public project, which is quite a rare opportunity. As described by the Artist 3 “The 
policy itself has been a very good thing for me personally, it has been excellent, 
because I have been able to take my studio based work, out into the public and have 
little pockets around the city, that have a personal history for me, lots of the places 
that I have done the work, there is something in my past, my childhood or growing up 
that that site has been important to me, and just to have that opportunity, is very rare. I 
have been able to in a very small way as an artist, make a little moment in my own 
history, and for me that is very important, because I am not an iconic artist. So that 
has been a bonus”. 
 
An additional particular personal benefit mentioned by the Artist’s involved in the 
Old Museum Building project, was the personal benefits gained from the Artist 
collaboration. The artist’s on the Old Museum Project worked within an artist 
collaboration that was comprised of three artists. The artists were all from different 
disciplines. The three artists has regular meeting and worked well. The Interviewees 
was able to benefit from the meetings, the three artists would feed off each other and 
would inturn inspire their personal work as well as the Art Built-in project. As 
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described by Artist 1 “The other two people I am working with are all young people 
from very different disciplines, and we get on extremely well and fire off each other, 
and have some really great ideas and that has been really wonderful”.  
 
Benefits According to Client representatives 
The major benefits achieved from the Art Built-in include benefits for the Artists, 
benefits for the building, cultural benefits, potential benefits, and personal benefits.  
 
Artist benefits  
According to the client representatives, the Art Built-in policy supports the 
Queensland art industry through providing new projects for artists. In particular, 
Artist are able to benefit from the policy by not only gaining jobs and financial gains, 
but also gaining the opportunity to develop new skills such as administration and 
project management skills.  
 
Artist’s can benefit from the Art Built-in policy through gaining recognition and 
public exposure .The artist is able to expand and diversify their CV, and also from the 
recognition gained from the Art Built-in projects that can lead to the generation of 
new business or other jobs.  
 
The Art Built-in project provides the artist with an opportunity to work on a large 
public building or location. In particular, the Gabba project provided the opportunity 
for the artists to work a large and iconic building. This opportunity is unique for artist, 
benefits their CV, and provides something special for their art. As described by Client 
1 “Getting involved in an iconic venue such as the Gabba is always very beneficial. 
Whilst the artists don’t have their names on a plaque at the moment, I know they have 
got it on their websites and so forth. As I said being involved in an iconic venue is a 
nice string to the bow”.  
 
Building benefits  
Benefits for the building include, increased public recognition for the building that 
can result in increased tourism, the artwork enhancing the enjoyment of the building 
users, lowered public resistance to new buildings, and the artwork enhancing the 
experience and work morale of the building occupants.  
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The artwork is able to increase public recognition by drawing attention to the amenity. 
An example was the artwork at an emergency services station. The artwork provides a 
benefit for the fire station by being able to draw focus to the amenity and increase the 
public recognition of the fire station. The artwork is also able to educate the public 
about Fire and Rescue overall. Although the uniforms and credibility are powerful 
tools of Fire and Rescue these aspects are only really seen in emergency 
circumstances. Therefore the artwork provides a way to communicate the message of 
the Fire Station, and Fire and Rescue to the public at other times. As described by 
Client 5 “If you put a sign that just says [an emergency services station], they will 
probably drive past it, and a thousand buildings that have got bigger letters on and 
they just don’t recognise it. However, it you drive past a bit of artwork that is easily 
recognised to be something that is relative to what we do, it draws their attention more 
to the building”.  
 
The emergency services station has also benefited from the positive media exposure 
that has arisen from the Art Built-in artwork. According to Client 4, the emergency 
services station gained a lot of interest from the newspapers, and the Artist was 
interviewed by Quest Newspapers and the Courier Mail, and the an emergency 
services station also had a big opening that involved different people from the policy 
Minister, the Emergency Services Minister, to the Director-General Commissioner.   
 
The artwork helps people to connect to the building that helps to encourage more 
people to visit the building. An example is Old Museum Building project. The 
artwork has been noted to have the potential to have a positive impact on the Old 
Museum building when the redevelopment is complete. When the building is finished 
that artwork can encourage people walk around and admire the building or gardens. 
The artwork will provide a real connection with the building. According to Client 3, 
the artwork will help people connect with the building and work to complement the 
building. Families will be to into the building and connect with the space. The artwork 
will be able to brings back and capture the heritage of the Old Museum Project and 
provide a place that families would like to make a day that has a rich history, feeling 
and a heritage atmosphere. 
 
  146
Another example is an emergency services station Art Built-in project. According to 
Client 4, the artwork has enhanced the fire station, by creating an interesting and 
aesthetically pleasing artwork that complements the building design and purpose. The 
fire station has also benefited from community drop in of both local community 
member and tourists to the community have dropped into the fire station, based on an 
interest in the artwork.  
 
The artwork is able to enhance the enjoyment of the building user by providing and 
also add to the experience of the building’s visitors. According to the Client 1, the 
artwork was able to enhance the enjoyment of the rich variety of Gabba patrons 
through story telling and educational functions. For example, people waiting in 
concession stands are provided with something real and interesting to look at, thereby 
making their experience more enjoyable. The artwork also provides a stimulant for 
patrons to start talking to each other, creating a closer and friendlier environment.  
 
According to Client 2, the artwork complementing the Gabba has provided benefits 
for the Gabba. For example, the Gabba artwork has been able to add to the experience 
of the visitors to the Gabba. As described by Client 2 “Obviously to the patrons that 
go there, it adds to the experience, they may have seen these things on TV or listened 
to them on the radio or read about them on paper, so when they are there, it adds to 
the history of the venue, and to the emotion of the event. We had 3.9 million people 
throughout venues last year, and there was a lot of sport and entertainment. I guess we 
are just trying to capture some of those moments, and putting them out on display. It 
fits in with our “Great venues, good times” motto. We are always trying to build a 
better event venue experience; it adds to the direction that we are taking the patron. I 
think it has a positive impact on the buildings, it adds colour and emotion and that is 
what sport and entertainment is about. Getting people excited and getting them 
through the door again”.  
 
Moreover, aesthetically pleasing artwork is able to help justify the artwork to the 
community. Artwork that is aesthetically pleasing for the public is able to influence a 
positive public perception of the value of the cost of the building.  
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Similar to the artwork’s ability to enhance the experience of building users, the 
artwork is able to enhance the experience and the work morale of the building 
occupants. The artwork can add an element of pride to the building that can increase 
morale and the happiness of workers.  
 
For example, the emergency service workers at an emergency services station 
benefited from the artwork. The artwork added an element of pride to the station. 
Increased morale is particularly important within the area of fire and rescue. For 
example, Client 5 stated that “I think it also adds to that element of pride in their 
station. What they have got is a little different and they do like it, and they are always 
pleased when they get positive comments from the public about it, so I think that goes 
into part of the morale in the place, because it tends to suffer from time to time in our 
line of work, and also I believe that will play a small part, but a part nonetheless in 
terms of sick leave management and those sort of issues. If people are happy with 
their workplace, they are less inclined for that to be contributing to that negative part 
of administrative business, which is not peculiar to the fire service that is 
everywhere”. 
 
Cultural and community benefits  
The artwork provides benefits for the community through working as a cultural 
investment, add to the culture of Brisbane, and future economic benefits from 
tourism. The wider community are able to gain enjoyment from the community’s 
appreciation of the artwork. The community also appreciates the landmark potential 
that the artwork provides.   
 
The artwork serves as a cultural investment and art appreciation through exposing 
people to art that would otherwise not be exposed. Artwork as a cultural investment is 
also able to help lower any resistance that people may have in spending money on art. 
The artwork within the Gabba is a good example. According to Client 1 the artwork is 
able to serve as a cultural investment by being able to educate and help to spread the 
knowledge about the long sporting history of the Gabba.  
 
The Art Built-in projects are able to provide cultural benefits for Brisbane. The 
artwork is able to add to the culture of Brisbane through improving and enhancing the 
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feeling of Brisbane. An example is the comparison to artwork in Europe. Europe has 
an abundance of art and sculpture built throughout the cities and walkways. 
According to Client 3, “the artwork is everywhere, sculptures, paintings, large 
massive towers, the exciting artwork you can look at, paintings and read the words”. 
This level of artwork is something missing in Brisbane. The artwork at the Old 
Museum helps to achieve something similar. The artwork is able to improve the 
culture of Brisbane by providing a rich and interesting atmosphere for the place. The 
Interviewee recognised that the enhancement of Brisbane’s culture will take a long 
time, but it will happen through public policies such as the Art Built- in policy. 
 
According to Client 5, the artwork is ‘good’ for Brisbane and provides an escape from 
the overcrowding of advertising within the city. Brisbane is in danger of being over 
run with ‘advertising clatter’. The artwork provides an aesthetic benefit that should be 
overtaken by advertising.  
 
Community benefits also include the future economic benefits from tourism. The 
artwork is able to provide a mechanism to attract tourism. The artwork works as a 
tourism attraction because it is not only serves as culturally significant but also 
provides a free public attraction. For example, when complete the Old Museum 
project will be able to be a tourist attraction once again. The Old Museum will be able 
to hold concerts and be able to bring back the old ‘ambience’ of the place.  
 
An example of community benefits is the community at an emergency services 
station. The local community have developed community pride for their new 
emergency services station, and consider the art beautiful. The artwork can benefit the 
community, as it is designed to be seen from both directions of traffic. As described 
by Client 4 “For the community, obviously they are very proud of their local new 
station and area head office, and as far as the artwork goes, sitting out the front when 
it is working, it is lit up and they have got this pretty idealistic emergency services 
worker, seen from both directions by traffic in their community”.  
 
Potential benefits  
The Art Built-in policy has the potential to provide a source for publicity. For 
example, a ceremony to mark the artwork unveiling would provide positive media 
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potential. Also according to Client 3, positive media has the potential to combat any 
negative reaction to the buildings redevelopment regarding any issues that the money 
should not be spent on a building that offers no returns. Relevant artwork is important 
to connect to the building to avoid negative public perception. 
 
The Old Museum is a good example of the artwork providing a source for positive 
media for the Art Built-in client, because it is a different kind of public building, 
given that it does not have the same financial returns as other public buildings because 
it is mostly used by charity organisations. Therefore, the positive media helps to 
combat any negative reaction to the re-development regarding any issues that the 
money should not be spent on a building that offers no returns.  
 
Also, other potential benefits that may be gained from the artwork include the 
potential to bring new people into the buildings, the potential to create behind the 
scenes tours and the potential to use the Art Built-in artwork as a launch point for 
other memorabilia. According to Client 2, memorabilia can contribute to the 
experience of coming to the ground. The increase of artwork has potential for tours 
attractions beyond sporting games.  All the potential benefits can lead to economic 
benefits through increased tourism.  
 
Personal Benefits  
Personal benefits include the enjoyment from a fun project, enjoyment from working 
on interesting and challenging projects, benefits from the chance to work with 
different people, and the opportunity to diversify the Clients CV from working on a 
big project and the enjoyment of working on interesting and challenging projects. 
 
Personal benefits included the enjoyment of a fun project and from the chance to deal 
with different people such as artists. As described by Client 2 “One of the main 
benefits was getting to meet some of the artists from a different walk of life. For 
example, one of the guys we worked with, I’ve seen him pop up in the Courier Mail 
previously, and I’ve learned a bit more about him through the work he has done, and 
industrial design and furniture that he has made. From that on a personal level, it is 
interesting to deal with different people, and seeing the work they are producing. I 
find it interesting, it adds a bit of colour to the week”.  
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Client 4 was also able to benefit from the Art Built-in project. The Interviewee 
enjoyed the opportunity to be part of the biggest, newest and most modern in design 
and IT capabilities in the area.  
 
Benefits According to Curators 
According to the curator, the Art Built-in policy is able to provide benefits for the 
building, the artists, the community, and also personal benefits for the interviewee.  
 
Building benefits  
The building is able to benefit from the artwork attracting people to the building. The 
artwork can attract people if the artwork is interesting, relevant and connected to the 
building. The artwork will impact on the building if it is site specific.  
 
The Old Museum Project is a good example of artwork that was able to impact the 
building, or has the potential to impact once the renovations are finished. The artists 
working on the Old Museum created an artwork that was site specific to the Old 
Museum, including the history, occupiers and users of the building when designing 
the artwork. As described by the Curator 1 “Also I think the Old Museum Project 
artwork attracts people to the building, because it is illuminated and there is sound, 
and people can see that in passing, in cars or pedestrians, which could bring them in to 
the site”. 
 
Artist benefits  
Artists are able to learn new skills such as project management skills. This is 
particularly important for new artist who lack experience. The artists also gain 
recognition and the opportunity to practice their art, with the projects forming an 
extension to their private practice. The relationship building between artists in 
collaborative work teams was another benefit.   
 
Community benefits  
The community was able to benefit from the educational functions of the multi-
layered artwork. Multi-layered artwork can be read on different levels and each 
viewing can reveal a different aspect of the artwork. Artwork can be educational. 
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Multilayered artwork is able to be viewed several times with ongoing learning and the 
artwork is able to educate about history of the building.  
 
Personal benefits  
The Old Museum project was also a personally rewarding experience for the 
Interviewee. Benefits for the interviewee included the enjoyment from working on an 
interesting project outside the gallery and also the opportunity to develop their 
research and writing skills. Research and writing were required to complete the 
project brief and expression of interest documents.  
 
 
Benefits According to Project managers  
According to the Project Manager, the Art Built-in policy is able to provide benefits 
for the Artists, the building, the Client and the community which includes community 
engagement benefits.  
 
Artist benefits  
Artists benefit from the Art Built-in projects through financial and economic gains, 
achieve artistic recognition, help to launch careers, the opportunity to have a large 
public work space, the opportunity to have own project, and also gain career 
development opportunities, such as exhibition practices and project management.  
 
Artist benefits also include the opportunity to work with and learn about new 
materials. For example, the artist works with building materials that they have not 
used before. As a result the artist can invent or discover new ways of working with 
the material that the building, client or DPW did not know about or have nor 
previously discovered. As described by Project Manager 1 “It is great to see an artist 
expand their exhibition practice into a different arena, by giving artists a new 
opportunities and  a budget it can help to launch their careers, as artists can get known 
for their artwork in a public space”.  
 
Building benefits 
The building can also benefit from the Art Built-in artwork. The artwork can help 
people connect with the building. The artwork can also become educational, for 
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example teaching history of the building with especially for example heritage 
buildings projects. As described by Project Manager 1 “People visiting the heritage 
building will appreciate the architecture, the landscaping, and the artwork which is 
educational. Public artwork at a heritage building can contain a lot of information 
about the building’s use.  
 
The artwork can be used to help the building achieve or enhance its environmental 
quote. For example, art can be used to create a six green star building. Art used within 
the building or landscape can help to increase the building’s environmental qualities. 
 
Client benefits  
The artwork provides benefits to the client by being a tool within their marketing 
campaigns. The artwork is able to help with the client marketing campaigns by 
providing an attractive point of interest.  
 
Community benefits  
The wider community is able to benefit from the Art Built-in projects through the 
educational role of the artwork. Art serves as community education by being able to 
educate the community about the history of the building, the community or the place. 
The artwork can also enhance community connection. For example the Thursday 
Island Court House project. The artwork at the Thursday Island Court House made a 
deep connection with the people visiting and attending the courts house, people 
showing emotion to the impact of the artwork. The artwork has also been able to 
attract people to the Court House who would otherwise not attend. A similar example 
is Brisbane Magistrates Court House.   
 
The community also benefits from being confronted with artwork on a day to day 
basis. As described by Project Manager 1 “I think that is good anyway, just for the 
general population to be confronted with artwork consistently from day to day”. 
 
The artwork also provides benefits for the community as a community asset. For 
example an artwork is able to provide the community with assets through 
photographic and video art. The photographic and video art becomes a historical 
representation of that time. Therefore the video or sound used within the art should 
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not be updated, as the artwork is an asset in itself. As described by Project Manager 1 
“For example, it is still difficult to convince Public Art clients that photography and 
video artwork is an asset. Both these artforms have become seen as an investment by 
art collectors, for example a video artwork just recently went up for auction at 
Sotheby’s. However, there is a deception that video artwork needs to be like a website 
or a TV screen that it’s context has to keep changing. This is an example of an 
ongoing issue, there is the arts industry movements to consider and the public 
perceptions that you need to be sensitive to as well”.  
 
Community engagement benefits  
Art Built-in project can help foster community engagement. As described by the 
Project Manager 1 “Community engagement is something that we do through the 
development of our projects, for example including stakeholders like heritage groups 
so they have their say, especially when it is changing and they are not happy about 
what is proposed; having the community involvement can really help”. 
 
Benefits According to Policy officers 
According to Policy officers in Queensland, there are a number of benefits from the 
Art Built-In policy. According to Queensland policy officers while some specific 
pieces of public art may not have worked out: 
“the policy framework has been successful and is working incrementally to  
advocate and advance policy within government, and to manage risk on behalf 
of government. Policy has been successful overall and has been adopted by 
local governments and private developers” 
 
The specific benefits of the Art Built-In policy identified by Queensland Policy 
Officers include: 
 
Benefits for Artists 
The main benefits for the artists are to provide employment and income for artists. A 
secondary benefit was the skills improvement for artists (both artistic and business 
skills).  
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However, the policy also brokered a wider set of relationships for the artist which 
would not have come into contact otherwise (e.g. Manufacturers, architects and 
designers). This provides an opportunity for involvement of the supply chain in arts 
projects – which adds something to their business. The initial public art work also has 
a knock on effect – successful completion of the initial art work leads to work in other 
states in Australia, and overseas – including one Brisbane firm which now has 
numerous international projects.   
 
Benefits for the Building  
Benefits of specific art projects for specific buildings was not discussed due to focus 
on wider policy settings, however, the policy officers noted an overall improvement in 
the quality of public art pieces in Queensland. The policy officers also noted that 
placing public art in places like hospitals was valued by Health clients as it was 
perceived as resulting in reduced recovery times in hospitals.   
 
The building itself may receive media attention due to the iconic nature of the 
artwork. An example was given of some large art work which often features on news 
and events reporting concerning Brisbane. 
 
Client and Community Benefits 
The intent of the policy was to have a wide range of outcomes, These included: 
o Enhancing the public appreciation for the arts 
o Enhancing the standard of visual arts in Queensland  
o Promoting tourism and regional identity (e.g. large public art works which 
have begun to be used by visual media when reporting about Brisbane)  
o Promoting a sense of place 
o Respect for cultural heritage and enhancing cultural diversity 
o Providing a vehicle for community expression, Indigenous representation 
and the inclusion of young people 
o Diffusion of the policy as it is adopted by private firms, and local 
government  
 
 
Summary of Benefits  
  155
A number of benefits from the Art Built-in policy have been identified through the 
interview process. These are summarised in the Table below. 
Table: Benefits of the Art Built-in policy According to Key Stakeholder Groups  
Stakeholder group  Benefits  
Artists Personal benefits  
o the enjoyment of challenging projects  
o the satisfaction of working on a public building  
 
Artist benefits  
o exposure and recognition from public art 
o development of new skill set and also project 
management skills  
o relationship building between artists in collaborative 
work teams (unexpected)  
 
Cultural and community benefits  
o enriching community ambience 
o enriching people’s lives 
o educate the community 
o enrich public culture in Brisbane 
o and art can provide iconic features to the building 
which the community can enjoy 
  
Building benefits  
o artwork creating an environment for the building 
o educate about the building 
o also naming the site 
Client 
Representative 
Artist benefits   
o financial gains 
o opportunity to develop new skills, particularly in 
administration and project management 
o gain public recognition and exposure  
o generation of new jobs 
  
Building benefits  
o include storying telling and educational functions 
o the artwork can also add to the experience of the 
building visitors and to the enjoyment of the building 
inhabitants  
 
Community and cultural benefits  
o artwork as a cultural investment 
o art appreciation 
o add to atmosphere of Brisbane 
 
Potential benefits 
o Art Built-in providing a source of publicity 
o Positive media attention can combat any negative 
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public perception regarding financial cost of the 
artwork. 
o Also, artwork has potential for tourism and economic 
benefits from tourism   
 
Personal benefits  
o enjoyment from working on a fun and interesting 
project 
o Also benefited from working on a ‘big’ project  
Curators Building benefits  
o artwork attracting people to the building 
o Site specific artwork is the best at doing this 
 
Artist benefits  
o development of new skills such as project management 
o the opportunity to practice their art and extend their 
private practice 
o New Artist practically gains from the experience  
o relationship building between artists in collaborative 
work teams (unexpected)  
 
Community benefits  
o education functions of the multi-layered artwork  
 
Personal benefits  
o enjoyment of working on an interesting project outside 
a gallery 
Project Managers Artist benefits  
o financial and economic gains 
o achieve artistic recognition and help launch careers 
o Also career development opportunities 
o opportunity to have a large project 
 
Building benefits  
o educational functions of the artwork 
o artwork helping people connect to the building 
o Artwork potential to help the building achieve or 
enhance its environmental quote 
 
Client benefits  
o artwork acting as a tool in their marketing campaign  
    
Community benefits  
o artwork as a community asset 
o artwork educating about history of building and place 
o art appreciation 
o Also can foster community engagement 
Policy Officers Artist benefits   
o financial support  
o opportunity to develop new skills, particularly in 
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administration and project management 
o generation of new jobs interstate and overseas 
  
Building benefits  
o Enhanced recovery times in hospitals 
o Media opportunities for government   
 
Community and cultural benefits  
o Enhancing the public appreciation for the arts 
o Enhancing the standard of visual arts in Queensland  
o Promoting tourism and regional identity  
o Promoting a sense of place 
o Respect for cultural heritage and enhancing cultural 
diversity 
o Providing a vehicle for community expression, 
Indigenous representation and the inclusion of young 
people 
o Diffusion of the policy as it is adopted by private 
firms, and local government  
 
 
 
 
Summary of Costs and Benefits of the Art Built-in Policy in Queensland  
There area a number of recurrent themes in the interview of the Queensland Art Built-
in policy. Theses costs and benefits are summarised in the following table.  
 
Table: Overall Summary of the Costs and Benefits of the Qld Art Built-in Policy 
compared to the literature review.  
Qld Art Built-in outcomes  
Costs  Benefits  
Time (unexpected)  
o The additional time of the 
stakeholders was not expected. 
However the majority of 
interviewees did consider the 
extra time as important to 
developing a good outcome.  
Financial pressures (unexpected)  
Skill development demands (unexpected) 
% of the building costs (expected)  
Personal benefits for interviewees  
o enjoyment of a challenging 
process (unexpected)  
Artist benefits  
o exposure / recognition (expected)  
o skill development (expected) 
o financial and economic gains 
(expected)  
o career development opportunities 
(expected)  
o relationship building between 
artists in collaborative work teams 
(unexpected)  
Community benefits  
o artwork as a community asset 
(expected)  
o educational role of the artwork 
o community art appreciation 
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(expected)  
o enhance cultural atmosphere of 
Brisbane (expected) 
o provide iconic buildings for 
Brisbane (expected)  
o Enhancing the standard of visual 
arts in Queensland  (unexpected)  
o Promoting tourism and regional 
identity (expected)  
o Promoting a sense of place 
o Providing a vehicle for 
community expression, 
Indigenous representation and the 
inclusion of young people 
(unexpected)  
o Diffusion of the policy as it is 
adopted by private firms, and 
local government 
Building benefits  
o Attracting people to the building 
by helping people connect with 
the building (unexpected)  
o Enhancing the experience of 
building users (unexpected)  
o Artwork potential to help the 
building achieve or enhance its 
environmental (unexpected)  
o Enhanced enjoyment and work 
morale of building occupants 
(unexpected)  
Potential benefits  
o Source for potential  
positive media (unexpected)  
o Potential for tourism and tourism 
economic benefits (expected)  
 
 
WA Percent for Art policy and Qld Art Built-in Comparative Analysis 
When a comparative analysis of the costs and benefits identified in the literature 
review and the interviews undertaken in Western Australia and Queensland, there are 
a number of unexpected costs and unexpected benefits alongside those that were 
expected.  
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Those elements which were expected were clearly identified in either the literature 
review, or were predicted by the economic framework which has framed the analysis 
of these social policies. Those elements which are labelled ‘unexpected’ were not 
identified in the literature review, but rather are novel findings of the research project.  
 
The diagram below (Figure 14) illustrates the comparison between the expected and 
unexpected costs and benefits involved within the WA Percent for Art policy and the 
Qld Art Built-in policy. The expected costs and benefits are derived from the previous 
national and international Percent for Art policies and Art Built-in Policies, and the 
unexpected outcomes have been derived from the WA Percent for Art and Qld Art 
Built-in research findings.    
 
Expected and Unexpected WA Percent for Art Outcomes  
Globerman and Vining (1996) proposed in their framework that contracting in a 
situation which comprised information asymmetries, externalities, high task 
complexity and high asset specificity was a high risk proposition. They proposed that 
the development of prototypes and the establishment of joint governance mechanisms 
were ways of coping with the complexity and minimising risk.  
 
The Western Australian policy required that each art project involved an initial 
submission of a number of concepts or ideas, which were then short listed to prepare 
detailed prototypes of the actual final artwork. This correlates with the proposition 
advocated by Globerman and Vinning (1996) that joint governance be incorporated 
into the procurement process.  
 
The other interesting element in the Western Australian policy was that it ensured 
adequate representation of stakeholders in the development of the artwork for a 
specific building. This strategy overcame the difficulties noted in the literature review 
concerning the ownership of the art by the intended audience, and the difficulties in 
specifying outcomes in contracts. In so doing, another cost was introduced into the 
process – that of expenditure of time, which was mentioned by every stakeholder 
group. What is interesting here though is that this cost was not considered significant 
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– and simply part of the process in ensuring there was a good outcome for all 
involved. In other words the indirect costs of the involvement of representatives of the 
community in the planning and delivery of the public art work ensured that the 
externalities were positive in the delivery of a highly specific public asset.  
 
Expected and Unexpected Queensland Art Built-in Policy   
Interesting costs (different to WA %Art)  
o Although the time is a burden, the extra time and effort helped to 
develop closer working relationships  
o The cost of administration was seen to be slightly higher than in 
Western Australia – partially due to the competitive tendering 
arrangements which applied at smaller project amounts (this has been 
addressed in new policy however)  
 
Interesting benefits (different to WA %Art) 
o potential benefits, such as publicity and media coverage  
o Client benefits – use of project in marketing campaign. Demonstrates 
another different outcome from the Art Built-in projects  
o Some of the artists felt the remuneration in Queensland was lower than 
that in Western Australia, which may be due to the current policy 
threshold engaging at $100,000 which would result in quite small 
projects for artists. This is likely to be addressed in the new policy 
which provides for larger projects.  
o In Western Australia the emphasis was on permanent pieces of public 
art, whereas in Queensland ‘temporary’ public art works have been 
commissioned – which are seen to be particularly important medium of 
art which is often underfunded 
o a really interesting aspect – mentioned by the Project Manager – was 
the Artwork potential to help the building environmental impact 
o While Western Australia also noted that artists gained additional work 
out of the existing projects, in Queensland one company had managed 
to gain very large contracts internationally.  
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Globerman and Vining (1996) proposed in their framework that contracting in a 
situation which comprised information asymmetries, externalities, high task 
complexity and high asset specificity was a high risk proposition. They proposed that 
the development of prototypes and the establishment of joint governance mechanisms 
were ways of coping with the complexity and minimizing risk.  
 
In both Queensland and Western Australian policies each art project involved an 
initial submission of a number of concepts or ideas, which were then short listed to 
prepare detailed prototypes of the actual final artwork. The selection of the art work 
was undertaken by a group of diverse stakeholders who could include the clients, the 
users, architects, engineers, public works authorities and even wider community 
groups. This correlates with the proposition advocated by Globerman and Vinning 
(1996) that joint governance be incorporated into the procurement process.  
 
The other interesting element in the Queensland and Western Australian policies was 
the representation of stakeholders in the development of the artwork for a specific 
building. This strategy overcame the difficulties noted in the literature review 
concerning the ownership of the art by the intended audience, and the difficulties in 
specifying outcomes in contracts. In so doing, another cost was introduced into the 
process – that of expenditure of time, which was mentioned by every stakeholder 
group. What is interesting here though is that this cost was not considered significant 
– and simply part of the process in ensuring there was a good outcome for all 
involved. In economic terms the indirect costs of the involvement of representatives 
of the community in the planning and delivery of the public art work ensured that the 
externalities were positive in the delivery of a highly specific public asset.  
 
The case study on percent for art in Queensland and Western Australia, has thus 
demonstrated that principal agent theory and extensions such as those proposed by 
Globerman and Vining (1996) have considerable utility in the examination of the 
embedding of social outcomes in public works procurement.   
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Additionally, while numerous costs and benefits have been proposed by various 
proponents of public art and percent for art, these have now been largely validated 
through a specific empirical case study – Percent for Art policies in Queensland and 
in Western Australia.   
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Table: WA Percent for Art policy and Qld Art Built-in Comparative Analysis 
 
WA Percent for Art Policy Qld Art Built-in Policy 
Costs Benefits Costs Benefits 
Outcomes 
predicted from 
literature 
review, which 
were also 
found in this 
case study 
% of total building costs 
 
Policy threshold is for 
projects over $2million 
(optional below that) 
 
Time of volunteers, 
coordination time of 
government 
 
Poor art (only a couple were 
identified. Generally very 
high satisfaction rate)  
 
Artist economic benefit, and 
skill development, creative 
opportunities 
 
Building appearance  
 
Increased cultural tourism 
and local identity   
 
Enhanced appreciation of the 
arts in community 
 
Providing emotional 
satisfaction, social inclusion, 
and history 
% of the building costs 
(expected) 
 
Mandatory threshold for 
projects over $100,000.  
Artist benefits  
- exposure and recognition  
- skill development  
- financial and economic 
gains  
- career development  
 
Community benefits  
- artwork as a community 
asset  
- community art 
appreciation  
- enhance cultural 
atmosphere of Brisbane  
- provide iconic buildings 
for Brisbane  
 
Potential benefits for tourism 
and tourism economic 
benefits  
Novel  
findings from 
this case study 
As per literature review, plus: 
 
The need for art maintenance  
 
The competitive environment 
for artists 
As per literature review, plus:  
 
A fun experience for all those 
involved 
Artists:  
- Additional commissions 
As per literature review, plus: 
 
Time (unexpected)  
- The additional time of the 
stakeholders was not 
expected.  
As per literature review, plus: 
Personal benefits for 
interviewees  
- enjoyment of a 
challenging process  
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Learning curve for artists  
 
Time 
- Preparation of 
submissions / briefs 
- Travel 
- Coordination time 
- Client time  
 
(While time was mentioned 
as a cost most interviewees 
regarded this as time well 
spent) 
 
due to enhanced artist 
visibility  
- Income for subcontracted 
artists and suppliers to the 
main artist 
- Collaborations between 
artists and other artists, 
engineers and architects 
 
Buildings 
- Enhanced functionality 
and quality of buildings 
 
Community benefits 
- Increased ownership of 
public buildings 
- Enhanced access to public 
buildings 
 
Policy diffusion 
Adoption of percent art 
policy by local authorities 
and private developers 
- However the majority of 
interviewees did consider 
the extra time as 
important to developing a 
good outcome.  
 
Financial pressures  
 
Skill development demands  
 
 
Artist benefits  
- relationship building 
between artists in 
collaborative work teams  
- Leads to further work 
opportunities (including 
overseas)  
 
Community benefits  
- Educational role of the 
artwork  
 
Building benefits  
- Attracting people to the 
building  
- Enhancing the experience 
of building users  
- Artwork potential to help 
the building achieve or 
enhance environment  
- Enhance enjoyment and 
work morale of building 
occupants  
 
Potential benefits  
- Source for potential  
positive media attention 
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Summary of comparative analysis  
Figure 14: Costs and Benefits of Percent for Art: Comparison between the expected 
outcomes identified from the literature and additional outcomes from this  
case study 
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Conclusions  
 
The evidence that has been compiled on the leveraging of social outcomes on public 
construction projects raises substantial concerns about the net social benefits of many 
current interventions. Several interventions appear to involve a ‘light’ approach to the 
imposition of training or employment obligations on contractors. As such, they have 
the advantage of keeping administrative and additional contracting costs to a 
minimum. However, the positive impacts of the policy interventions on training and 
employment outcomes also appear to have been very small. 
 
The comparison of the policy approaches adopted in Queensland and Western 
Australia has yielded some insights into possible improvements. The positive 
assessment of the impact of the committee established to provide industry feedback 
on the 10% Training Policy in Queensland indicates that structures of this type could 
be important innovations in other jurisdictions and for other policies. The higher level 
of resourcing of Indigenous Employment Policies in Queensland – together with the 
adoption of employment and training targets for specific indigenous communities – 
appears to have been much more successful than the WA approach, based on tender 
preference. The resourcing of the Industry Capability Network in Queensland - 
together with the adoption of a flexible approach to the application of the Local 
Employment Policy – appears to have avoided many of the problems experienced 
with the WA Buy Local Policy.  
 
Generally, however, the project has highlighted that in the absence of strong industry 
commitment to policy objectives, policy interventions are likely to result in high 
levels of avoidance activity, substantial administrative costs and very few benefits. 
Thus, for policy action on, for example, training or local employment to be 
successful, compliance issues must be adequately addressed.  
 
It is important to note in contrast the percent for art policies reviewed here, which 
provided for extensive consultation in the implementation of the policy in specific 
projects. While this consultation necessitated considerable involvement of time, the 
net effect was to engage these stakeholders in active decision making processes 
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concerning the art in buildings, thereby minimising risk associated with such art, and 
enhancing the ownership of the building in the process, and delivering a range of 
perceived benefits to these key stakeholders as an outcome of the percent art process.  
Perhaps the alignment of consultative process, which addresses cost and risk 
associated with percent art projects, and the delivery of a tangible product, which was 
also seen to deliver a range of intangible benefits for key stakeholders in the building, 
meant that percent art policies were better received in comparison to other policies.  
 
Currently it appears that pre-qualification schemes (similar to the Priority Access 
Scheme) and schemes that rely on measuring, for example, the training investments of 
contractors within particular projects do not achieve high levels of compliance and 
involve significant administrative costs. Alternatives need to be developed to these 
policies. One possibility is a levy on each public construction project – set as a 
proportion of the total project costs. Although a full evaluation of this policy 
alternative was beyond the scope of the multi-outcomes construction policies project, 
it appears to offer the potential to minimize the transaction costs on contractors whilst 
enabling the creation of a training agency dedicated to improving the supply of skilled 
construction labour. A recommendation is thus made that this policy alternative – and 
the effectiveness of schemes, such as the Industry Training Fund in Queensland -  be 
fully researched and evaluated. 
 
The results of the multi-outcomes research project also highlight the need for 
sensitivity to project circumstances in the development and implementation of polices 
for public construction projects. As noted in the introduction, there is little perceived 
direct incentive for companies to train their staff, unless this results in defined benefits 
for their firm. In contrast, the percent art policies include a process of training and 
information sharing by art coordinators / art curators who discuss the benefits of the 
policy with key stakeholders, and engage these stakeholders in decision making about 
the solution.  
 
Ideally a training policy framework would have the flexibility to respond to 
circumstances where contractors share a commitment to the policy objectives and are 
able to identify measurable social outcomes from the particular government projects 
they are involved in. This would involve a project-by-project negotiation of goals and 
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performance measures. It is likely to only be practical for large, longer term projects, 
but could provide a way forward to achieve policy outcomes in a more negotiated 
manner. The key would be to identify benefits for the contractors and other 
stakeholders in the process.  
 
As a final observation, the results of the multi-outcomes project have also shown the 
potential for policy development in each State to be informed by the experiences of 
other jurisdictions. As Queensland and Western Australia share many similar 
economic and other characteristics, and have very similar social and economic goals, 
this potential is especially large. Thus, it can be expected that there will be ongoing 
collaborations between the State governments on research aimed at further improving 
training and employment outcomes via public construction projects. 
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Appendix A: Summary of interviews for percent for art  
 
Stakeholder 
group 
Interviewee Number   Date of 
interview  
Type of 
interview 
Art Coordinator  Art Coordinator 1   June 2007  Face to face  
Art Coordinator 2   June 2007 Face to face 
Art Coordinator 3  June 2007  Face to face 
Art Coordinator 4   November 2006  Face to face 
Art Coordinator 5   November 2006  Face to face 
Artist  Artist 1   June 2007  Face to face 
Artist 2   June 2007 Face to face 
Artist 3   June 2007  Face to face 
Building User 
Representative  
Building user representative 1   June 2007 Face to face 
Building user representative 2  June 2007 Face to face 
Building user representative 3  June 2007 Face to face 
Client 
Representative 
Client representative 3  November 2006  Face to face 
Client representative 4  November 2006  Face to face 
Client representative 5  November 2006  Face to face 
Client representative 6  November 2006  Face to face 
Client representative 7  November 2006  Face to face 
Client representative 1  June 2007 Face to face 
Client representative 2  June 2007 Face to face 
DHW Contract 
Manager 
DHW contract manager 1  June 2007 Face to face 
DHW contract manager 2   June 2007  Face to face 
DHW contract manager 3   June 2007 Face to face 
DHW contract manager 4   November 2006  Face to face 
DHW contract manager 5   November 2006  Face to face 
DHW Policy 
Officer  
DHW Policy Officer 1  June 2007 Face to face 
DHW Policy Officer 2   June 2007  Face to face 
DHW Policy Officer 3   June 2007 Face to face 
Project Architect Project Architect 1  June 2007 Face to face 
 
The following interviews have been conducted, however, at time of publication, feedback 
is still been gained on the interviews in order to include their perspectives in the research.   
 
Art Coordinator Art Coordinator 6 November 2007 Face to Face 
 Art Coordinator 7 November 2007 Face to Face 
 Art Coordinator 8 November 2007 Face to Face 
DWH Policy 
Officer  
DHW Policy Officer 4 November 2007 Face to Face  
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Appendix B: Summary of interviews for Art Built-in   
Stakeholder 
group 
Interviewee Number   Date of 
interview  
Type of 
interview 
Artists Artist 1 November 2007 Face to face 
Artist 2 December 2007 Face to face 
Artist 3 December 2007  Face to face 
Artist 4 December 2007 Face to face 
Artist 5  December 2007 Face to face 
Client 
Representative 
Client Representative 1  November 2007  Face to face  
Client Representative 2 November 2007 Face to face 
Client Representative 3 December 2007 Face to face 
Client Representative 4  December 2007 Face to face 
Client Representative 5 December 2007 Face to face 
Curators Curator 1 December 2007 Face to face 
Project Managers DPW Project Manager 1 October 2007  Face to face 
Arts Queensland  Policy Officers April 2008 Face to face  
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